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1.1 Introduction: 
Artificial intelligence is a branch of science associated with logic, 
psychology, dynamic system, philosophy, linguistics and computer science. It has 
also many important links with other fields. The ability to combine knowledge 
from all these fields will benefit a progress in the quest of creating an intelligent 
entity. Currently, artificial intelligence rather seems to concentrate itself on more 
inventive applications. However, towards enhancing these applications, more 
human features are needed to artificial intelligent agents and robotics (i.e., human 
emotions and action regulation).  
 Moreover, agent technology is a fast growing area of research in artificial 
intelligence. Intelligent agents are simply defined as the autonomous problem-
solving entities residing in an environment to solve problems. They automatically 
execute intelligent task by adaptation to changes in their environment and 
interaction with other agents. This technology is expected to become the next 
generation of software. In addition, robots and intelligent agents will soon be a part 
of our everyday lives. In general, it means that we can expect that robots and 
intelligent agents will act and react in many ways that a human can. According to 
Bradshaw (1997, p.3), the more intelligent the robot, the more capable of pursuing 
its own self-interest rather than its master’s. The more humanlike the robot, the 
more likely to exhibit human frailties and eccentricities.   
1.2 Dörnerians’ Approach: 
Cognitive Psychology considers psychic processes (i.e., thinking, learning 
and memory) as processes of information processing. There are a lot of theoretical 
systems which describe human thought as information processing. But how could 
one describe motivation and emotion in terms of information processing?  
Dörnerians’ approach can respond to such question because “Dörnerians” are 
interested in action regulation of man. Dörner and his co-workers developed PSI- 
theory that explained human action regulation in perspective of the interaction 
between emotions, motivations and cognition. In this theory, man is a motivated 
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emotional-cognitive system, not only a cognitive system in the sense of 
contemporary cognitive science. Bartl and Dörner (1998, p.1) noted that a single 
theory of cognitive processes does not succeed in explaining human behaviour.  
Furthermore, it is necessary to include assumptions about the dynamics of 
emotions and motivations. Computer programs were constructed to simulate the 
theoretical assumptions of PSI-theory (see: Dörner & Hille, 1995; Hille, 1997; 
Schaub, 1997). The PSI-theory is formulated completely in terms of the theory of 
neuronal networks (Bartl & Dörner, 1998, pp.1-2).  
 To understand the human ability to cope with complex and unknown 
realities, it is not only necessary to explore the cognitive system of man but also to 
investigate additionally the relationships between cognition, emotion, and 
motivation (see: Dörner & Hille, 1995, p.3828). Dörner’s theory describes the 
informational structure of an intelligent, motivated, emotional agent (PSI) which is 
able to survive in arbitrary domains of reality. This agent has different motives (i.e. 
need for energy, water, pain-avoidance, certainty and competence). The cognitive 
processes of this agent are modulated by emotional states and high mental 
processes (i.e. memory, planning, and thinking). The hypotheses of the theory are 
presented in mathematical form. It is shown that the theory enables the simulation 
of different forms of emotional behaviour found with subjects. (Dörner, 2003, p. 
75). 
1.3 Research Motivation: 
Computers are able to play chess, they are even much better in it than most 
people. Computers are also able to control a power plant. They are more reliable 
than man. However, one cannot expect from them either to make suggestions for 
improvement. They will never look for a better way to do their job than the 
programmed one. They will never change their program automatically in case of a 
sudden change of the environment. Artificial intelligence suffers from certain 
shortcomings. Furthermore, the systems of artificial intelligence are rigid and 
domain specific. They are not able to adapt their behaviour to the conditions of the 
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current situation (Dörner & Hille, 1995, p.3828). We are particularly interested in 
how the artificial robot performs with respect to the human character. We model 
human thinking, as an example for a mental process, on a computer and see if our 
theory is correct (ibid). We believe that the robot’s behaviour or performance will 
lead to a high achievement like human. Thus, this research takes a closer look to 
apply PSI-theory to simulate different characters.  For this purpose, an experiment 
was constructed followed by simulating the experiment’s results. This research is 
situated within a larger project with the ultimate goal of developing an intelligent 
robot that exhibits and simulates high mental cognitive processes and interacts 
socially and verbally like human manner. 
1.4 Research Domain: 
Wagman (1993, p.1) argued that the augmentation of intelligence in 
computers may be achieved by two general methods or a combination of methods. 
In the first general method, the computer models the cognitive processes of human 
intellect. Augmentation of computer intelligence through this method requires the 
continuous expansion of reliable and valid knowledge concerning human cognitive 
processes. In the second general method, the intelligence of the computer models 
formal logical structures and processes. Augmentation of computer intelligence 
through this method requires the continuous expansion of reliable and valid 
knowledge concerning the theory and application of systems of logic and 
coordinated sets of programming languages.  
 Computer games offer interesting and challenging environments for many, 
more isolated, research problems in artificial intelligence (Laird & van Lent, 2000, 
p.1178).  For example, placing agents into a game environment offers interesting 
and challenging environments for research problems in artificial intelligence. This 
study was designed and carried out to contribute towards our vision of the future of 
simulating cognitive processes. 
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1.5 Research Questions and Hypotheses: 
The main purposes of the current dissertation are to determine whether PSI-
agent (and of course the theory behind the agent) can simulate different strategies 
in an uncertain complex problem environment that has multi-goals and can PSI-
agent simulate single cases. For that aims we used the scenario island-game to 
compare the behaviour of PSI with the behaviour of experimental subjects. We 
assume that human participants in our experiment are subject to certain cognitive 
and motivational processes. The current research will attempt to answer and to 
investigate the following questions and hypotheses: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1: Questions and hypotheses. 
Questions and Hypotheses 
 What is the state of PSI-agent’s behaviour in corresponding to agent criteria? 
 Can PSI-agent simulate all the different action strategies that can be found 
with man? 
 It is possible to simulate the behaviour of individual human beings by PSI-
agent. 
 How can we improve the PSI-agent respectively to the theory behind the 
agent? 
The method used to resolve the questions of this research consists of both 
psychological experiment and computer simulation that simulate the different 
action strategies found in the experiment by using PSI-agent. The method that 
used to analyze the results of the experiment is based on both qualitative and 
quantitative analyzation of the participants’ behaviour in island-game. 
To investigate our questions and hypotheses, we will do the following 
steps: Firstly, we will give an overview about the architecture of the PSI-theory 
and the underlying theoretical assumptions. Secondly, we will describe the 
scenario “island–game” and the experimental design. Thirdly results of the 
experiment will be discussed and explained in perspective of concepts of the PSI-
theory. Fourthly, we will simulate subjects’ strategies and two single cases by 
PSI-agent. Finally we will discuss results of the simulation and give some hints 
towards improving and elaborating the PSI model of action regulation. 
Chapter One: Introduction. 
 
21 
1.6 Organization of the Dissertation: 
The dissertation consists of six chapters and the literature is organized in a 
hierarchy structure. We will first present the framework of artificial intelligence 
and simulation environment and then identify agent components to highlight the 
desired features in agent architectures 
for the tasks and environments. Next, 
we will present PSI-theory as an 
example of intelligent architecture that 
is used to simulate human motivations, 
emotions and cognitive processes (see 
figure 1.1). Method, simulation, results 
and discussion chapters are organized 
in a hierarchy structure too. These 
chapters are organized as the 
following: 
Chapter One: 
Chapter one has been an introductory chapter. It has introduced the main 
problem area that the dissertation addresses and a background to the work in the 
dissertation. Research motivation, domain and research questions have been also 
demonstrated.  
Chapter Two: 
Chapter Two will present an overview of the framework of artificial 
intelligence and simulation. It will provide a more detailed discussion of various 
aspects and definitions of the artificial intelligence field. Moreover, goals, basic 
terminology, characteristics, advantages, benefits and applications of the field will 
be discussed. Neural networks and expert systems will be reviewed. Finally, we 
will describe the field of simulation together with types of simulations and 
simulation environments. 
 
Artificial Intelligence 
Agents 
PSI 
Figure 1.1: 
Organization of Literature. 
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Chapter Three: 
Chapter Three presents approaches for agent design and specifies which 
basic components and features must be present in an agent generally and cognitive 
agent especially. It will also outline the characteristics and difficulties face agents, 
and the types of agents. Finally, this chapter states the desirable properties and 
criteria that an intelligent system or agent must have.   
Chapter Four: 
Chapter four gives a review of PSI’s architecture and the underlying 
philosophy behind the architecture that is the basis for the later chapters in the 
dissertation, presenting its several aspects, its various components, 
implementations and problem domain that PSI’s architecture is designed for it. 
Moreover, related work and description of PSI’s action and behaviour is also 
reviewed. 
Chapter Five: 
Chapter five describes the experimental set-up, materials, apparatus, 
instructions and experimental design and procedure. Furthermore, results of the 
experiment and procedures that were used to analyze subjects’ strategies during 
the experiment will be explained. 
Chapter Six: 
The intention of this chapter is to see if we have achieved our goals of 
simulating different strategies. Thus, chapter six gets to the central questions of the 
dissertation, shows both the simulation of different strategies that had found and 
the simulation of two different single cases. Moreover, an evaluation for PSI’s 
agent determined by agent criteria to estimate PSI’s action and behaviour is also 
reviewed. Discussion, suggestions, argumentations, work in progress, future work 
and contributions to PSI theory and research will be also shown to see if the ideas 
worked and where can things be improved. Such data could provide a 
consequential contribution to enhance and develop our PSI-theory.  
 
Chapter       
Artificial Intelligence & Simulation 
 
  
 
 
Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the framework of artificial 
intelligence. In section 2.1, we will provide a general description and definition of 
the artificial intelligence field. As well, goals and applications of the field will be 
demonstrated. Finally, basic artificial intelligence terminology such as Schemata, 
Algorithms and heuristics will be shown. In section 2.2, description, definitions, 
characteristics, advantages, benefits and applications of expert systems will be 
discussed. Neural networks and connectionist framework will be reviewed in 
section 2.3. Moreover, fundamentals and characteristics of connectionist system, 
classification, benefits, advantages and problems face the field of artificial neural 
networks will be reviewed in this section too. Section 2.4 will briefly summarize 
differences between expert systems and artificial neural networks. Finally, in 
section 2.5, we will describe the field of simulation. Furthermore, description, 
advantages and disadvantages of simulation will be discussed together with types 
of simulations and simulation environments. 
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2.1 Artificial Intelligence 
2.1.1 Description of the field:  
In general, artificial intelligence is a branch of science that enables 
computers to solve problems, learn from experience, recognize patterns in large 
amounts of complex data and make complex decisions based on human knowledge 
and reasoning skills. Additionally, artificial intelligence is constructing programs 
that can learn from their environment and respond to previously un-encountered 
situations in appropriate ways. Artificial intelligence searches the type of problems 
that cannot be solved with traditional algorithmic techniques. These are often 
problems in which quality is more important than the quantitative aspects. 
Therefore, artificial intelligence is concerned with qualitative rather than 
quantitative problem solving, with reasoning rather than calculation, with 
organizing large and varied amounts of knowledge rather than implementing a 
single well-defined algorithm.  
Artificial intelligence is often divided into two major classes: strong 
artificial intelligence and weak artificial intelligence. In general, strong artificial 
intelligence argues that it is possible that one day a computer will be invented 
which can be called a mind in the fullest sense of the word. In other words, it can 
think, reason, imagine, etc., and do all the things that we currently associate with 
the human brain. Weak artificial intelligence, on the other hand, argues that 
machines can act as if they are intelligent and computers can only appear to think 
and are not actually conscious in the same way as human brains are. Strong 
artificial intelligence deals with the creation of some form of computer-based 
artificial intelligence that can truly reason and solve problems; a strong form of 
artificial intelligence is said to be sentient or self-aware. Moreover, strong artificial 
intelligence states that a computer with the right program would be mental.  In 
contrast, weak artificial intelligence deals with the creation of some form of 
computer-based artificial intelligence that cannot truly reason and solve problems; 
such a machine would, in some ways, act as if it is intelligent, but it would not 
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possess true intelligence or sentience. Furthermore, weak artificial intelligence just 
aims to solve problems not necessarily to be mental or model human behaviour. 
Strong artificial intelligence is trying to construct algorithms to find 
solutions to complex problems in a more human-like method and redefines 
intelligence to include more than just the ability to solve complex tasks or simply 
convince observers that such a quality exists within a system. Strong artificial 
intelligence rests upon the principle that complex machine systems such as neural 
networks are capable of establishing connections between different sets of data 
which were not previously programmed into the system. Therefore, from the strong 
artificial intelligence’ point of view,  systems that begin and continue to learn, 
creating and building a knowledge base have the ability to exhibit intelligent 
behaviour. 
 On the other hand, weak artificial intelligence is trying to construct 
programs that able to solve the problem regardless of the way it is achieved and 
whether or not the outcome is done in a human manner. Weak artificial 
intelligence is the science of incorporating “intelligent” aspects into non-intelligent 
systems to make them function at a higher, more efficient level. At this point, 
Intelligence is in quotes because the computer or program is not intelligent, it 
merely appears that way because of the sophistication of modern program design. 
For example a program may guess what the user is attempting to do or type 
because the previous attempts have been stored in memory.        
While weak artificial intelligence provides us with cool little toys and 
makes our lives a little bit easier, it is not nearly as interesting as strong artificial 
intelligence. Strong artificial intelligence is the theory that it is possible to create a 
machine that can function at or at a higher level than humans in many-to-every 
aspect of life. 
 
                                                 

 For further details about strong and weak artificial intelligence see: (Rich &    
   Knight, 1991; Russell & Norvig, 1995). 
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2.1.2 Definitions of artificial intelligence: 
Russell and Norving (1995, p.5) introduced definitions of artificial 
intelligence according to eight recent textbooks as shown in “table 2.1”. 
 
Russel and Norvig (ibid, pp.5-8) classified different definitions for artificial 
intelligence by distinguishing the behaviour of the system (acting vs. thinking) and 
the way it behaves (human vs. rational). This distinction leads to four different 
approaches to artificial intelligence: 
Table 2.1: Definitions of artificial intelligence. 
Source: (Russell & Norving, 1995, p. 5). 
Systems that think rationally 
“The study of mental faculties 
through the views of computational 
models” (Charniak and McDermott, 
1985). 
“The study of computations that make 
it possible to perceive reason and act” 
(Winston, 1992). 
 
Systems that think like humans 
“The exciting new effort to make 
computers think… machines with 
minds, in the full and literal sense” 
(Haugeland, 1985). “[The automation 
of] activities that we associate with 
human thinking, activities such as 
decision making, problem solving, 
learning…etc.”(Bellman, 1978). 
Systems that act rationally 
“A field of study that seeks to explain 
and emulate intelligent behaviour in 
terms of computational processes” 
(Schalkoff, 1990). 
“The branch of computer science that 
is concerned with the automation of 
intelligent behaviour” (Luger and 
Stubblefield, 1993). 
Systems that act like humans 
“The art of creating machines that 
perform functions that require 
intelligence when performed by 
people”  (Kurzweil, 1990). 
“The study of how to make computers 
do things at which, at the moment, 
people are better” (Rick and Knight, 
1991). 
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•   Acting humanly: The “Turing-test” approach 
This category is basically the area where the “Turing-test” can be applied to test 
the human characteristics of a program. This test consists of four main aspects:  
 Natural Language Processing to enable it to communicate successfully in 
English (or some other human language); 
 Knowledge Representation to store information provided before or during 
the interrogation; 
 Automated Reasoning to use the stored information to answer questions and 
to draw new conclusions; 
 Machine Learning to adapt to new circumstances and to detect and 
extrapolate patterns. 
One should note that this test does not test the physical abilities. This is done by 
the total “Turing-test” which only works in connection with computer vision and 
robotics. 
•   Thinking humanly: The cognitive modelling approach 
This category can also be covered by the field of cognitive science, which brings 
together computer models from AI and experimental techniques from psychology. 
Here, the goal is to imitate human thinking as closely as possible. It is not only the 
solution of a problem which is interesting, but how the program achieves this 
solution. 
•   Thinking rationally: The laws of thought approach 
This field of AI is based on the Greek philosopher “Aristotle” who was one of the 
first to codify “right thinking”. His famous syllogisms - for example, “Socrates is a 
man; all men are mortal; therefore Socrates is mortal.”- (that had led later to the 
field of logic). There are two main obstacles pointed out here: 
 Firstly, it is not easy to handle uncertain things (which obviously do exist in 
our world). 
 Secondly, there is a big difference between being able to solve a problem in 
principle and doing so in practice. 
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•   Acting rationally: The rational agent approach 
Acting rationally means acting so as to achieve one’s goals, given one’s beliefs. 
According to “Russel” and “Norvig”, the last category leads therefore towards a 
rational agent approach. In general, an agent is something that perceives and acts. 
Correct inference from the last category is only a part of a rational agent, because 
one way to act rationally is to reason logically to the conclusion that a given action 
will achieve one’s goals, and then to act on that conclusion.  
On the other hand, correct inference is not all of rationality; because there 
are often situations where there is no provably correct thing to do, yet something 
must still be done. There are also ways of acting rationally that cannot be 
reasonably said to involve inference. For example, pulling one’s hand off of a hot 
stove is a reflex action that is more successful than a slower action taken after 
careful deliberation. 
2.1.3 Goals of artificial intelligence: 
Computers with some intelligence can be very useful for a number of 
purposes. For instance, they can help humans to reach decisions (task support) and 
they can perform tasks for a user without direct supervision. The goal of artificial 
intelligence is the design of systems that behave intelligently (Pollack, 1992). 
Moreover, the development of autonomous intelligent systems has been a primary 
goal of artificial intelligence (Wallace & Laird, 1999, p.117). Furthermore, 
artificial intelligence started as a field whose goal was to replicate human-level 
intelligence in a machine (Brooks, 1997, p. 395).  
Therefore, the goal of artificial intelligence is often stated in terms of 
understanding intelligent behaviour in order to build adaptive intelligent systems 
or autonomous agencies, which have their internal goal-structure and external 
behaviour that generally serves to achieve a goal and to operate independently 
                                                 

 For further details about artificial intelligence and cognitive architectures see:  
    (Doyle & Dean, 1996; Chandrasekaran & Josephson, 1994; Gellatly, 1986). 
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from designers. And their performances on these tasks should be considered in 
somewhat intelligent by giving the principles that make intelligence possible. 
Concisely, one can say that the goal of artificial intelligence is designing computer 
systems that can perceive; learn; solve problems; make plans and can effectively 
imitate high-order human behaviour. 
2.1.4 Applications of artificial intelligence: 
There are many interesting applications in artificial intelligence, including: 
games, mathematics, intelligent agents, language translation, robotic surgery, 
scheduling systems, travel planning systems, package design, financial 
management systems, decision trees, routing diagrams, drive cars, recognize 
handwriting and spoken speech, and control factories. Briefly, some applications 
that are described by Watson and Blackstone (1989, p.449) as follow: 
• Robotics:  
Robotics involves the creation of machines that can move and relate to 
objects as humans can. The most frequent uses of robots include picking up items 
and placing them elsewhere, loading machines with items, performing repeated 
tasks such as welding, painting and assembling parts into a whole. 
• Vision systems:  
Vision systems provide machines with the ability to perceive using a camera 
connected to a computer. The image recorded by the camera is divided into many 
squares; each square is assigned a number depending on the intensity of its light 
reflection. These patterns are then compared against electronic templates of objects 
to determine the identity of the object. Some useful programs can work solely in 
two dimensions, but full computer vision requires partial three-dimensional 
information that is not just a set of two-dimensional views. In particular, computer 
vision is trying to build a system that can see as well as a human. 
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• Natural language processing:  
Natural language processing focuses on machines understanding and 
responding to human commands. This important and heavily investigated artificial 
intelligence area has seen only limited results because human speech is highly 
context-dependent and ambiguous. Moreover, the field of natural language 
understanding tries to interpret human language to something a computer can 
understand and manipulate. The applications of this field are useful not only for 
testing theory on how human languages work but also to fit computers with more 
natural means of communication with humans.  
• Chess programs:  
For many years now, computer experts have been writing chess-playing 
programs with the aim of producing something which no human could beat. Chess 
is a challenge for programmers because its basic rules are so simple and well-
defined and yet there is almost no limit to the refinement of chess skill (Sloboda, 
1986, p. 206). Additionally, because chess program cannot compute all possible 
combinations, it is usually sufficient to combine three essential operations: 
a. Generate static lists of legal moves. 
b. Assess the value of a particular series of moves by means of evaluation 
functions that is assign numeric values to each given board position  (there are 
four basic chess values that a computer must consider before deciding on a 
move: material, position, king safety and tempo). 
c. Choose the move that yields the highest value.  
2.1.5 Basic concepts of artificial intelligence:  
In this section, the basic concepts of artificial intelligence that will be 
frequently used in the following chapters will be discussed. 
• Schemata: 
This concept goes back at least to ‘Kant’ as a description of mental concepts 
and mental categories (Smolensky, 1989, p.248). Schemata appear in many AI 
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systems in the forms of frames, scripts, or similar structures; they are prepackaged 
bundles of information that support inference in stereotyped situations (ibid,   
p.248). Thus, a schema is a configuration of knowledge about objects and events, 
including general information (Haberlandt, 1994, p. 147).  
• Characteristics of schemata:  
The schema expresses typical 
information, not the unique features 
of a specific office, as an example. 
A schema usually includes sub-
schemas; each of the objects in the 
office may be viewed as a schema.  
Schemas for physical objects like 
room, desk, and house are known as 
frames. Schemas for events are 
known as scripts.  
• Algorithms and heuristics: 
Anderson (1989, p.44) showed that the algorithms approach and the 
heuristics approach are broadly speaking sorts of strategy that may be employed in 
programming a computer to play games. Heuristic programming uses heuristics 
rules drawn from experience to solve problems. This is in contrast to algorithmic 
programming, which is based on mathematically provable procedures. Self-
learning and getting better with experience characterize heuristic programming.  
 For some problems there is a known solution procedure which, if properly 
executed, guarantees a correct answer. Such procedures are known as algorithms. 
Most problems, however, cannot be cracked algorithmically, or if there is an 
algorithm it may be lengthy and difficult to operate. In such cases we usually grope 
our way towards a solution by calling upon various rules of thumb which go under 
the name of heuristics (Sloboda, 1986, p.177). 
 
Table 2.2: Features of schemas. 
Features of schemas: 
Rumelhart and Ortony (through: 
Haberlandt, 1994, p. 147) list four basic 
features of schemas: 
• A schema has variables. 
• Schemas can include other schemas. 
• Schemas vary in their abstractness.  
• Schemas are flexible.  
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• Description of algorithms: 
An algorithm is a procedure which guarantees a solution for members of 
some problem class. For instance, most of us learned algorithms for solving long 
multiplication when we were at school. If one follows all the steps in the right 
order and makes no calculation errors then one always ends up with the right 
answer (Sloboda, 1986, p. 206). Therefore, one can program the machine to try all 
the possible moves in a game one after another until it comes up with the optimum 
move in any particular situation (Anderson, 1989, p.44).  However, many 
important computational problems can be solved algorithmically. But many others 
cannot, for theoretical or practical reasons (Haugeland, 1996, p.13). Generally, an 
algorithm is suitable for situations where the number of moves and variables to 
consider (and hence calculations to perform) is relatively small (Anderson, 1989, 
p.45). 
Sloboda (1986, p. 206) discussed the relationship between algorithm and 
chess by discussing the following question:  “Is there an algorithm for chess? well, 
in theory there is. It involves considering each alternative move, then each possible 
reply by your opponent, then each possible reply you could make, and so on, until 
you had explored the consequences of every possible move right through to the 
point where one or other player won. You would then choose the move associated 
with the largest number of winning outcomes.  
Unfortunately, such an algorithm is unworkable. Someone has calculated 
that there are more possible chess games than there are atoms in the universe. Even 
if one only looked five moves ahead one would have to consider up to 50,000,000 
different combinations of moves. It would probably take even the fastest existing 
computer with unlimited storage space, several million years to play a game of 
chess using such an algorithm.” 
• Description of heuristics: 
George Polya (see: Luger & Stubblefield, 1989, p. 149) defines heuristic as: 
“the study of the methods and rules of discovery and invention“. This meaning can 
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be traced to the term’s Greek root, the verb “eurisco”, which means “I discover”. 
When “Archimedes” emerged from his famous bath, he shouted “Eureka!”- 
meaning “I have found it!”.  
In order to reduce the search space in problems (such as chess), what one 
usually needs are heuristics. These are like rules of thumb which have a reasonable 
probability of producing acceptable results. It is pretty clear that human problem-
solving normally proceeds with a large helping of heuristics, and such heuristics 
are the usual stock in trade of coaches (Sloboda, 1986, pp. 206-207). In the case of 
chess, sensible heuristics involve looking ahead a few moves in various directions 
and then evaluating factors like number and kind of pieces, mobility, control of the 
center, pawn coordination, and so on. These are not infallible measures of the 
strength of chess positions; but, in combination, they can be pretty good. This is 
how chess-playing computers work—and likewise many other machines that deal 
with problems for which there are no known algorithmic solutions 
(Haugeland,1996,p.14).  
Luger and Stubblefield (1989, pp. 149-150) showed that Al problem solvers 
employ heuristics in two basic situations: 
1- A problem may not have an exact solution because of inherent ambiguities in 
the problem statement or available data. Medical diagnosis is an example of 
this. A given set of symptoms may have several possible causes; doctors use 
heuristics to choose the most likely diagnosis and formulate a plan of 
treatment. 
2- A problem may have an exact solution, but the computational cost of finding 
it may be prohibitive.  
• Characteristics of heuristics: 
1- Many human problems are too ill-defined for algorithms to apply. Often we 
are unaware of all the possibilities available to us and so cannot evaluate all 
the alternative courses of action. Even when we can do this, it may take far 
long or take up too many mental resources. Heuristics offer the prospect of 
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rapid response to a situation. In the real world one rarely has unlimited time 
to decide (Sloboda, 1986, p. 207). 
2- The practical reason for using heuristics is that, in many games, the number 
of possible moves is too great to allow the machine to use an algorithm, even 
if the algorithm is known. Therefore, heuristic search limited the search to a 
small subset of a very large universe of possibilities on the basis of external 
information (Widman & Loparo, 1989, p.7). 
3- Heuristics are guides to action that have been acquired through experience. 
Their advantages include simplicity and familiarity, and their weakness is 
that we can never know in advance whether they will lead us in the right 
direction (Sloboda, 1986, p.177). 
• Production rules: 
Formally, a production rule consists of an “IF” clause and a “THEN” 
clause. The “IF” clause includes a set of conditions that must be met in order to 
execute the actions specified in the “THEN” clause (Haberlandt, 1994, p.156). 
Production rules have the general form (If x is true, then y is true; or If x is true; 
then produce y.).  And because a skill has many components, many rules are 
needed to describe it adequately (ibid, p.156). The principal mechanism for 
problem solving in artificial intelligence is the production system, which consists 
of three modular elements: a global data base, a set of production rules, and a set of 
control structures (Wagman, 1993, pp. 15-16). 
Summary: 
In the previous part, the basic fundamentals and aspects of artificial 
intelligence were briefly discussed. In the next two parts, additional discussion 
about the two basic approaches of artificial intelligence, expert system and 
artificial neural networks, will be concisely demonstrated. 
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2.2 Expert Systems 
2.2.1  Description and definitions: 
Expert systems are knowledge-
based information systems that use a 
knowledge base about a specific 
complex application area to act as an 
expert consultant to end users. In 
addition, a clear definition of an expert 
system determined by ‘Feigenbaum’ 
(through: Wagman, 1993, p.126) was: 
 “An intelligent computer 
program that uses knowledge and 
inference procedures to solve problems 
that are difficult enough to require 
significant human expertise for their 
solution”. 
 In other words, expert systems, or knowledge-based systems, are programs 
that reproduce the behaviour of a human expert within a narrow domain of 
knowledge (Widman & Loparo, 1989, p.9).  
2.2.2 Characteristics of expert systems:  
Expert systems are rule-based logic programs that are designed to solve 
problems or make recommendations within a specific knowledge domain.  Human 
experts determine which parts of the knowledge domain are pertinent for the 
system, and those are gathered into a knowledge base.  An inference engine 
processes and combines facts related to a particular problem, case or question with 
the knowledge from the knowledge base in order to come up with an answer.  This 
requires that the inference engine link pieces of relevant knowledge in order to 
build a chain of logic leading to a valid conclusion.  
Table 2.3: Steps towards developing  
an expert system.  
Briefly, Watson and Blackstone 
(1989, p.465-74) indicated that 
expert systems are developed 
using the following steps:  
1. Identify an appropriate problem. 
2. Develop a prototype system. 
3. Develop the complete system. 
4. Evaluate the system. 
5. Integrate the system. 
6. Maintain the system. 
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Typically, an expert system consists of two parts, an inference engine, and a 
knowledge base (Widman & Loparo, 1989, p.126). The inference engine is 
generic. Inference is performed through a logical chaining of “If-Then” rules that 
are acquired from an expert. The logic on which these systems are based is 
deterministic. It handles the user interface, external files, program access, and 
scheduling. The knowledge base contains the information that is specific to a 
particular problem. This knowledge base allows an expert to define the rules which 
govern a process. 
The system can operate in one of two modes: A data-driven forward 
chaining mode, in which known data is input to determine if some conclusion may 
be reached; or, a goal-drive back-chaining mode, to determine if a given outcome 
has the necessary and sufficient supporting input data (ibid).  
An expert system is faster and more consistent and can have the knowledge 
of several experts. Moreover, it operates under various conditions and 
disturbances, and incorporates human expertise and thinking into their decision-
making process. Of course, it does not get tired or distracted by overwork or stress. 
An expert system can solve real-world problems using human knowledge and 
following human reasoning skills. 
2.2.3 Advantages and benefits of expert systems: 
Beginning in the 1980s, the use of expert systems has proliferated in the 
sciences, medicine, psychology, law, engineering, finance, architecture and other 
professions (Wagman, 1993, p.127).  
Table 2.4: Benefits of expert systems. 
Watson and Blackstone (1989, p.471) indicated that there are many potential 
benefits that can result from developing expert systems such as: 
i) Freeing personnel for other activities. ii) Saving money, time spent on the 
decision-making activity and providing decision-making skills that are in short 
supply. iii) Moving toward more nearly optimal decision making and increasing 
decision-making consistency. iv) Providing a model for training new personnel 
in decision making and providing a standard of performance for control 
purposes. 
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In the following, some advantages of expert system will be shown: 
• The economic advantage is that expert systems are less expensive than human 
expertise; they are reliable and do not show the degradation in performance that 
accompanies human fatigue, overwork, and stress (Wagman, 1993, p.127). 
• A model also can be used for training personnel in appropriate decision-making 
behaviour. For example, the model can be shown to a novice decision maker to 
illustrate the decision-making heuristics that have been employed in the past. In 
a training program the novice can be given structured decision cases, asked to 
make decision and presented with the decisions made by the model. The process 
can be repeated until the decisions made by the novice and the model converge 
(Watson & Blackstone, 1989, p.472).  
• An expert system also can be used to monitor decisions made by humans. The 
decisions made by the model can be compared to the human’s with exception 
reports being generated when deviations are noted. This procedure might be 
desirable with novice decision makers or when there are multiple decision 
makers acting according to prescribed guidelines (ibid, p.472). 
• Expert systems had the potential to interpret statistics, in order to formulate 
rules. Moreover, expert systems can analyze survey results, and will do it 
accurately and can very quickly propose recommendations for the inclusion of 
survey topics. 
2.2.4 Applications of expert systems: 
Expert systems have been built to solve a range of problems in domains 
such as medicine, mathematics, engineering, chemistry, geology, computer 
science, business, law, defense, and education. These programs have addressed a 
wide range of problem types (Luger & Stubblefield, 1989, p. 293). Expert Systems 
use the specialist knowledge that people like doctors and lawyers have in order to 
assist other people by giving advice on those subjects. For example, Medical 
expert systems have a task that is to organize and present all the relevant records 
for a particular patient to the physician. Furthermore, Medical expert systems have 
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been developed to analyze the disease symptoms, medical history, and laboratory 
test results of a patient, and then suggest a variety of possible diagnosis to the 
doctor. “Table 2.5” shows an example demonstrated by Waterman (through: 
Wagman, 1993, p.129) as an application of expert system in Medicine. 
 
In addition, the following list (Widman & Loparo, 1989, p.9; Luger & 
Stubblefield, 1989, p. 293) includes the types of problems to which expert systems 
have been applied:  
 Control: Performing real-world interventions to achieve desired goals and 
governing the behaviour of a complex environment. 
 Design: The making of specifications to create objects that satisfy particular 
requirements and/or to meet certain performance goals. 
Name                         Medicine 
PUFF:    Diagnosis lung disease. 
VM:               Monitors intensive-care patients. 
ABEL:    Diagnosis acid-base/electrolytes. 
AI/COAG:    Diagnosis blood disease. 
Al/RHEUM:    Diagnosis rheumatoid disease. 
CADUCEUS:  Diagnosis internal medicine disease. 
ANNA:            Monitor digitalis therapy. 
BLUE BOX:    Diagnosis/remedy depression. 
MYCIN:    Diagnosis/remedy bacterial infections. 
ONCOCIN:    Remedy/manage chemotherapy patients. 
ATTENDING: Instruct in anesthetic management. 
GUIDON:        Instruct in bacterial infections. 
Table 2.5: Expert systems in medicine. 
Source: (Wagman, 1993, p.129). 
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 Instruction: Teaching new concepts and information to non-experts. For 
example, detecting and correcting deficiencies in students’ understanding of a 
subject domain. 
 Interpretation: Analysis of data to determine their meaning and forming 
high-level conclusions or descriptions from collections of raw data. 
 Monitoring: Comparing the observed behaviour of a system to its expected 
behaviour. 
 Planning: Creation of programs of actions that can be carried out to achieve 
goals. 
 Prediction: Projecting probable consequences of given situations. In other 
words, forecasting the course of the future from a model of the past and 
present. 
 Repair: Prescription of real-world interventions to resolve problems. 
 Diagnosis: Determining the cause of malfunctions in complex situations based 
on observable symptoms. 
2.2.5 Deficiencies and limitations of expert systems: 
Luger and Stubblefield (1989, p.17-18) demonstrated the following 
deficiencies of expert systems: 
• Difficulty in capturing “deep” knowledge of the problem domain. MYCIN, for 
example, lacks any real knowledge of human physiology. It does not know what 
blood does or the function of the spinal cord. Folklore has it that once, when 
selecting a drug for treatment of meningitis, MYCIN asked if the patient was 
pregnant, even though it had been told that the patient was male.  
• Lack of robustness and flexibility. If humans are presented with a problem 
instance that they cannot solve immediately, they can generally return to an 
examination of first principles and come up with some strategy for attacking the 
problem. Expert systems generally lack this ability. 
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• Inability to provide deep explanations. Because expert systems lack deep 
knowledge of their problem domains, their explanations are generally restricted 
to a description of the steps they took in finding a solution. They cannot tell 
“why” a certain approach was taken. 
• Difficulties in verification. While the correctness of any large computer system 
is difficult to prove, expert systems are particularly difficult to verify. This is a 
serious problem, as expert systems technology is being applied to critical 
applications such as air traffic control, nuclear reactor operations, and weapons 
systems. 
• Unlike a human being, however, current programs cannot learn from their own 
experience; their knowledge must be extracted from humans and encoded in a 
formal language (Luger & Stubblefield, 1989, p.291-292). In other words, an 
expert system has inability to learn from its errors (Widman & Loparo, 1989, 
p.13) and it must be taught new knowledge and modified as new expertise is 
needed.  
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2.3 Neural Networks 
2.3.1 Introduction: 
In the past few years the approach to cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence known as connectionist modeling has dramatically increased its 
influence (Smolensky, 1989, p.233). Connectionist systems are networks of lots of 
simple active units that have lots of connections among them, by which they can 
interact. There is no central processor or controller, and also no separate memory 
or storage mechanism. The only activity in the system is these little units changing 
state, in response to signals coming in along those connections, and then sending 
out signals of their own (Haugeland, 1996, p.21). 
2.3.2 Connectionism framework: 
The goal of connectionist research is to model both lower-level perceptual 
processes and such higher-level processes as object recognition, problem solving, 
planning, and language understanding (Smolensky, 1989, p.233). In addition, the 
basic strategy of the connectionist approach is to take as its fundamental 
processing unit something close to an abstract neuron (Rumelhart, 1989, p.207). 
Rumelhart (ibid, p.209) demonstrated seven major components of any 
connectionist system: 
• A set of processing units; 
• A state of activation defined over the processing units; 
• An output function for each unit that maps its state of activation into an output; 
• A pattern of connectivity among units; 
• An activation rule for combining the inputs impinging on a unit with its current 
state to produce a new level of activation for the unit; 
• A learning rule whereby patterns of connectivity are modified by experience; 
and 
• An environment within which the system must operate. 
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Figure 2.2: An example of a single-layer network. 
Figure 2.1: An example of a neuron model. 
Figure 2.3: An example of a hidden-layer network. 
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2.3.3 Fundamentals of neural networks: 
Neural networks try to simulate a part of a natural brain with neurons, 
synapses and dendrites. It consists of several layers of so called units, where one 
layer is the input layer and one is the output layer (Russell & Norving, 1995). The 
layers in the middle are called hidden layers as shown in “figure 2.3”. From every 
layer to the next, every unit (i.e., neuron) is connected by a weighted joint to every 
unit in the above layer. Every unit sums up the incoming signals and produces and 
output signal (continuous or discrete) dependent on the activation function which is 
assigned to the units. This activation function is usually chosen among the step, 
sign or sigmoid function. Learning in neural networks is the process of updating 
the weights between the units (see figures 2.1 and 2.2).  
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Neural networks can be trained to give the correct response for each input 
by applying training examples. Difficulties with neural networks arise when 
deciding about the structure of the neural networks, the number of input and output 
units and the number and size of the hidden layers (Niederberger & Gross, 2002, 
pp. 13-14).  
The neural network learns by modifying its sets of weights and/or threshold 
characteristics in response to the correctness of its classification. Correct 
classifications reinforce (increase) the weights that led most strongly to the final 
result. Incorrect classifications do the opposite. There are many types of weight 
adjustment algorithms, or “learning rules” (Widman & Loparo, 1989, p.14). 
2.3.4 Characteristics of connectionist system: 
• The set of processing units: 
Any connectionist system begins with a set of processing units. Specifying 
the set of processing units and what they represent is typically the first stage of 
specifying a connectionist model. In some systems these units may represent 
particular conceptual objects such as features, letters, words, or concepts; in others 
they are simply abstract elements over which meaningful patterns can be defined. 
A unit’s job is simply to receive input from its neighbors and, as a function of the 
inputs it receives, to compute an output value, which it sends to its neighbors. The 
system is inherently parallel in that many units can carry out their computations at 
the same time. Within any system we are modeling, it is useful to characterize 
three types of units: input, output, and hidden units. Input units receive inputs from 
sources external to the system under study. These inputs may be either sensory 
inputs or inputs from other parts of the processing system in which the model is 
embedded. The output units send signals out of the system. They may either 
directly affect motoric systems or simply influence other systems external to the 
ones we are modeling. The hidden units are those whose only inputs and outputs 
are within the system we are modeling. 
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• The state of activation: 
In addition to the set of units we need a representation of the state of the 
system at time (t). This is primarily specified by a vector a (t), representing the 
pattern of activation over the set of processing units. Each element of the vector 
stands for the activation of one of the units. It is the pattern of activation over the 
whole set of units that captures what the system is representing at any time. It is 
useful to see processing in the system as the evolution, through time, of a pattern of 
activity over the set of units. 
Different models make different assumptions about the activation values a 
unit is allowed to take on (Rumelhart, 1989). Activation values may be continuous 
or discrete. If they are continuous, they may be unbounded or bounded. If they are 
discrete, they may take binary values or any of a small set of values. Thus in some 
models units are continuous and may take on any real number as an activation 
value. In other cases they may take on any real value between some minimum and 
maximum such as, for example; the interval (0, 1). When activation values are 
restricted to discrete values, they most often are binary—such as the values (0) and 
(1), where (1) is usually taken to mean that the unit is active and (0) is taken to 
mean that it is inactive. 
• The output function: 
Units interact by transmitting signals to their neighbors. The strengths of 
signals, and therefore the degree of which they affect their neighbors, are 
determined by their level of activation (Rumelhart, 1989, pp.210-212). 
Connectionist systems are large networks of extremely simple computational units, 
massively interconnected and running in parallel (Smolensky, 1989, p.233). Each 
unit or processor has a numerical activation value which it communicates to other 
processors along connections of varying strength; the activation value of each 
processor constantly changes in response to the activity of the processors to which 
it is connected. The values of some of the units form the input to the system, and 
the values of other units form the output; the connections between the units 
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determine how input is transformed to output (ibid, p.233). Briefly, in 
connectionist systems, knowledge is encoded not in symbolic structures but rather 
in the pattern of numerical strengths of the connections between units. 
2.3.5 Training stages of a neural network: 
The process of training a neural network involves the following stages: 
1. The untrained network is presented with carefully selected patterns of typical 
input data. 
2. The network maps the data into an initial pattern of output data. 
3. The network adjusts the weights of its connections using a variety of functions 
and according to how much the resulting output patterns differ from what they 
are expected to be. A training file is developed, consisting of data for each 
input node and the desired response for each of the network's output nodes. The 
adjustment of the weights is a matter of trial-and-error, does not follow rigidly 
programmed instructions and involves no software programming. 
4. Step (3) is repeated for many typical input patterns, so that the actual output of 
the network converges with the desired (by the trainer) output. When the gap 
between actual output and desired output falls below a pre-established (by the 
trainer) threshold of accuracy, the training process is complete. As a result, the 
network operates satisfactorily and is ready to be used as a predictive or 
diagnostic tool. As well, it is ready to process new selections of the kind of 
input patterns for which it has bee trained (Floridi, 1999). 
2.3.6 Classification of artificial neural networks: 
There are two major learning methods for neural networks: supervised and 
unsupervised. The supervised learning approach is most commonly used and it 
requires historical data with examples of both inputs and outputs to train the 
model. It is used to build prediction, classification and time series models. It is 
called supervised learning because during training, the network can compare the 
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predicted results to the actual results and adjust the model accordingly. 
Unsupervised learning does not have known answers to train the model but instead 
creates its own interpretation and validation of the data. Unsupervised learning is 
often used for grouping data.  
Depending on their methods of data processing and training, artificial neural 
networks can be classified as: 
• Feed-forward: When they have no feedback and simply associate inputs with 
outputs. These types of artificial neural networks are normally used for simple 
pattern recognition. 
• Recurrent: When they implement feedback relations needed in order to create 
a dynamic system that will produce the appropriate pattern.  
• These types of neural networks are normally used for pattern reconstruction: 
• Supervised: When they require a human trainer to adjust the artificial neural 
networks to the desired output. The most widely used supervised artificial 
neural networks are known as Back Propagation artificial neural networks. 
They are multi-layered, feed-forward networks that are trained using an error 
criterion. The network's output is compared with the desired output to produce 
an error measure; then an algorithm propagates the error from the output to the 
input in order to adjust the weights increasingly well so as to reduce the error. 
The network is trained by repeating this process many times. Once the error 
parameter has decreased below a specified optimal threshold, the network is 
said to have converged and its training is complete. Back Propagation artificial 
neural networks are used for classification and prediction tasks. 
• Self-organizing: When they can learn to identify structures in the data by 
adapting automatically in response to particular types of inputs, according to 
pre-established requirements (Floridi, 1999). 
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Rumelhart (1989, p.213) explained that changing the processing or 
knowledge structure in a connectionist system involves modifying the patterns of 
interconnectivity. In principle this can involve three kinds of modification: 
(1)  Development of new connections. 
(2)  Loss of existing connections. 
(3)  Modification of the strengths of connections that already exist. 
2.3.7 Benefits of neural networks: 
Neural networks show both promise and a number of yet unresolved 
difficulties. In addition to the fact that connectionist systems are capable of 
exploiting parallelism in computation and mimicking brain-style computation, such 
systems are important because they provide good solutions to a number of very 
difficult computational problems that seem to arise often in models of cognition. In 
particular they typically are good at solving constraint-satisfaction problems; are 
efficient mechanisms for best-match search, pattern recognition, and content-
addressable memory; automatically implement similarity-based generalization; 
offer simple, general mechanisms for adaptive learning; and exhibit graceful 
degradation with damage or information over load (Rumelhart, 1989, pp.215-216). 
Moreover, Luger and Stubblefield (1989, p. 584-585) demonstrated the 
following benefits of neural networks:  
♦ They handle noise well. Once trained, neural nets show an ability to recognize 
patterns even though part of the input data is missing or obscured. 
♦ They provide a tool for modeling and exploring brain function, much as 
production systems have helped cognitive scientists study higher-level 
cognitive processes. 
♦ By patterning themselves after the architecture of the brain, they provide a 
plausible model of intelligent mechanism.  
♦ They are robust. Because the information is distributed, neural nets can survive 
the failure of some nodes.  
♦ They are a promising model of associative memory.  
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♦ They are able to learn new concepts. 
♦ In addition, they have had success in areas like vision that have frustrated more 
traditional approaches. 
Briefly, from the previous discussion, one can summarize the characteristics 
of artificial neural networks as follow: 
1- Parallelism.                2- Capacity for adaptation.             3- Distributed memory.  
4- Ability to learn.         5- Capacity for generalization. 
2.3.8 Advantages of neural networks: 
Neural network technology has proven to be very effective in pattern 
recognition tasks such as handwriting recognition and modeling of seemingly 
serial human behaviour such as touch typing and verb conjugation and may 
provide an important new tool for tasks that require learning by the program 
(Widman & Loparo, 1989, p.14). 
Neural networks can provide a lower-level model of intelligent mechanism, and 
they have already made progress toward modeling perception and associative 
memory (Luger & Stubblefield, 1989, p. 586).  
In addition, artificial neural networks are useful for problems such as 
physical processes that do not have algorithmic interpretations or algorithmic 
interpretations are too complex and difficult to be found. They are used in specific 
paradigms: recognition of speakers in communications; texture analysis; three-
dimensional object recognition; handwritten word recognition; and facial 
recognition. Moreover, artificial neural networks create their own relationship 
among information and can work with large numbers of variables or parameters. 
Real world applications of artificial neural networks technology include 
voice and visual recognition, chemical structures, biomedical instrumentation, 
medical diagnosis, credit rating, forecasting of future sales, investment analysis 
(where predictions can be attempted on the basis of patterns provided by past data), 
market performance, economic indicators, writing recognition (especially signature 
verification, when new signatures need to be compared with those stored), 
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automatic control and monitoring. Best-Match Search is considered one of the 
most advantages of artificial neural networks. The following is concisely 
conclusion of this feature. 
Best-Match Search: 
Best-Match Search, using neural networks, can be used to find stored data 
that match some target or probe. Rumelhart (1989, p.222) explained the process as 
the following: 
♦ When a previously stored (that is, familiar) pattern enters the memory system, 
it is amplified, and the system responds with a stronger version of the input 
pattern. This is a kind of recognition response. 
♦ When an unfamiliar pattern enters the memory system, it is dampened, and the 
activity of the memory system is shut down. This is a kind of unfamiliarity 
response. 
♦ When part of a familiar pattern is presented, the system responds by “filling 
in” the missing parts. This is a kind of recall paradigm in which the part 
constitutes the retrieval cue, and the filling in is a kind of memory-
reconstruction process. This is a content-addressable memory system. 
♦ When a pattern similar to a stored pattern is presented, the sys tem responds by 
distorting the input pattern toward the stored pattern. This is a kind of 
assimilation response in which similar inputs are assimilated to similar stored 
events. 
♦ Finally, if a number of similar patterns have been stored, the system will 
respond strongly to the central tendency of the stored patterns, even though the 
central tendency itself was never stored. Thus this sort of memory system 
automatically responds to prototypes even when no prototype has been seen. 
Rumelhart (ibid) believed that these properties correspond very closely to the 
characteristics of human memory and are exactly the kind of properties we want in 
any theory of memory. 
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2.3.9 Problems challenge the field of artificial neural networks: 
Because of the previous advantages, research in neural networks is growing 
rapidly and promises to contribute valuable insights to artificial intelligence as a 
whole. However, Luger and Stubblefield (1989, p. 585) indicated that a number of 
problems must be addressed if this work is to continue to grow: 
• Neural nets are not brains, in spite of their surface similarity to human neural 
systems. Brains have a different, more complex structure; they are highly 
modular, and there is growing evidence that they not only learn by adjusting 
weights on connections but also are able to grow new connections. 
• Neural nets can not now model higher-level cognitive mechanisms, like 
attention, symbols, reference. Whether or not humans prove to be physical 
symbol systems, they are very good at producing and manipulating symbols; 
how can this be done in a simulated network? Also, it is not clear how networks 
can represent mechanisms like focus of attention. 
• Neural nets may be at the wrong level of abstraction; they may be too weak to 
describe higher-level processes.  
• Higher-level organization and abstractive principles do not disappear. Humans 
reason from class taxonomies and rules of performance. The brain itself is a 
highly structured and organized system. It is unlikely that any progress in 
intelligence will come without an understanding of the principles of this 
organization. 
• Some human intellectual activity may not be parallel. Much higher-level 
reasoning and problem-solving behaviour seems to be quite serial in nature. In 
these cases, a production system approach may be much more fruitful. 
• Brains are very large, having trillions of neurons. Although we can certainly 
achieve useful behaviour from smaller systems, the complexity of more highly 
intelligent programs may require more neurons than we could efficiently 
implement on a computer. Higher-level symbolic descriptions may ultimately 
prove more efficient to design and implement.  
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• Although neural architectures obviously underlie human intelligence, they may 
not be the best abstraction for implementing it on a machine. 
Moreover, two major limitations of the neural network approach are that the 
network can not be “told” facts, as can conventional expert systems, and that 
“knowledge” in the network is not easily available to the user. Unlike a symbolic 
Al system, the neural network elements can not “explain” their numeric weighting 
factors. This latter limitation can be partially overcome by examining the weights 
of a mature network to characterize the strengths of the relationships between 
inputs and outputs (Widman & Loparo, 1989, p.14).  
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2.4 Differences between expert systems and artificial neural networks 
2.4.1 Structure: 
A neural net is a set of nodes and connections that store experimental 
knowledge obtained by training on task examples. An expert system is a set of 
deductive rule-bases, which follows sets of instructions and hence require 
programs in order to perform its computations. Furthermore, since expert systems 
have explicit rules, it is easy to understand how their decisions are made.  By 
contrast, a faulty neurocomputing system might need nothing more than additional 
nodes, connections, or training-set examples, requiring no particular insight to add 
to the system. 
2.4.2 Data distribution:  
Unlike expert system, which requires a programmer to assume frequently a 
certain form to the data and test its validity until the correct form is found; neural 
networks do not require assumptions about the form or distribution of the data to 
analyze it. Moreover, neural networks are more tolerant of imperfect data, such as 
the presence of missing values or other data quality problems. Furthermore, neural 
networks perform better than traditional statistical methods when the form of the 
data is unknown or non-linear, or when the problems are complex with highly 
interrelated relationships. 
2.4.3 Adaptability: 
Neural networks are flexible tools in a dynamic environment, and have the 
capacity to learn rapidly and change quickly. As circumstances, data values and 
outcomes change, the model quickly learns and adapts to constantly changing 
information by modifying connection weights. On the other hand, rule based 
systems are limited to the specific situation for which they were designed, and the 
learning process seems difficult to simulate. To facilitate, when conditions change, 
they are no longer valid. 
2.4.4 Processing: 
Expert systems process problem rule at a one time, sequential, using “If-
Then” rules. In contrast, neural networks is called parallel processing. 
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2.5 Simulation 
2.5.1 Description:  
Simulation has become ever more prominent as a method for studying 
complex systems in which uncertainty is present. In other words, computer 
simulation is the problem-solving process of predicting the future state of a real 
system by studying an idealized computer model of the real system (Widman & 
Loparo, 1989, p.15). In this manner, the purpose of simulation experiments is to 
understand the behaviour of the system or evaluate strategies for the operation of 
the system. Additionally, simulation is an interdisciplinary subject, using ideas and 
techniques from statistics, probability, and computer science. Simulation is one of 
the most frequently used management science techniques, and every indication 
shows that its popularity is growing (Watson & Blackstone, 1989, p.15). 
Furthermore, simulation experiments are usually performed to obtain predictive 
information that would be costly or impracticable to obtain with real devices 
(Widman & Loparo, 1989, p.15). Moreover, simulation is used when there are only 
poor mathematical modeling alternatives (Watson & Blackstone, 1989, p.15).  
Simulation gives an overview of the real system using statistics, estimating 
probabilities of events (e.g. risks), and testing a model. Simulations are usually 
referred to as either discrete event or continuous, based on the manner in which the 
state variables change. Discrete event refers to the fact that state variables change 
instantaneously at distinct points in time. In a continuous simulation, variables 
change continuously, usually through a function in which time is a variable. In 
practice, most simulations use both discrete and continuous state variables, but one 
of these is predominant and drives the classification of the entire simulation.  
Simulation allows us to ask many “what if” questions about changes in our 
systems without actually changing the systems themselves. Thus, it is useful to 
understand the current system and explain why it is behaving as it is, and to 
explore changes to try to improve it. Finally, simulation models contain equations 
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that express relationships between variables of interest (Watson & Blackstone, 
1989, p.22). 
2.5.2 Advantages and disadvantages of simulation: 
Watson and Blackstone (1989, p.16) demonstrated the following advantages    
of simulation: 
1- It is possible to experiment on a system without exposing the organization to 
real-world dangers. For this reason, simulation has been referred to as “the 
manager’s laboratory”. 
2-  By investigating possible changes in a real-world system through a simulation 
model, we can often learn how to improve the behaviour of a system without 
actually trying out both good and bad proposals on the system. 
3- It is easier to control experimental conditions in a simulation model than in a 
real-world system. 
4- In a simulation model it is possible to compress long periods of time into 
seconds of computer time. As an example, consider a new product proposal. A 
simulation model can describe quickly the product’s movement through the 
introduction, growth, maturity, and decline stages of the product life cycle.  
Moreover, compared to experimenting with the actual system, simulation is 
often the only possibility, because it is much more flexibility to try things out 
before building the actual system. It has flexibility to control different variables, 
and it is helpful to understand the actual system, and it allows the analysis of a 
system’s capabilities, capacities, and behaviours without requiring the construction 
of or experimentation with the real system. In addition, simulation makes it 
possible to study more complicated models, which do not have an analytical 
solution (or solution is difficult), and it does not have to make as many simplifying 
assumptions (For further details see: Law & kelton, 1982, p.8). However, despite 
the advantages of simulation presented above, simulation has also disadvantages. 
For example:  It can take long time to simulate a problem and systems with many 
particles and long time scales are problematical. 
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2.5.3 Building a computer simulation: 
Within the overall task of simulation, there are essential processes for           
building a computer simulation. In this section, these processes will be described 
as discussed by Law and Kelton (1982):  
Define problem space.  
The first step in developing a simulation is to explicitly define the problem 
that must be addressed by the model. The objectives and requirements of the 
project must be stated along with the required accuracy of the results. Boundaries 
must be defined between the problem of interest and the surrounding environment. 
Interfaces must be defined for crossing these boundaries to achieve interoperability 
with external systems. A model can not be built based on vague definitions of 
hoped for results. 
Define conceptual model.  
Once the problem has been defined, one or more appropriate conceptual 
models can be defined. These include the algorithms to be used to describe the 
system, input required, and outputs generated. Assumptions made about the system 
are documented in this phase, along with the potential effects of these assumptions 
on the results or accuracy of the simulation. Limitations based on the model, data, 
and assumptions, are clearly defined so that appropriate uses of the simulation can 
be determined.  
The conceptual model includes a description of the amount of time, number 
of personnel, and equipment assets that will be required to produce and operate the 
model. All potential models are compared and trade-offs made until a single 
solution is defined that meets the objectives and requirements of the problem and 
for which algorithms can be constructed and input data acquired. 
 
                                                 

 For further details about building computer simulation see (Banks, 1997; Banks,  
   1999; Banks, 2001). 
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Collect input data.  
Once the solution space has 
been determined, the data required to 
operate and define the model must be 
collected. This includes information 
that will serve as input parameters, aid 
in the development of algorithms, and 
be used to evaluate the performance of 
the simulation runs. This data includes 
known behaviours of working systems 
and information on the statistical 
distributions of the random variates to 
be used. Collecting accurate input data 
is one of the most difficult phases in 
the simulation process, and the most 
prone to error and misapplication. 
Construct software model.  
The simulation model is 
constructed based on the solution 
defined and data collected. 
Mathematical and logical descriptions 
of the real system are encoded in a 
form that can be executed by a 
computer. The creation of a computer 
simulation, as with any other software 
product, should be governed by the 
principles of software engineering. 
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Figure 2.4: 
Simulation development process. 
 
Analyze Data 
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Verification, validation and accreditation of the model.  
Verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A), is an essential phase in 
ensuring that the model algorithms, input data, and design assumptions are correct 
and solve the problem identified at the beginning of the process. Since a simulation 
model and its data are the encoding of concepts that are difficult to completely 
define, it is easy to create a model that is either inaccurate or which solves a 
problem other than the one specified. The VV&A process is designed to identify 
these problems before the model is put into operation. Validation is the process of 
determining that the conceptual model reflects the aspects of the problem space 
that need to be addressed and does so such that the requirements of the study can 
be met. Validation is also used to determine whether the operations of the final 
software model are consistent with the real world, usually through experimentation 
and comparison with a know data set. Verification is the process of determining 
that the software model accurately reflects the conceptual model. Accreditation is 
the official acceptance of the software model for a specified purpose. A software 
model accredited for one purpose may not be acceptable for another, though it is 
no less valid based on its original design. 
Design experiments. 
This phase identifies the most productive and accurate methods for running 
the simulation to generate the desired answers. Statistical techniques can be used to 
design experiments that yield the most accurate and uncompromised data with the 
fewest number of simulation runs. When simulation runs are expensive and 
difficult to schedule, experimental design can ensure answers at the lowest cost and 
on the shortest schedules. 
Execute simulation. 
This is the actual execution of the designed, constructed, and validated 
model according to the experimental design. The simulation runs generate the 
output data required to answer the problem initially proposed. In the case of Monte 
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Carlo models, many hundreds or thousands of replications may be required to 
arrive at statistically reliable results. 
Collect output data. 
Concurrent with the execution of the model, output data is collected, 
organized, and stored. This is sometimes viewed as an integral part of the model, 
but should be distinctly separated since it is possible to change the data collected 
without changing the model algorithms or design. 
Analyze data. 
Data collected during the execution of a simulation can be voluminous and 
distributed through time. Detailed analyses must be performed to extract long-term 
trends and to quantify answers to the driving questions that motivated the 
construction of the simulation. Analysis may produce information in tabular, 
graphic, map, animation, and textual summary forms. Modern user interfaces have 
greatly enhanced this phase by displaying data in forms that can be easily 
understood by diverse audiences. 
Document results.  
The results of the simulation study or training session must be documented 
and disseminated to interested parties. These parties identify the degree to which 
the simulation has answered specific questions and areas for future improvements. 
Expand model. 
Simulation models are expensive and difficult to build. As a result, once a 
model is built, it will be modified for use on many related projects. New 
requirements will be levied, new users will adopt it, and the entire development 
process will be conducted many times over. 
2.5.4 Types of simulations: 
There are two major types of simulation: continuous and discrete. 
Continuous simulation predicts the behaviour of systems described by differential 
equations, such as thermal, mechanical, analog electrical and fluid devices. 
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Moreover, it concerns the modeling over time of a system by a 
representation in which the state variables change continuously with respect to 
time. Discrete-event simulation concerns the modeling of a system as it evolves 
over time by a representation in which the state variables change only at a 
countable number of points in time (law & Kelton, 1982, p.4).  
Discrete simulation predicts the behaviour of event-driven systems, such as 
manufacturing plants, message traffic on networks, and purposeful movements of 
people such as in bank queues. Discrete simulation also is used to simulate 
intelligent agents such as opposing military command centers, competing 
commercial organizations, and espionage—counterespionage net works (Widman 
& Loparo, 1989, p.16). 
2.5.5 Simulation environments: 
An important issue when constructing an agent is the environment in which 
the agent will act (Niederberger & Gross, 2002, p.32). In this section, we will 
briefly review several different kinds of environment that are discussed by 
Niederberger and Gross (ibid), and Russell and Norving (1995, p.46):  
1. Fully observable vs. partially observable: 
An environment is fully observable if the agent's sensors give it access to 
the complete state of the environment at any point in time. If all aspects that are 
relevant to the choice of action are able to be detected then the environment is 
effectively fully observable. Noisy and inaccurate sensors can result in partially 
observable environments. A fully observable environment is convenient because 
the agent need not maintain any internal state to keep track of the world. 
2. Accessible vs. inaccessible: 
If an agent's sensors give it access to the complete state of the environment 
needed to choose an action, the environment is accessible. An environment is 
effectively accessible if the sensors detect all aspects that are relevant to the choice 
of action. An accessible environment is convenient because the agent need not 
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maintain any internal state to keep track of the world. Inaccessible environments 
are not implicitly non-deterministic. 
3. Deterministic vs. nondeterministic: 
If the next state of the environment is completely determined by the current 
state and the actions selected by the agents, then we say the environment is 
deterministic. In principle, an agent need not worry about uncertainty in an 
accessible, deterministic environment. If the environment is inaccessible, however, 
then it may appear to be non-deterministic. This is particularly true if the 
environment is complex, making it hard to keep track of all the inaccessible 
aspects. Thus, it is often better to think of an environment as deterministic or non-
deterministic from the point of view of the agent. 
4. Episodic vs. sequential: 
In an episodic environment, the agent’s experience is divided into 
“episodes”. Each episode consists of the agent perceiving and then acting. The 
quality of its action depends just on the episode itself and does not depend on the 
actions in prior episodes. Episodic environments are much simpler because the 
agent does not need to think ahead.  
5. Discrete vs. continuous: 
This focuses on the way time is handled and to the percepts and actions of 
the agent. An environment is discrete if there are a limited number of distinct, 
clearly-defined states of the world which limits range of possible percepts and 
actions. Chess is discrete while taxi driving is continuous. Chess is discrete - there 
are a finite number of states and a discrete number of percepts and actions. Taxi 
driving is continuous - the speed and location of the taxi and the other vehicles 
sweep through a range of continuous values. 
6. Static vs. dynamic: 
   A- Static environment: 
An environment is static if it doesn't change between the time of perceiving 
and acting. Moreover, a static environment does not change while the agent is 
thinking. Static environments are easy to deal with it because the agent does not 
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need to keep looking at the world while deciding on an action, nor need to worry 
about the passage of time. A static environment consists of unchanging 
surroundings in which an agent navigates, manipulates, or perhaps simply problem 
solves. In such an environment, there are no moving objects. Thus, the agent, then, 
does not need to adapt to new situations. Static environment includes one-player 
games, in which nothing changes through the action of the agent.  
Negatives: The actual world is not at all static and the goal of AI projects is to 
create an agent that can navigate in the real world.  
   B- Dynamic environment:  
If the environment can change while an agent is deliberating, then we say 
the environment is dynamic for the agent. (The environment is semidynamic if the 
environment itself does not change with the passage of time but the agent's 
performance score does). Dynamic environment changes over time independent of 
the actions of the agent. It can be unpredictable. This means that not only is the 
world changing but also it changes in a way that the agent cannot (fully) 
comprehend. This often occurs when an agent's representation of the world is 
incomplete (or non-existent). Because of this unpredictability, it may be desirable 
that the agent's processing be interruptible, to handle unexpected, and urgent, 
contingencies.  
7. Simulated environments: 
By operating in a simulated environment, architecture is able to avoid 
dealing with such issues as real-time performance and unreliable sensors. In 
simulated environment, the agent can be used to test higher-level cognitive 
functions such as planning and learning without real-world implementation issues. 
Operating in a simulated environment also offers the advantage that the agent may 
be exposed to a variety of different tasks and surroundings without an inordinate 
amount of development time. Thus, the same architecture can be applied to tasks 
involving space exploration and undersea diving without the necessity of 
developing the necessary hardware to transport the agent to either location.  It has 
the ability to incrementally add new knowledge without significant slowdown. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have aimed to give a general introduction to 
the field of artificial intelligence. Additionally, terms and concepts that 
have been used in this chapter will use frequently in next chapters when 
we will discuss agent concept and Dörner’s approach (PSI-theory) that 
explained human action regulation through the relationships between 
cognition, emotion, and motivation. This chapter has highlighted key 
trends in the development of the field of artificial intelligence and its 
important goals and applications. The main framework of artificial 
intelligence field has been reviewed, many definitions have been stated 
and different points of view have been demonstrated. The main areas of 
artificial intelligence activity include expert systems, artificial neural 
networks, natural language understanding, computer vision, robotics 
and simulation have been discussed.   
The reason for doing artificial intelligence is developing useful 
and smarter computer programs. However, the definitions of artificial 
intelligence were slightly different according to the author’s point of 
view of the natural of artificial intelligence. The difference lies in two 
dimensions: one is focused on the thought processes and reasoning; 
another is involved with behaviour. Artificial intelligence can be 
viewed as an attempt to model aspects of human thought on computers 
but sometimes is defined as trying to solve by computer any problem 
that a human can solve faster. Our point of view is that artificial 
intelligence should not only model aspects of human thought, but also 
should have the same motives, emotions, and even though errors that 
humans have.  Moreover, artificial intelligence should not build such 
intelligent program that is smarter than human; rather should construct 
intelligent program which has the same intelligence that humans have. 
Chapter       
Agents  
Fundamentals, Types & Evaluation Criteria 
Summary 
The area of agents has been for at least the last ten years a constant growing 
area of interest. Agents are used as metaphors for work in most areas of the field of 
artificial intelligence. However, the word agent is currently in vogue in the popular 
computing press and within the artificial intelligence and computer science 
communities. This chapter clarifies with a brief overview the framework of the 
agent research. In section 3.1, we will provide a general agent description, 
definition and finally outline the characteristics and difficulties face agents. In 
section 3.2., basic fundamentals of building an intelligent agent will be discussed. 
Section 3.3 will briefly summarize the types of agents. Finally, in section 3.4, 
evaluation criteria of agents such as capabilities related to learning, planning, and 
robotic agent, interaction with environment and agent’s performance will be 
demonstrated.   
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3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Description of an agent: 
The term agent covers a wide 
range of behaviour and functionality. In 
general, an agent is an active 
computational entity with a persistent 
identity that can perceive, reason about, 
and initiate activities in its environment 
that can communicate (with other 
agents). An (intelligent) agent 
perceives its environment with sensors and acts (rationally) upon that environment 
with its effectors. Moreover, an agent is a computer software system whose 
perceives and acts in an environment to achieve specific goals. We can split an 
agent into an architecture and an agent program, which maps the percepts to some 
actions (Niederberger & Gross, 2002, p.33) and the difference between an agent 
and a program is that all software agents are programs, but not all programs are 
agents (Franklin & Graesser, 1997).  
In summary, an agent is something that 
perceives and acts in its environment 
based upon the perceived information 
(ibid, p.33). 
3.1.2 Agent definitions: 
There are various definitions of the term “agent”, and these definitions 
range from the simple to the lengthy. Therefore, from our point of view, a review 
of simple definitions with supplemental characteristics and explanations of agent 
could solve the definition problem.  
Erickson’s definition: 
 
 
Figure 3.1: An agent and environment. 
Agent Environment 
Sensors 
Effector
An agent is a program that is, to some degree, capable of initiating actions, 
forming its own goals, constructing plans of action, communicating with other 
agents, and responding appropriately to events without being directly controlled 
by a human (Erickson, 1997, p.80).   
Figure 3.2:  An agent formula.  
Source: (Russell & Norving, 1995, p.36). 
An agent = architecture + program. 
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Russell and Norvig’s definition:  
An agent is anything that can be 
viewed as perceiving its 
environment through sensors and 
acting upon that environment 
through effectors (Russell & 
Norving, 1995). 
Maes’s definition: 
Agents are computational systems 
that inhabit some complex dynamic 
environment, sense and act 
autonomously in this environment, 
and by doing so realize a set of 
goals or tasks for which they were 
designed (Maes, 1995). 
Hayes-Roth’s definition: 
Intelligent agents continuously perform 
three functions: perception of dynamic 
conditions in the environment; action to 
affect conditions in the environment; and 
reasoning to interpret perceptions, solve 
problems, draw inferences, and 
determine actions (Hayes-Roth , 1995). 
Franklin and Graesser’s definition: 
An autonomous agent is a system situated 
within and a part of an environment that 
senses that environment and acts on it 
over time, in pursuit of its own agenda 
and so as to effect what it senses in the 
future (Franklin & Graesser, 1997). 
Figure 3.5: Hayes-Roth’s definition.  
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Figure 3.6: 
 Franklin and Graesser’s definition. 
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Figure 3.3: Russell & Norvig’s definition. 
Figure 3.4: Maes’s definition.  
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Comment 
Despite the big efforts spent on research in the area, there is no 
agreement about what should be meant by an agent. However, there are 
four agreements among researchers. Firstly, all agents are situated in 
some environment. Secondly, each senses its environment and act 
autonomously upon it. Thirdly, no other entity is required to feed it 
input, or to interpret and use its output and no agent exists without a 
context. And finally, every agent, if correct, meets its design objectives. 
Each acts so that its current actions may effect its later sensing, that is 
its actions effect its environment. Moreover, each acts continually over 
some period of time.  
Hence, some researchers seem to have given up the attempts to 
define agents and characterize basically everything as agents. 
Obviously, Russell and Norvig’s definition depends on what we 
presume as the environment, and on what sensing and acting mean. If 
we define the environment as whatever provides input and receives 
output, and take receiving input to be sensing and producing output to 
be acting, every program is an agent.  
According to Maes’s definition, “autonomously” as a character 
of agent is added and environments are restricted to being complex and 
dynamic. Therefore, her definition considers agent as complex 
information processing system. However, the definition is quite open to 
extension and interpretation. Hayes-Roth’s definition claims that agents 
reason during the process of action selection. According to Franklin and 
Grasser’s definition, “sense in the future” is too open for interpretation 
for the definition to be objective and it is much less formal.  
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3.1.3 Characteristics of an agent: 
In addition, an agent is computer program that is characterized by carrying 
out some set of operations and can demonstrate some degree of independence or 
autonomy. It should have sensors to perceive conditions in its environment, and 
have ability to affect conditions in the environment. It should have reasoning to 
interpret perceptions, solve problems, respond in a meaningful way, and determine 
actions. Moreover, it should continuously realize a set of goals or tasks and have 
its own ideas about how to accomplish tasks. It has the ability to take over some 
human tasks and interact with people in human like ways, and makes a decision 
about what action to perform based on its experience. Agents consider dynamic 
when they can exercise some degree of activity. An agent must have its own 
unique identity. 
Furthermore, an intelligent agent interacts with–influences and is influenced 
by–other dynamic entities in its environment. It perceives data from the 
environment, reasons to interpret perceptions, solve problems, make decisions, 
etc., acts to affect external entities and to achieve its goals. To keep pace with 
external events and avoid missing important demands and opportunities for action, 
the agent performs these functions asynchronously, concurrently, and selectively. 
Nonetheless, these functions must be integrated. Perception must inform reasoning 
In principle, an agent program mainly consists of the following tasks which are 
executed repeatedly (Niederberger & Gross, 2002, p.33): 
1. Perception: The agent gets actual information from its environment to 
sense its new situation after the last action. 
2. Inference: The agent infers with respect to its percepts about the world and 
what has to be done. 
3. Selection: The agent selects one or more actions considering the possible 
outcomings of step 2. 
4. Acting: The selected action is performed.  
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and action. Reasoning must guide perception and action. Action must feed back on 
perception and reasoning (Hayes-Roth, 1991, p.79). 
 In addition, an intelligent agent acts as a single purposeful entity. It 
attempts to construct a consistent interpretation of the world, acquire information 
relevant to its ongoing activities, notice important unanticipated events, and take 
actions that advance its goals. It establishes and modifies its own goals and 
allocates its own limited resources among competing tasks in a purposeful, 
coordinated manner, in accordance with its current goals and constraints and its 
current interpretation of the environment (ibid). 
3.1.4 Difficulties challenge intelligent agents:  
1. Uncertainty in the World Model: 
The agent can never be completely certain about the state of the external 
world since there is ambiguity and uncertainty that may happen because of the 
following difficulties: First, sensors have limited precision and accuracy. Second, 
there are hidden variables that sensors can’t “see”, e.g. vehicle behind large truck 
or storm clouds approaching. Finally, the future is unknown, uncertain (i.e., cannot 
foresee all possible future events which may happen). 
2. Construct new architecture or reuse an existing architecture? 
Researchers attempting to develop new agents are faced with a difficult 
problem: should they construct their own symbolic architecture for the tasks at 
hand, or should they reuse an existing architecture? Because symbolic 
architectures tend to be large and complex, development requires a significant 
amount of time and effort (Wallace & Laird, 1999, p.117). 
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3.2 Basic Fundamentals of Building an Intelligent Agent 
3.2.1 Introduction: 
This section will discuss the basic terminology of general agent architecture. 
According to Niederberger and Gross (2002, p.57), designing an agent architecture 
is a non-trivial task. Considerations have to be taken with respect to a large 
number of requirements and constraints. For example, to build an agent we need to 
answer the following questions: 
- What is the goal to be achieved? The answer of this question describes a situation 
we want to achieve, a set of properties that we want to hold, etc.  
- What are the actions? The answer of this question characterizes the primitive 
actions or events that are available for making changes in the world in order to 
achieve a goal. The given action should specify whether that action can be applied 
to the current world (i.e., is it applicable and legal), and what the exact state of the 
world will be after the action is performed in the current world. The number of 
actions / operators depends on the representation used in describing a state. What 
relevant information is necessary to encode about the world to describe the state of 
the world, describe the available transitions, and solve the problem?  
3.2.2 Perception and situation assessment:  
Sensing and perception can be thought to be two different things. Sensing is 
the action of getting a stimulus while perception decides what it is and what the 
further meaning of this stimulus can be. Once the stimulus has been sensed, it can 
be perceived which is principally a classification problem (Niederberger & Gross, 
2002, p. 42). Moreover, perception considers inputs from the environment, such as 
the location of a fire and an indication of its intensity. The agent may also obtain 
information about the environment through sensing actions (Winikoff et al, 2001).  
An agent may sense the world through different modalities, just as a human 
has access to sight, hearing, and touch. The sensors may range from simple devices 
to more complex mechanisms. Perception can also involve the integration of 
Chapter Three: Agents – Fundamentals, Types & Evaluation Criteria. 
 
70 
results from different modalities into a single assessment or description of the 
environmental situation, which an architecture can represent for utilization by 
other cognitive processes. Perception is a broad term that covers many types of 
processing, from inexpensive ones that an architecture can support automatically 
to ones that require limited resources and so must be invoked through conscious 
intentions. For example, the human visual system can detect motion in the 
periphery without special effort, but the fovea can extract details only from the 
small region at which it is pointed. A cognitive architecture that includes the 
second form of sensor must confront the issue of attention that is deciding how to 
allocate and direct its limited perceptual resources to detect relevant information in 
a complex environment. An architecture that supports perception should also deal 
with the issue that sensors are often noisy and provide at most an inaccurate and 
partial picture of the agent's surroundings. Dynamic environments further 
complicate matters in that the agent must track changes that sometimes occur at a 
rapid rate.  
An architecture can also acquire and improve this knowledge by learning 
from previous perceptual experiences. An intelligent agent should also be able to 
move beyond perception of isolated objects and events to understand and interpret 
the broader environmental situation. Thus, situation assessment requires an 
intelligent agent to combine perceptual information about many entities and 
events, possibly obtained from many sources, to compose a large-scale model of 
the current environment (Langley& Laird, 2002, pp.7-8). 
3.2.3 Recognition and categorization:  
An agent's filter override mechanism must be carefully designed to embody 
the right degree of sensitivity to the problems and opportunities that arise in her 
environment. If the agent is overly sensitive, willing to reconsider her plans in 
response to every unanticipated event, then her plans will not serve sufficiently to 
limit the number of options about which she must deliberate. On the other hand, if 
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the agent is not sensitive enough, she will fail to react to significant deviations 
from her expectations (Bratman et al, 1988). 
 Moreover, an intelligent agent must make some contact between its 
environment and its knowledge. This requires the ability to recognize situations or 
events as instances of known or familiar patterns. However, recognition need not 
be limited to static situations. Recognition is closely related to categorization, 
which involves the assignment of objects, situations, and events to known concepts 
or categories. To support recognition and categorization, a cognitive architecture 
must provide some way to represent patterns and situations in memory. Because 
these patterns must apply to similar but distinct situations, they must encode 
general relations that hold across these situations. An architecture must also 
include some recognition process that lets it identify when a particular situation 
matches a stored pattern or category and, possibly, measure the degree to which it 
matches. Finally, an ideal architecture should include some means to learn new 
patterns or categories from instruction or experience and to refine existing patterns 
when appropriate (Langley& Laird, 2002, p. 6). 
3.2.4 Belief, desire and intention: 
 Beliefs: A belief is some aspect of the agent’s knowledge or information 
about the environment, self or other agents; (informative). For example an 
agent might believe there is a fire at (X) because she saw it recently, even if 
she cannot see it now. Beliefs are essential since an agent has limited sensory 
ability and also it needs to build up its knowledge of the world over time 
(Winikoff et al, 2001). 
 Desires: Desires are understood to be things the agent wants to achieve. In 
decision-theoretic accounts, an agent is seen as selecting a course of action on 
the basis of her subjective expected utility, which is a function of the agent's 
beliefs and desires (Bratman et al, 1988). 
 Intention: Intentions are defined as the currently chosen course of action; 
deliberative (Winikoff et al, 2001).  
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3.2.5 Reasoning: 
Problem solving is closely related to reasoning. In fact, reasoning is a 
central cognitive activity that lets an agent augment its knowledge state. Whereas 
planning is concerned primarily with achieving objectives in the world by taking 
actions, reasoning draws mental conclusions from other beliefs or assumptions that 
the agent already holds. For example, a pilot might conclude that, if another plane 
changes its course to intersect his own, it is probably an enemy fighter. To support 
such reasoning, a cognitive architecture must first be able to represent relationships 
among beliefs. Reasoning plays an important role not only when inferring new 
beliefs but when deciding whether to maintain existing ones. To the extent that 
certain beliefs depend on others, an agent should track the latter to determine 
whether it should continue to believe the former, abandon it, or otherwise alter its 
confidence. Such belief maintenance is especially important for dynamic 
environments in which situations may change in unexpected ways, with 
implications for the agent's behaviour. One general response to this issue involves 
Cohen and Levesque (through: Wooldridge& Jennings, 1995) identify seven 
properties that must be satisfied by a reasonable theory of intention: 
1. Intentions pose problems for agents, who need to determine ways of 
achieving them. 
2. Intentions provide a ‘filter’ for adopting other intentions, which must not 
conflict. 
3. Agents track the success of their intentions, and are inclined to try again if 
their attempts fail. 
4. Agents believe their intentions are possible. 
5. Agents do not believe they will not bring about their intentions. 
6. Under certain circumstances, agents believe they will bring about their 
intentions. 
7. Agents need not intend all the expected side effects of their intentions. 
Table 3.1: Properties of Intention. 
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maintaining dependency structures in memory that connect beliefs and that the 
architecture can use to propagate changes as they occur (Langley& Laird, 2002,pp. 
10-11 ). 
3.2.6 Planning: 
For many years, planning had a quite specific meaning in AI. It was the 
process of formulating a program of action to achieve some specified goal 
(Pollack, 1992). Plans are means of achieving certain future world states. In 
addition plan is a way of realising a goal (Winikoff et al, 2001). A plan for 
achieving a goal provides a function which returns the next action to be performed. 
This function takes into account the current state of the world (beliefs), what 
actions have already been performed, and might involve sub-goals and further 
plans. Intuitively, plans are an abstract specification of both the means for 
achieving certain desires and the options available to the agent (ibid). An agent has 
a simple plan if and only if she believes that all the acts in that plan play a role in it 
by generating another act (Pollack, 1990, p.89). 
Winikoff et al (2001) argued that each plan has: 
1. A body describing the primitive actions or sub-goals that have to be achieved 
for plan execution to be successful;  
2. An invocation condition which specifies the triggering event, and  
3. A context condition which specifies the situation in which the plan is 
applicable. 
In addition, there are two mainly types of planning, hierarchical and 
conditional planning (Russell & Norving, 1995). Hierarchical planning is an 
approach to decomposing the planning into multiple levels of abstraction. At a 
higher level, a planner may find a sequence of places to go, while at a lower level, 
concrete movement instructions for the effectors of the agent must be found. 
Resolving the plan directly at the lower level would produce a much longer plan. 
At the lowest level, primitive operators complete the plan which can be executed 
Chapter Three: Agents – Fundamentals, Types & Evaluation Criteria. 
 
74 
directly by the agent. Conditional Planning deals with incomplete information by 
constructing a conditional plan that accounts for each possible situation. The agent 
finds out which part of the plan to execute by including its sensory information in 
the plan to test for the appropriate conditions. The major disadvantage of 
conditional planning is the big number of possible conditions, which grows 
exponentially with the number of steps in the plan. Another approach with 
incomplete or incorrect information is execution monitoring. Here, the agent 
monitors what is happening and can therefore decide on what is going on and 
when things went wrong. In this case, a re-planning has to be done to find a new 
plan from the unexpected situation.  
Pollack (1990) summarized the analysis of having a plan as follows:  
An agent “A” has a plan to do “β” that consists in doing some set of acts “II” 
provided that: 
1. “A” believes that he can execute each act in “II”. 
2. “A” believes that executing the acts in “II” will entail the performance of “β”. 
3. “A” believes that each act in “II” plays a role in his plan.  
4. “A” intends to execute each act in “II”. 
5. “A” intends to execute “II” as a way of doing “β”. 
6. “A” intends each act in “II” to play a role in his plan 
Intelligent agents that operate in and monitor dynamic environments must 
often modify existing plans in response to unanticipated changes. This can occur in 
several contexts. For instance, an agent should update its plan when it detects a 
changed situation that makes some planned activities inapplicable, and thus 
requires other actions. Another context occurs when a new situation suggests some 
more desirable way of accomplishing the agent's goal; such opportunistic planning 
can take advantage of these unexpected changes. Monitoring a plan's execution can 
also lead to revised estimates about the plan's effectiveness, and ultimately to a 
decision to pursue some other course of action with greater potential. Re-planning 
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can draw on the same mechanisms as generating a plan from scratch, but requires 
additional operators for removing actions or replacing them with other steps. 
Similar methods can also adapt to the current situation a known plan the agent has 
retrieved from memory (Langley& Laird, 2002, pp.9-10). 
3.2.7 Decision making and choice:  
The essence of intelligent agents is rational decision making. An important 
aspect in decision making is balancing proactive and reactive aspects. On the one 
hand we want the agent to stick with its goals by default; on the other hand we 
want it to take changes in the environment into account (Winikoff et al, 2001).  
In other words, to operate in an environment, an intelligent system requires 
the ability to make decisions and select among alternatives. To support decision 
making, a cognitive architecture must provide some way to represent alternative 
choices or actions, whether these are internal cognitive operations or external ones. 
It must also offer some process for selecting among these alternatives, which most 
architectures separate into two steps: 
 The first determines whether a given choice or action is allowable, 
typically by associating it with some pattern and considering it only if the pattern 
is matched. For instance, one can specify the conditions under which a chess move 
is legal, then consider that move only when the conditions are met. 
 The second step selects among allowable alternatives, often by computing 
some numeric score and choosing one or more with better scores. Finally, an ideal 
cognitive architecture should incorporate some way to improve its decisions 
through learning (Langley& Laird, 2002). 
3.2.8 Prediction and monitoring: 
Cognitive architectures exist over time, which means they can benefit from 
an ability to predict future situations and events accurately. For example, a good 
driver knows approximately when his car will run out of gas. Perfect prediction 
may not be possible in many situations, but perfection is seldom necessary to make 
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predictions that are useful to an intelligent system. Prediction requires some model 
of the environment and the effect actions have on it, and the architecture must 
somehow represent this model in memory.  
One general approach involves storing some mapping from a description of 
the current situation and an action onto a description of the resulting situation. 
Another instead encodes the effects of actions or events in terms of changes to the 
environment. In either case, the architecture also requires some mechanism that 
uses these knowledge structures to predict future situations, say by recognizing a 
class of situations in which an action will have certain effects. An ideal 
architecture should also include the ability to learn predictive models from 
experience and to refine them over time. Once an architecture has a mechanism for 
making predictions, it can utilize those predictions to monitor the environment. 
Because monitoring relates sensing to prediction, it raises issues of attentional 
focus when an architecture has limited perceptual resources. Monitoring also 
supports learning, since errors in prediction can help an agent improve its model of 
the environment (ibid, p. 8). 
3.2.9 Execution, action and control: 
Based on its perception, the agent has to choose an action which it is going 
to execute (Niederberger & Gross, 2002, p.42). There are a number of questions 
which intelligent agents must answer, such as: Which action shall I perform now? 
Which goal do I work on now? How shall I attempt to realise this goal? Where 
shall I go now (for mobile agents)? And who shall I interact with (for social 
agents)?  Mechanisms to answer these kinds of questions are core intelligent agent 
processes. (Winikoff et al, 2001). 
Cognition occurs to support and drive activity in the environment. To this 
end, a cognitive architecture must be able to represent and store motor skills that 
enable such activity. For example, a mobile ground robot or unmanned air vehicle 
should have skills or policies for navigating from one place to another, for 
manipulating its surroundings with effectors, and for coordinating its behaviour 
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with other agents on its team. These may be encoded solely in terms of primitive 
or component actions, but they may also specify more complex multi-step skills or 
procedures. The latter may take the form of plans that the agent has generated or 
retrieved from memory, especially in architectures that have grown out of work on 
problem solving and planning. However, other formulations of motor skill 
execution, such as closed-loop controllers, have also been explored. 
A cognitive architecture must also be able to execute skills and actions in 
the environment. In some frameworks, this happens in a completely reactive 
manner, with the agent selecting one or more primitive actions on each decision 
cycle, executing them, and repeating the process on the next cycle. This approach 
is associated with closed-loop strategies for execution, since the agent can also 
sense the environment on each time step. The utilization of more complex skills 
supports open- loop execution, in which the agent calls upon a stored procedure 
across many cycles without checking the environment. However, a flexible 
architecture should support the entire continuum from fully reactive, closed-loop 
behaviour to automatized, open-loop behaviour, as can humans. 
Ideally, a cognitive architecture should also be able learn about skills and 
execution policies from instruction and experience. Such learning can take 
different forms, many of which parallel those that arise in planning and problem 
solving. For example, an agent can learn by observing another agent's behaviour, 
by successfully achieving its goals, and from delayed reward signals. Similarly, it 
can learn or refine its knowledge for selecting primitive actions, either in terms of 
heuristic conditions on their application or as a numeric evaluation function that 
reflects their utility. Alternatively, an agent can acquire or revise complex skills in 
terms of known skills or actions (Langley& Laird, 2002, p.11). 
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3.2.10 Interaction and communication: 
Sometimes the most effective way for an agent to obtain knowledge is from 
another agent, making communication another important ability that an 
architecture should support. A communicating agent must represent the knowledge 
that it aims to convey or that it believes another agent intends for it. The content so 
transferred can involve any of the cognitive activities that have been discussed so 
far. Thus, two agents can communicate about categories recognized and decisions 
made, about perceptions and actions, about predictions and anomalies, and about 
plans and inferences. A cognitive architecture should also support mechanisms for 
Comment 
A traditional argument for both psychology and artificial 
intelligence addresses components and mechanisms for such an 
intelligent agent, in which the problems of intelligence are to transform 
perception into a useful mental representation; apply a cognitive 
process to create a representation of desired actions. Moreover, 
cognitive psychology considers psychic processes (i.e., thinking, 
learning, and memory-processes, as processes of information 
processing). There are a lot of theoretical systems which describe 
human thought as information processing. However, how could one 
describe motivation and emotion in terms of information processing? 
The answer of the previous question, and a variety of factors and 
features that will be important to consider when building robots that are 
meant to act autonomously, will be described in chapter four when we 
demonstrate Dörner’s approach (PSI-theory). Briefly, Dörner is 
interested in action regulation of human being, in which man is 
considered not only a cognitive system in the sense of contemporary 
cognitive science, but also a motivated emotional-cognitive system. 
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transforming knowledge into the form and medium through which it will be 
communicated. The most common form is spoken or written language, which 
follows established conventions for semantics, syntax, and pragmatics onto which 
an agent must map the content it wants to convey. Generation of language can be 
viewed as a form of planning and execution, whereas understanding of language 
can be viewed as a form of perception and inference. However, the specialized 
nature of natural language makes these views misleading, since the task raises 
many additional issues. 
An important form of communication occurs in conversational dialogues, 
which require both generation and understanding of natural language, as well as 
coordination with the other agent in the form of turn taking. Learning is also an 
important issue in language and other forms of communication, and some 
communicative tasks, like question answering, require access to memory for past 
events and cognitive activities (Langley& Laird, 2002, pp.11-12 ). 
3.2.11 Memory, learning and self-reflection: 
A cognitive architecture can also benefit from capabilities that cut across 
those described in the previous sections, in that they operate on mental structures 
produced or utilized by them. One capacity of this sort involves remembering - the 
ability to encode and store the results of cognitive processing in memory and to 
retrieve or access them later. An agent cannot remember external situations or its 
own physical actions; it can only recall cognitive structures that describe those 
events or inferences about them. This idea extends naturally to memories of 
problem solving, reasoning, and communication. To support remembering about 
any cognitive activity, the architecture must store the cognitive structures 
generated during that activity, index them in memory, and retrieve them when 
needed. The resulting structures are often referred to as episodic memory (ibid, 
pp.11-12). 
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Another capability that requires access to traces of cognitive activity is 
reflection. This may involve processing of either recent mental structures that are 
still available or older structures that the agent must retrieve from episodic 
memory. One type of reflective activity concerns the justification or explanation of 
an agent's inferences, plans, decisions, or actions in terms of cognitive steps that 
led to them. Another revolves around meta-reasoning about other cognitive 
activities, which an architecture can apply to the same areas as explanation, but 
which emphasizes their generation (e.g., forming inferences or making plans) 
rather than their justification. To the extent that reflective processes lay down their 
own cognitive traces, they may themselves be subject to reflection. However, an 
architecture can also support reflection through less transparent mechanisms, such 
as statistical analyses, that are not themselves inspectable by the agent. 
A final important ability that applies to many cognitive activities is 
learning. It has been discussed previously the various forms this can take, in the 
context of different architectural capacities, but we should also consider broader 
issues. Unlike the storage of cognitive structures in episodic memory, learning 
involves generalization beyond specific beliefs and events. Although most 
architectures carry out this generalization at storage time and enter generalized 
knowledge structures in memory, it can instead happen at retrieval time through 
analogical or case-based reasoning. Either approach can lead to different degrees 
of generalization or transfer, ranging from very similar tasks, to other tasks within 
the same domain, and even to tasks within related but distinct domains (Langley& 
Laird, 2002, pp.11-12 ). 
 Many architectures treat learning as an automatic process that is not subject 
to inspection or conscious control, but one can also use meta-reasoning to support 
learning in a more deliberate manner. The data on which learning operates may 
come from many sources, including observation of another agent, an agent's own 
problem solving behaviour, or practice of known skills. But whatever the source of 
experience, all involve processing of memory structures to improve the agent's 
capabilities (ibid, pp. 12-13). 
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3.3 Types of Agents  
3.3.1 Introduction: 
There are several dimensions to classify agents. Firstly, agents may be 
classified by their mobility (i.e., by their ability to move around some network). 
Secondly, they may be classed or ranked from least to most complex as either 
deliberative (goal-based agents and utility-based agents) or reactive (simple 
reflexive agents and reflexive agents with internal state). Deliberative agents 
possess an internal symbolic reasoning model, and they engage in planning and 
negotiation with other agents in order to achieve their goals. On other hand, 
reactive agents do not have any internal symbolic models of their environment, 
and they act using “a stimulus− response” type of behaviour by responding to the 
present state of the environment in which they are embedded. Thirdly, agents may 
be classified along several attributes which ideally they should exhibit such as; 
autonomy, learning and co-operation. For example, learning agent learns action 
policies from previous encounters with similar situations, and these policies 
become increasingly accurate as experience accumulates. 
 
Hybrid 
agents 
Collaborative 
agents 
Interface 
agents 
Reactive 
agents 
Information 
agents 
Heterogeneous 
agents 
An agent 
typology 
Smart 
agents 
Mobile 
agents 
Figure 3.7: A classification of software agents. 
Source: (Nwana, 1996). 
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Nwana (1996) introduced eight major categories of agent as shown in figure 3.7: 
1. Collaborative agents: Collaborative Agents emphasize autonomy and 
cooperation (with other agents) in order to perform tasks for their owners. They 
may learn, but this aspect is not typically a major emphasis of their operation. In 
order to have a coordinated set up of collaborative agents, they may have to 
negotiate in order to reach mutually acceptable agreements on some matters. 
2. Interface agents: Interface Agents emphasize autonomy and learning in order 
to perform tasks for their owners. They support and provide assistance, typically 
to a user learning to use a particular application such as a spreadsheet or an 
operating system. The user’s agent observes and monitors the actions taken by 
the user in the interface (i.e., ‘watches over the shoulder of its user’), learns new 
‘shortcuts’, and suggests better ways of doing the task.  
3. Mobile agents: Mobile agents are computational software processes capable of 
roaming wide area networks such as the WWW, interacting with foreign hosts, 
gathering information on behalf of its owner and coming ‘back home’ having 
performed the duties set by its user.  
4. Information agents: In short, Information agents perform the role of managing, 
manipulating or collating information from many distributed sources. 
5. Reactive agents: In sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3., reactive agents will be discussed.  
6. Hybrid agents: Hybrid agents refer to those whose constitution is a 
combination of two or more agent philosophies within a singular agent. These 
philosophies include a mobile philosophy, an interface agent philosophy, 
collaborative agent philosophy, etc. 
7. Heterogeneous agents: Heterogeneous agent systems, unlike hybrid systems, 
refer to an integrated set-up of at least two or more agents which belong to two 
or more different agent classes. A heterogeneous agent system may also contain 
one or more hybrid agents. 
8. Smart agents.  
                                                 

 For further details about agents’ applications and internet see (Maes, 1997). 
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Types of reactive and deliberative agents will be shortly shown:  
3.3.2 Simple reflex agent: 
Description:  
Simple reflex agents (also called stimulus-response agents) just react to the 
current situation at each time step with no memory of past actions or situations. In 
other words, it responds immediately to its percepts (Niederberger & Gross, 2002, 
p.34). This type of agent is generally very responsive because, without contextual 
information, the proper reaction to the current situation can be calculated very 
quickly (Laird & van Lent, 1999, p.579). The decision is based on so called 
condition-action rules, which are simple if-then relations. Humans have many such 
reflexes, for example closing the eyes when something is approaching them. The 
whole knowledge of the agent is then encoded into these rules (see: Niederberger 
& Gross, 2002, p.34).  Stimulus-response agents can also implement multiple 
behaviours but aren’t easily able to represent higher level tactics (Laird & van 
Lent, 1999, p.579). Figure (3.8) and table (3.2) give the structure of a simple reflex 
agent in schematic form, showing how the condition–action rules allow the agent 
to make the connection from percept to action. 
Limitations: 
Simple-reflex-agents use simple if-then rules match percepts to actions, and 
respond immediately to percepts (Niederberger & Gross, 2002, p.33). No need to 
consider all percepts, and it can generalize percepts by mapping to the same action. 
Moreover, it could adapt to changes in the environment by adding rules. Although 
such agents can be implemented very efficiently, their range of applicability is 
very narrow. Even for very simple environments, the need for an internal state 
arises to keep track of specific information, when the complete access to the 
environment is not guaranteed (ibid, p.34). 
 The following problems could be found in such architecture:  
 
1. May be too big to generate and store.    2.  Not adaptive to changes in the 
environment; instead entire table must be updated if changes occur.  
3. No knowledge of non-perceptual parts of the current state. 
4. Reacts only to current percept.                   5.  No history remembered. 
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Table 3.2:  A simple reflex agent.  
It works by finding a rule whose condition matches the current situation 
(as defined by the percept) and then doing the action associated with 
that rule (ibid, p.41). 
 
Figure 3.8:  Schematic diagram of a simple reflex agent. 
Source: (Russell & Norving, 1995, p.41). 
Agent Sensors 
What the world 
is like now 
What action I 
should do now 
Effectors 
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function Simple-Reflex-Agent (percept) returns 
action 
static: rules, a set of condition-action rules 
state - Interpret-Input (percept) 
rule - Rule-Match (state, rules) 
action - Rule-Action (rule) 
Condition-action rules 
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3.3.3 Reflex agent with an internal state: 
Description: 
The simple reflex agent described before will work only if the correct 
decision can be made on the basis of the current percept. Unfortunately, in some 
cases, the agent may need to maintain some internal state information in order to 
distinguish between world states that generate the same perceptual input but 
nonetheless are significantly different. Here, “significantly different” means that 
different actions are appropriate in the two states. Updating this internal state 
information as time goes by requires two kinds of knowledge to be encoded in the 
agent program. First, we need some information about how the world evolves 
independently of the agent. Second, we need some information about how the 
agent’s own actions affect the world. Figure (3.9) gives the structure of the reflex 
agent, showing how the current percept is combined with the old internal state to 
generate the updated description of the current state. Table (3.3) shows the agent 
program. The interesting part is the function “update-state”, which is responsible 
for creating the new internal state description.  
3.3.4 Goal-based agents: 
Description: 
Knowing about the current state of the environment is not always enough to 
decide what to do. In other words, the agent needs some sort of goal information, 
which describes situations that are desirable. The agent program can combine this 
with information about the results of possible actions (the same information as was 
used to update internal state in the reflex agent) in order to choose actions that 
achieve the goal. Sometimes this will be simple, when goal satisfaction results 
immediately from a single action. Moreover, decision–making of this kind is 
fundamentally different from the condition–action rules, in that it involves 
consideration of the future—both “What will happen if I do such-and-such?” and 
“Will that make me happy?” Figure (3.10) and table (3.4) show the goal-based 
agent’s structure. 
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Table 3.3: A reflex agent with internal state. It works by finding a 
rule whose condition matches the current situation (as defined by 
the percept and the stored internal state) and then doing the action 
associated with that rule (ibid, p.43). 
 
 
Agent Sensors 
Effectors 
What the world 
is like now 
What action I 
should do now Condition-action rules 
State 
How the world evolves 
What my actions do 
En
v
ir
o
n
m
en
t 
Figure 3.9: A reflex agent with internal state. 
                              Source: (Russell & Norving, 1995, p.43). 
 
function Reflex-Agent-With-State (percept) returns 
action 
static: state, a description of the current world state 
           rules, a set of condition-action rules 
state - UpDate-State (state, percept) 
rule - Rule-Match (state, rules) 
action - Rule-Action (rule) 
state -  UpDate-State (state, action) 
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Figure 3.10: An agent with explicit goals. 
Source: (Russell & Norving, 1995, p.44). 
 
Agent 
Effectors 
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function Reflex-Agent-With-State-And-Goals 
(percept) returns action 
static: state, a description of the current world state 
           rules, a set of condition-action rules  
           goals, a set of goals 
state - UpDate-State (state, percept) 
rule - Rule-Match (state, rules, goal) 
action - Rule-Action (rule) 
state -  UpDate-State (state, action) 
return action 
 
Table 3.4: Goal-based agent. Actions chosen to achieve a desired 
situation and goals help decide which situations are good. 
 
Sensors 
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Limitations:  
Although the goal-based agent appears less efficient, it is more flexible with 
respect to reaching different destinations. Moreover, goal-based agents may have 
to consider long sequences of possible actions before deciding if goal is achieved.  
3.3.5 Utility-based agents: 
Description: 
Goals alone are not really enough to generate high-quality behaviour 
because of, for example, many action sequences that should be taken. Goals just 
provide a crude distinction between “happy” and “unhappy” states, whereas a 
more general performance measure should allow a comparison of different world 
states (or sequences of states) according to exactly how happy they would make 
the agent if they could be achieved. Because “happy” does not sound very 
scientific, the customary terminology is to say that if one world state is preferred to 
another, then it has higher utility for the agent utility is therefore a function that 
maps a state onto a real number, which describes the associated degree of 
happiness.  
Limitations: 
A complete specification of the utility function allows rational decisions in 
two kinds of cases where goals have trouble. Firstly, when there are conflicting 
goals, only some of which can be achieved (for example, speed and safety), the 
utility function specifies the appropriate trade-off. Secondly, when there are 
several goals that the agent can aim for, none of which can be achieved with 
certainty, utility provides a way in which the likelihood of success can be weighed 
up against the importance of the goals. The overall utility-based agent structure 
appears in Figure (3.11) and table (3.5). 
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Figure 3.11: A complete utility-based agent. 
Source: (Russell & Norving, 1995, p.44). 
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Effectors 
function Utility-Based-Agent(percept) 
static: a set of probabilistic beliefs about the state of the 
world 
Update-Probs-for-Current-State(percept,old-action) 
Update-Probs-for-Actions(state, actions) 
Select-Action-with-Highest-Utility(probs) 
return action 
 
Table  3.5: Utility-based agent.  
Utility-based agents try to maximize their own “happiness” 
which is expressed with a so called utility function 
(Niederberger & Gross, 2002, p.33). 
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3.4 Evaluation Criteria 
Any intelligent system that involves integration of many components is 
designed to engage in certain activities; taken together, these activities constitute 
its functional capabilities. In this section, we will discuss the capabilities that a 
cognitive architecture can support and what the architecture as a system should do 
towards fulfilling those capabilities. 
3.4.1 The behavioural capabilities of an agent: 
The behavioural capabilities of an agent cover its interaction with the world 
and the other characters (Laird, 1999). In this section we will concentrate on the 
characteristics of behavioural capabilities that seem to be generally useful for 
agents. 
                                                 

 For further details about agents’ components see (Dörner,1999; Wooldridge &    
   Jennings, 1994; Schmidt, 2002). 
Brooks (1997, p. 402) considered some of the requirements for creatures 
(agents): 
• A creature must cope appropriately and in a timely fashion with changes in 
its dynamic environment. 
• A creature should be robust with respect to its environment. Minor changes 
in the properties of the world should not lead to total collapse of the 
creature’s behaviour; rather one should expect only a gradual change in 
capabilities of the creature as the environment changes more and more. 
• A creature should be able to maintain multiple goals and, depending on the 
circumstances it finds itself in, change which particular goals it is actively 
pursuing; thus it can both adapt to surroundings and capitalize on fortuitous 
circumstances. 
• A creature should do something in the world; it should have some purpose in 
being. 
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In addition, Laird and Van Lent (1999) argued that an effective artificial 
intelligence engine should support agents that are: 
1- Reactive.   2- Context Specific.   3- Flexible.   4- Realistic.   5- Easy to develop. 
Moreover, they emphasized that each of the components of the artificial 
intelligence engine must be carefully designed to implement the five requirements 
above. 
Furthermore, Laird (1999) defined the following capabilities that should be 
also considered:  
1. Human sensing: The ability of a character to sense things in the 
environment should be similar to the abilities of a human in the game. The 
character should not have superhuman abilities, such as seeing through walls 
(unless the character is superman) and should not have subhuman abilities 
(being unable to hear someone running up from behind in a quiet room). 
2. Human actions: A character should be able to perform actions in the 
environment that correspond roughly to what a human could do in a similar 
environment. 
3. Human-level reaction times: Humans do not respond instantaneously to 
changes in their environment, nor do they take arbitrarily long to respond 
(unless distracted). 
4. Spatial reasoning: Many games are only 2D Cartesian grids where spatial 
reasoning is straightforward. However, the topology of a game from the 
standpoint of a character can be complex as obstacle, shortcuts, and a third 
dimension are added. 
5. Memory: Most current game characters can be described as, “out of sight, 
out of mind”, which leads to very inhuman-like behaviour. Thus, complex 
characters need to maintain memories of the world and have a model of how 
the world changes over time. 
6. Common sense reasoning: This is the most dreaded of all classes of 
reasoning in AI because it is completely ill-defined. The only viable 
approach seems to be to determine what knowledge is necessary for the 
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tactics you wish to encode in your character and then encode the necessary 
common-sense knowledge to support those tactics. But this is insufficient if 
you wish to develop characters that develop their own tactics. 
7. Goals: Characters must have a purpose, some goal they are trying to achieve. 
Often, there will be multiple goals, and the character has to decide which 
one to pursue or which actions pursue multiple goals. The goals should drive 
the actions of the character. 
8. Tactics: A character should have a variety of tactics or methods that can be 
applied to achieving goals. 
9. Planning: Planning provides the ability to try out actions internal, discover 
consequences, avoid death and destruction. Many of the benefits of planning 
can be compiled into a knowledge base when you know the world and goals 
beforehand. 
10. Communication and coordination: For many games, the underlying goals 
for the characters require that they cooperate with other characters, and 
possibly the human player. The characters need to communicate in realistic 
ways and coordinate their behaviour as would humans. 
11. Learning: For most games, learning can be avoided. It is only an issue for 
characters that have prolonged interactions with the human players. 
Learning is sometimes difficult to implement and can lead to unexpected 
and undesirable behaviour unless carefully controlled. However, Bradshaw 
(1997, p.7) noted that ideally, an agent that functions continuously in an 
environment over a long period of time would be able to learn from its 
experience.  
12. Unpredictable behaviour: As with all of the capabilities covered here, non-
determinism itself is less important than the illusion of unpredictability. It 
also depends on context. When there is only one right thing to do, then being 
predictable is fine. However, if a character has a sufficiently broad and rich 
set of fine-grained responses, its behaviour may be very difficult to predict. 
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13. Personality: Personality can be thought of what distinguishes one character 
from another above and beyond gross characteristics such as physical build 
and general mental capability. 
14. Emotions: Unfortunately, there are no comprehensive computational 
models of how emotions impact behaviour. What are the triggers for anger? 
How does anger impact other behaviours? However, as with personality, the 
expression and influence of emotion may be critical to creating the illusion 
of human behaviour. 
15. Physiological stressors: In addition to emotions, there are other 
physiological changes that happen to people that in turn impacts their 
behaviour. In computer games, there is often a collective component of 
health, although the level of health rarely changes the behaviour of a 
character except when it goes down to zero (and the character dies). Other 
stressors include fatigue, heat, chemicals, radiation, ..etc. 
3.4.2 Capabilities related to learning: 
Introduction: 
It is generally accepted by the artificial intelligence community that 
learning is a desirable and useful capability of a generally intelligent agent. This 
learning can take a number of forms, and the matter of which type of learning is 
most appropriate depends both on the researcher and the particular agent in 
question. Some systems include mechanisms for multiple learning methods in 
order to various components of their system to learn in their own ways. An agent is 
considered learnable when there are adaptive changes in its behaviour based on its 
previous experience (Franklin & Graesser, 1997). In the following, briefly 
                                                 

 For further details about agents’ emotions and facial expressions see (Kaiser et       
   al. ,1998; Kaiser & Wehrle, 2001; Moldt & von Scheve, 2001; André et al.,     
   2000; Bui et al. , 2001; Bartneck, 2001; Belavkin, 2004; Scheutz et al. , 2000;  
   Scheutz, 2002; Wehrle, 1998; Rickel et al., 2001). 
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definitions of essential terms demonstrated by University of Michigan (artificial 
intelligence center) will be discussed and for further details about agents in 
general and agents’ criteria see (Alonso et al. , 2001; Wallace & Laird, 2003; 
Ekdahl, 2001; Horn et al. , 1999; Aylett & Luck, 2000; Floridi & Sanders, 2001; 
Norman & Long, 1995; Stahl, 2004). 
1- Reflexive learning: 
Generally, reflexive learning is learning that is done "automatically". 
Reflexive systems learn everything, even knowledge that does not promise to 
enhance the agent's behaviour. This extra knowledge threatens to slow the agent, 
since it must be searched each time the agent attempts to retrieve a piece of 
knowledge. An agent learns reflexively when there is no decision about when to 
learn. Reflexive mechanisms are generally architectural; thus, what is learned and 
the resource from which the information is learned is usually also determined 
without explicit deliberation. The advantage of a reflexive approach is speed in 
what is learned. The disadvantages come from investing too much time in learning, 
especially when the utility of what is being learned is poor. 
A general paradigm for behaviour is “Perceive-Think-Act”. However, in 
order to react quickly to dynamic environmental events, some architectures 
respond instantly to external stimuli, a quality often called reflexiveness. This may 
lend the system some extra speed when the event has been experienced previously 
(i.e., the reflex may be learned as well as innate) and the reaction can be performed 
instantly without having to plan a response. Other systems always deliberate 
before acting. 
2- Monotonic vs. non-monotonic learning: 
If an agent may not learn any knowledge that contradicts what it already 
knows then it is said to learn monotonically. For example, it may not replace a 
statement with its negation. Thus, the knowledge base may only grow with new 
facts in a monotonic fashion. The advantages of monotonic learning are greatly 
                                                 

 http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/cogarch0 
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simplified truth-maintenance, and greater choice in learning strategies. Since 
learning consists of the addition of new facts to the database, it may not be 
appropriate for all environments, although many simulated environments may be 
assumed to be consistent. In these cases a non-monotonic learning method is 
necessary. 
An agent that may learn knowledge that contradicts what it already knows 
is said to learn non-monotonically. So, it may replace old knowledge with new if it 
believes there is sufficient reason to do so. The advantages of non-monotonic 
learning are increased applicability to real domains, and greater freedom in the 
order things are learned in. Architectures that are constrained to add only 
knowledge consistent with what has already been learned are said to learn 
monotonically. 
3- Learning by analogy: 
Learning by analogy generally involves abstracting details from a particular 
set of problems and resolving structural similarities between previously distinct 
problems. Analogical reasoning refers to this process of recognition and then 
applying the solution from the known problem to the new problem. Such  
technique is often identified as case-based reasoning. Analogical learning 
generally involves developing a set of mappings between features of two instances. 
4- Learning by abstraction: 
Contrasted with concept acquisition, abstraction is the ability to detect the 
relevant or critical information and action for a particular problem. Abstraction is 
often used in planning and problem solving in order to form a condition list for 
operators that lead from one complex state to another based on the criticality of the 
precondition. For instance, in an office environment, a robot with a master key can 
effectively ignore doors if it knows how to open doors in general. Thus, the 
problem of considering doors in a larger plan may be abstracted from the problem 
solving. This can be performed by the agent repeatedly to obtain the most general 
result. 
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5- Learning by instruction: 
An agent that is given information about the environment, domain 
knowledge, or how to accomplish a particular task is said to be able to learn from 
instruction. Some instruction is given by a programmer, who simply gives the 
agent the knowledge in a sequential series of instructions. Other learning is 
interactive; the programmer is prepared to instruct the agent when the agent lacks 
knowledge and requests it. This last method supports experiential learning in 
which a teacher may act as both a guide (when called upon) and as an authority 
(when the agent is placing itself in danger or making a critical mistake). 
6- Learning from experimentation: 
Learning from experimentation, also called discovery, involves the use of 
domain knowledge, along with observations made about the environment, to 
extend and refine an agent's domain knowledge. An agent manipulates its 
environment to determine new information. 
7- Generalization and transfer learning: 
Generalization is the ability to apply knowledge and information gained in 
completing some task to other tasks and situations. Humans generalize routinely. 
Generalization can result from a number of different learning strategies including 
explanation-based learning, analogical learning, and abstraction learning. The 
generality of an architecture is an explanation of the types of tasks and 
environments the architecture can successfully deal with. This can be thought of as 
an effect of an architecture's versatility and taskability.  
Transfer learning is capability that comes from generalization and is related 
to learning by analogy. Learned information can be applied to other problem 
instances and possibly even other instances. Three specific types of learning 
transfer are normally identified:  
Within -Trial: Learning applies immediately to the current situation. 
Within-Task: Learning is general enough that it may apply to different problem 
instances in the same domain. Across-Task: Learning applies to different domains. 
1. Within -Trial: Learning applies immediately to the current situation. 
2. Within-Task: Learning is general enough that it may apply to different 
problem instances in the same domain.  
3. Across-Task: Learning applies to different domains. 
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3.4.3 Capabilities related to planning: 
1- Coherence: 
Coherence refers to an agent's ability to resolve conflicts between 
competing or conflicting goals. Moreover, even though many behaviours may be 
active at once, or may be actively switched on or off, the creature should still 
appear to an observer to have coherence of actions and goals. It should not be 
rapidly switching between inconsistent behaviours, nor should two behaviours be 
active simultaneously, if they interfere with each other to the point that neither 
operates successfully (Brooks, 1991, p.46). 
2- Deliberative and context specific: 
Wooldridge and Jennings (1995, p.42) defined deliberative agent or agent 
architecture as: 
 “One that possesses an explicitly represented, symbolic model of the 
world, and in which decisions (for example about what actions to perform) are 
made via symbolic reasoning”.  
Context specific agents ensure that their actions are consistent with past 
sensor information and the agent’s past actions (Laird & van Lent, 1999, p.579). 
3- Veracity: 
Veracity is the assumption that an agent will not knowingly (intentionally) 
communicate false information (see: Wooldridge& Jennings, 1995). 
4- Taskability: 
The taskability of an architecture is its ability to perform different tasks 
based on external commands from a human or from some other agent. For 
instance, can the architecture be asked to do various tasks without having to be 
reprogrammed or rewired? (Laird, 1991, p.12). The more tasks an architecture can 
perform in response to such commands, and the greater their diversity, the greater 
its taskability (Langley& Laird, 2002, p.19). 
 
Chapter Three: Agents – Fundamentals, Types & Evaluation Criteria. 
 
98 
5- Reactivity and persistence: 
Reactive agent means that the agent is one that perceives its environment, 
recognizes features of it, maintains an ongoing interaction with it, and responds to 
changes that occur in it (in a timely manner for the response to be useful) 
(Winikoff et al, 2001; Laird & Van Lent, 2000; Franklin & Graesser,1997; 
Bradshaw, 1997). We can measure an architecture's reactivity in terms of the speed 
with which it responds to unexpected situations or events, or in terms of the 
probability that it will respond on a given recognize-act cycle. The more rapidly an 
architecture responds, or the greater its chances of responding, the greater its 
reactivity (Langley& Laird, 2002, p.21). 
 Fully reactive agent has no memory, thus it does not have state, and it just 
responds to stimuli. Reactive agent is characterized by a direct connection between 
sensors and effectors. A fully reactive agent has several advantages because its 
behaviour is linked directly to sensing, and it is able to respond quickly to new 
changes in the environment and those reactions are specific to the current situation 
(Laird & van Lent, 1999, p.579). Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) defined a 
reactive architecture to be one that does not include any kind of central symbolic 
world model, and does not use complex symbolic reasoning. 
Despite the importance of reactivity, we should note that, in many contexts, 
persistence is equally crucial. An architecture that always responds immediately to 
small environmental changes may lose sight of its longer-term objectives and 
oscillate from one activity to another, with no higher purpose. We can measure 
persistence as the degree to which an architecture continues to pursue its goals 
despite changes in the environment. Reactivity and persistence are not opposites, 
although they may appear so at first glance. An agent can react to short-term 
changes while still continuing to pursue its long-term objectives (Langley& Laird, 
2002, p.21). 
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6- Scalability:  
An architecture is considered to be scalable if it can handle increasingly 
complex problems that demand a greater amount of knowledge. The scalability 
depends on whether the architecture can scale up to bigger and bigger problems 
with more knowledge? (Laird, 1991, p.12). Because architectures must handle 
tasks and situations of different difficulty, we want to know its scalability. Making 
architectures more scalable with respect to increased knowledge remains an open 
research issue (Langley& Laird, 2002, p. 20).  
7- Efficiency: 
The efficiency of an architecture is its ability to do a task within certain 
time and space constraints. And because cognitive architectures must be used in 
practice, they must be able to perform tasks within certain time and space 
constraints. Thus, efficiency is another important metric to utilize when evaluating 
an architecture. We can measure an architecture's space and time efficiency as a 
function of task complexity, environmental uncertainty, length of operation, and 
other complicating factors. We can examine an architecture's complexity profile 
across a range of problems and amounts of knowledge. The less an architecture's 
efficiency is affected by these factors, the greater its scalability (ibid).  
In summary, an agent can be measured for efficiency in three ways:  
1. The implicit representation of state in the form of the task queue is minimal.  
2. The automatic failure recovery occurs very fast.  
3. Operations that are no longer of use can be aborted. 
3.4.4 Capabilities related to robotic agent: 
1- Autonomous: 
Autonomy concept refers to goal-directedness, proactive and self-starting 
behaviour (Bradshaw, 1997, p.8). Autonomic agents operate without the direct 
intervention of humans or others, and have some kind of control over their actions 
and internal state (Wooldridge& Jennings, 1995). One can consider that autonomy 
is the first order, while self-reflection is the second order of autonomy concept. 
                                                 

 For further details see (http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/cogarch0/atlantis/issue/eff.html). 
Chapter Three: Agents – Fundamentals, Types & Evaluation Criteria. 
 
100 
Without this property –autonomy-, an agent would no longer be a dynamic entity, 
but rather a passive object. Subsequently, autonomous agents have individual 
internal states and goals, and they act in such a manner as to meet its goals. In 
addition, by autonomy, we mean the ability of the systems to make their own 
decisions and to execute tasks on the designer’s behalf (Alonso, 2002, p.25). 
In addition, agents are useful when we state something that we want to 
achieve, then we give a very abstract specification of the system, and let the 
control mechanism figure out what to do, knowing that it will act in accordance 
with a model. In other words, we give the system general information about the 
relationships between objects, and let its figure out what to do. Therefore, an agent 
should know about the world (its environment) in order to be able to accomplish 
its goals, and when the goals or the environment change, the agent must change its 
model as well or modify it in order to cope with the changing of its goals or its 
environment. This type of agent is called autonomous agent, which is 
characterized by the following: 
 An autonomous agent should be capable of flexible autonomous action in 
order to meet its design objectives. 
 An autonomous agent can act randomly until it has gathered enough 
information from its environment to act rationally. 
 An agent is called autonomous if it operates completely autonomously, and 
when it decides itself how to relate its sensor data to motor commands in such 
a way that its goals are attended to successfully. 
 Autonomous agents have the ability to take over some human tasks and 
interact with people in human like ways. 
 An agent is autonomous to the extent that its action choices depend on its 
experience, rather than on knowledge built in by the designer (Russell & 
Norving, 1995). Moreover, in unknown scenarios where it is difficult to 
control directly the behaviour of our systems, the ability of acting 
autonomously is essential (Alonso, 2002, p.25). 
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2- Versatility: 
The versatility of an architecture is a measure of the types of goals, 
methods, and behaviours the architecture supports for the specified environments 
and tasks (Laird, 1991, p.12).  The agent may perform sequences of tasks to 
achieve a goal. It may perform different instances of several different tasks aimed 
at different goals concurrently. However, these tasks must be integrated to share 
knowledge and results. For example, models of the environment should inform 
diagnosis, which should in turn provide a basis for reaction or planning. 
Conversely, reactions and plans should influence prospective models of the 
environment and, in some cases, might also be directed towards evidence 
gathering for diagnosis (Hayes-Roth, 1991, p.79). 
3- Rationality and realistic: 
Rationality is the assumption that an agent will act in order to achieve its 
goals, and will not act in such a way as to prevent its goals being achieved - at 
least insofar as its beliefs permit (Wooldridge& Jennings, 1995). Bratman (1988) 
described rational behaviour as the production of actions that further the goals of 
an agent, based upon her conception of the world. The rationality of an 
architecture is a measure of consistency. That means are the actions it performs 
always consistent with its knowledge and goals? (Laird, 1991, p.12). We can 
measure an architecture's rationality by examining the relationship between its 
goals, its knowledge, and its actions (Langley& Laird, 2002, p. 19). For instance, 
Newell indicated that if an agent has knowledge that one of its actions will lead to 
one of its goals, then the agent will select that action. Since an architecture makes 
many decisions about action over time, we can estimate this sense of rationality by 
noting the percentage of times that its behaviour satisfies this criterion (ibid). 
Realistic agents behave like humans. More specifically, they have the same 
strengths has human players as well as the same weaknesses (Laird & van Lent, 
1999, p.579). Also the agent should act to achieve its goals and in the time should 
care about the surrounding environment. 
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4- Personality, socialability and communication: 
Personality: Personality is the capability of manifesting the attributes of a 
“believable” character such as emotion (Bradshaw, 1997, p.8).  
Socialability: Socialability means that the agent has the ability to interact in a 
friendly way with other agents (and possibly humans) via some kind of agent-
communication language, and perhaps cooperate with others (see: Wooldridge& 
Jennings, 1995; Franklin & Graesser, 1997).  
Moreover, friendliness or pleasant social relations mark the interaction. An agent 
must also show a social attitude. In an environment populated by heterogeneous 
entities, agents must have the ability to recognise their opponents, and form groups 
when it is profitable to do so (Alonso, 2002, p.26). 
Communication: Communication ability is the ability to communicate with 
persons and other agents with language more resembling humanlike “speech acts” 
than typical symbol-level program-to-program protocols (Bradshaw, 1997, p.8). 
Communicative agent is able to engage in complex communication with other 
agents, including people, in order to obtain information or to achieve some goal. 
Moreover, agents begin to act as a society when agents can be engaged in multiple, 
parallel interactions with other agents. The interaction becomes most complex 
when systems involving many heterogeneous agents that can coordinate through 
cooperative and/or competitive mechanisms (such as negotiation and planning). 
5- Execution: 
Real-time execution and interruptible execution are necessary because most 
tasks of interest require that an agent responds enough to react to changes in the 
environment and response to changes requires that an agent be able to stop one 
activity and switch to another (Lee & Yoo, 1999, p. 133).   
Real-time execution: The agent needs to be responsive to its environment and 
predictably fast enough to act on the changes in the environment (ibid).  
Interruptible execution: A dynamically changing environment demands that the 
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agent be able to stop its current activity and gracefully switch to other more urgent 
or higher priority activities (ibid).   
Temporal continuous execution: A temporally continuous agent is the agent that 
runs continuously or continues execution rather than a single input and a single 
output agent, and then terminate. Temporal continuity is persistence of identity and 
state over long periods of time (Bradshaw, 1997, p.8).  
6- Benevolence: 
One of the most important issues to consider when designing an agent is 
whether the different agents will be benevolent or/and competitive.Benevolence is 
the assumption that agents do not have conflicting goals, and that every agent will 
therefore always try to do what is asked of it (see: Wooldridge& Jennings, 1995). 
Moreover, believable agent has a well-defined believable personality and 
emotional state. 
7- Believable: 
Believable agents provide the illusion of life, thus permitting the audience’s 
suspension of disbelief (see: Wooldridge& Jennings, 1995). A key component of 
such agents is emotion. Agents should not be represented in a computer game or 
animated film as the flat, featureless characters that appear in current computer 
games. They need to show emotions; to act and react in a way that resonates in 
tune with our empathy and understanding of human behaviour (ibid).  
8- Cooperative: 
Cooperation here means that the ability to perform some activity in a shared 
environment with other agents. Activities are often coordinated via plans or some 
other process management mechanism. An agent that is able to coordinate with 
other agents and possibly humans via some communications language to achieve a 
common purpose or may in some circumstances work together to achieve some 
goal is considered cooperative (see: Bradshaw, 1997, p.8). In order to co-operate, 
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agents need to possess a social ability (i.e., the ability to learn and/or interact with 
their external environment). 
9- Mobility: 
Mobility is the ability of an agent to move around an electronic network 
(see: Wooldridge& Jennings, 1995; Bradshaw, 1997, p.9) and/or is the ability of an 
agent to transport itself from one machine to another (Franklin & Graesser, 1997). 
Mobility is being able to migrate in a self-directed way from one host platform to 
another (Bradshaw, 1997, p.8).    
3.4.5 Capabilities related to interaction with environment 
1- Flexible: 
Flexible agent has the ability to dynamically choose which actions to 
invoke in response to the state of its external environment.  Moreover, flexible 
agents have a choice of high level tactics with which to achieve current goals and a 
choice of lower level behaviours with which to implement current tactics (Laird & 
van Lent, 1999, p.579).  
2- Proactive: 
Proactive agents do not simply act in response to their environment; they 
are able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour by taking the initiative (see: 
Wooldridge& Jennings, 1995). Proactive agent implies the use of goals and 
modifies the agent’s internal execution cycle.  
An important aspect of proactiveness is the persistence of goals. If a plan 
for achieving a goal fails then the agent will consider alternative plans for 
achieving the goal in question (Winikoff et al, 2001). Proactiveness means that the 
agent could do things; generate and attempt to achieve goals (able to exhibit goal-
directed behaviour); take the initiative; recognize opportunities; engage in 
planning; and goal directed behaviour. Proactive agent will actually estimate the 
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environment for events and other messages to determine what action it should take 
to achieve its goals. In short, an agent can decide what it can do. 
3- Adaptivity: 
Adaptivity is being able to learn and improve with experience (Bradshaw, 
1997, p.8). An agent is considered adaptive when the agent automatically 
customizes itself to the preferences and to modify its behaviour based on its 
experience. In other words, it should be able to learn, adapt to changes in its 
environment, and would in some occasions attempt to adapt itself to deal with new 
or changing goals.  
 
Moreover, the agent should be capable of responding to other agents and/or 
its environment to some degree, and it should be able to react to a simple stimulus 
to make a direct, predetermined response to a particular event or environmental 
signal. 
Such adaptive functionality holds great promise for making computer 
systems more responsive, personal, and proactive. However, while such 
functionality is necessary for enhancing systems, it is not sufficient. Adaptive 
functionality does no good if it is not, or can not be used; it may do harm if it 
confuses its users, interferes with their work practices, or has unanticipated effects 
(ibid). There are many chances for adaptive functionality to fail. The system may 
In general, systems with adaptive functionality are doing the following 
(Erickson, 1997, p.82):  
 Noticing: Trying to detect potentially relevant events. 
 Responding: Acting on the interpreted events by using a set of action 
rules, either by taking some action that affects the user, or by altering their 
own rules (i.e., learning). 
 Interpreting: Trying to recognize the events (generally, this means 
mapping the external event into an element in the system's 'vocabulary') by 
applying a set of recognition rules.  
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fail to notice a relevant event (or may mistakenly notice an irrelevant event). It 
may misinterpret an event that has been noticed. Or it may respond incorrectly to 
an event that it has correctly noticed and interpreted (that is, the system does 
everything right, but the rules that it has for responding to the event don't match 
what the user expects). These failures are important to consider because they have 
a big impact on the user's experience (ibid). 
3.4.6 Capabilities related to agent’s performance 
1- Intelligent: 
Brooks (1997, p.395) noted that: 
 “I and others believe that human-level intelligence is too complex and too 
little understood to be correctly decomposed into the right subpieces at the 
moment, and that even if we knew the subpieces we still wouldn’t know the right 
interfaces between them. Furthermore we will never understand how to decompose 
human-level intelligence until we’ve had a lot of practice with simpler 
intelligences.” 
Whatever the term intelligent agent means, an agent have to show some of 
the following features to consider an intelligent agent: It should have a basic set of 
attributes and facilities. Moreover, it must be formalized by knowledge (i.e., 
beliefs, goals, desires, intentions, plans, assumptions) and be able to act on this 
knowledge. It should be able to examine its beliefs and desires, form its intentions, 
plan what actions it will perform based on certain assumptions, and eventually act 
on its plans. It should be able to choose an action based on internal goals and the 
knowledge that a particular action will bring it closer to its goals. It must be able to 
interact with other agents or human using symbolic language. It should have a 
model of rational human thinking strategy. 
2- Saliency: 
Saliency refers to an intelligent agent's ability to act appropriately to the 
current situation. In other words, The behaviours that are active should be salient 
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to the situation the creature finds itself in, for example, it should recharge itself 
when the batteries are low, not when they are full (Brooks, 1991, p.46). 
3- Adequacy: 
This attribute is generally associated with robotic agents. Brooks (1991, 
p.46) noted that adequacy means that the behaviour selection mechanism must 
ensure that the long term goals that the creature designer has for the creature are 
met (i.e., a floor cleaning robot should successfully clean the floor in normal 
circumstances, besides doing all the ancillary tasks that are necessary for it to be 
successful at that).  
4- Perception and prediction:  
Prediction refers to an architecture's ability to predict what the state of the world is 
or might be, what things might happen in the outside world, and what other things might 
happen as a consequence of the agent's actions. In a computer game, the character can 
decide what the next action should be based on what its observations and its 
historical data. From this perspective, the character is similar to a baby trying to 
create a model of the world based on the information it has access to (Pisan, 2000, 
P. 67). 
5- Providing explanations for decisions: 
It is often desirable that an agent provides explanations of its actions. 
Providing explanations for decisions is the ability to query the agent about things 
like past episodes, or the current state of the world. If not posed in natural 
language, some of these queries are quite simple if the agent simply has episodic 
or state information immediately available. Moreover, in multi-agents 
environment, the agent can summarize local situations and report them to other 
agents. The reports should provide the receiving agents with a global view of the 
situation and allow them to coordinate with other agents effectively (Lee & Yoo, 
1999, p. 134). 
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Discussion 
In this chapter, we have demonstrated the area of agents within 
the artificial intelligence and computer science communities. We have 
reviewed the framework of the agent research and that included a 
general description of an intelligent agent, definitions, basic 
fundamentals of agents, types of agents and evaluation criteria of 
agents. However, in spite of the big efforts spent on research in the 
agent’s area there is no agreement about what should be meant by 
agent. In fact, since the concept of “agent” is so unsatisfactorily 
defined, it appears as everything could be called agent. Yet, an 
intelligent agent from our point of view is the agent that shows at least 
autonomous capability (act independently) and it should have 
capabilities and properties such as: learning, planning, robotic tasks, 
interaction with environment and agent’s performance. In other words, 
since capability is something that an architecture is able to do, therefore 
understanding agent capabilities and properties can help us to identify 
the techniques and methods that were used to construct a particular 
architecture or architectural components. These properties have often 
been studied as part of artificial intelligence research because there is 
agreement between researchers that the behaviour of a system, with 
regards to intelligent architectures, refers to the physical agent's 
capability of navigating through its environment, and how it uses 
knowledge it possesses to reach its goals. Furthermore, fundamentals of 
an agent have been presented. Moreover, we have reviewed several of 
the many aspects that have classified agents. Finally, we have focussed 
mainly on evaluation criteria of agents, which have been considered as 
clear set of standards available to analyze systems. Such criteria will be 
used in next chapter to evaluate our autonomous agent (PSI). 
Chapter       
PSI-Theory  
Fundamentals & Related Work 
 
Summary 
This chapter provides an overview of the framework of PSI-theory and we 
will describe the internal structure of the motivated emotional-cognitive system. 
In section 4.1, we will provide a general description of basic units of PSI–agent and 
the process of running intentions. In section 4.2, description of PSI-motivators, 
affiliation motive (the need for affiliation), uncertainty motive (the need for 
certainty) and incompetence motive (the need for efficiency signals) will be 
discussed. PSI- emotions, selection threshold and resolution level will be explained 
in section 4.3. As well, action regulation will be discussed in this section too. In 
Section 4.4, we will review and discuss related work to our research. Such as, a 
comparison between PSI-model and human behaviour in a complex and dynamic 
task, a comparison between PSI-emotions and human emotions in a complex task, 
and the simulation of social emotions, especially for aggression in groups of social 
agents. 
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4.1 Fundamentals 
4.1.1 Introduction: 
PSI is part of a theoretical approach which Dietrich Dörner calls "synthetic 
psychology", in which Dörner described motivation and emotion in terms of 
information processing. This approach includes assumptions about the dynamics of 
emotions and motivations and tries to analyze psychological processes by 
simulating them as processes of information processing. Furthermore, the approach 
explicitly goes beyond the mere cognitive capacities and directly integrates 
perception, body movements, actions, emotions and motivations.  
In consideration to the relationship between psychology and artificial intelligence, 
Dörner believes that: 
1- Artificial intelligence could learn a lot from psychological research (i.e., 
building intelligent systems that model psychological phenomena should have 
the ability to empirically predict human behaviour and to solve problems by the 
way humans do (human-like strategies). 
2- Intelligent system that imitates human behaviour should not only imitate just 
correct behaviour, but also it should imitate human errors.  
In addition, Dörner & Hille (1995, p.3832) argued some hints about what is 
necessary to construct autonomous robots. They had suggested that such a robot 
should be supplied with:  
 A motive of curiosity to acquire knowledge about its environment in case it is 
possible and desired. 
 A mechanism of action or motive selection to decide autonomously what to do 
by taking into consideration the situation. 
 Internal parameters which determinate the "personality" and may create 
different behaviour types of robots for different tasks or times.  
 Emotions in terms of a possibility to provide plastic behavior, which fits to the 
current situation.  
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4.1.2 PSI-agent: 
PSI-theory is partially implemented as a 
computer program which describes the 
informational structure of an intelligent, 
motivated, emotional agent (PSI) that is 
able to survive in arbitrary domains of 
reality. PSI’s robot can be imagine as a 
steam engine that has a sensory and a 
motor system and is motivated too. For 
example, PSI has hunger, thirst, and a 
need for competence and certainty. 
Figure 4.1 shows PSI- agent and figure 
4.3 shows a rough sketch of PSI’s 
internal structure. 
The robot is able to perceive objects and situations, to plan, to remember sequences 
of actions which proved to be successful in the past, to learn goals and switch 
between different tasks etc..(see Dörner et al., 2002; Dörner, 2003). The sensory 
system comprises two kinds of “noses”, one for smelling water and another one for 
smelling fuel.  
Additionally the system is equipped with one eye to be able to identify optical 
patterns. PSI-agent is able to move and to suck liquids by a suction pump. In PSI 
cognition, motivation and emotion are conceptualized as information processes, 
generally as "calculation" (Dörner & Starker, 2004). PSI architecture has ability not 
only to achieve some desired goal or result without requiring change in the 
algorithm, but also to yield a solution regardless of changing in the problem domain. 
In addition, any change to domain could readily be incorporated in the solution.  
                                                 
∗ PSI-theory was programmed by Dietrich Dörner and Jürgen Gerdes and the 
theory was programmed by using Pascal language.  
 
Figure 4.1: PSI-agent. 
Chapter Four: PSI-Theory−Fundamentals & Related Work.                                                                                     
 
112 
Dörner and Gerdes (2005, p. 39) 
noted that: “The energy store 
of an organism can be 
considered as a tank, as 
exhibited in figure 4.2. This 
tank empties in the course of 
the time by consumption 
(dependent on basal 
metabolism + activity of the 
organism).This tank has a setpoint; it should be filled! 
If there is a setpoint-deviation there is a need. This need is the basis of the 
motivation. There exists a need indicator which is dependent on the extent of the 
deviation. A lot of such "tanks" can be found in an organism. First there are tanks 
for the "existential" needs; hunger, thirst and pain may be the most important. A 
pain indicator signals that the structure of the organism is hurt (the "tank" of 
structural intactness deviates from its setpoint). Very important are tanks for 
attachment, for certainty and for competence. The attachment tank is filled up by 
"signals of legitimacy" (as Boulding 1974, p. 196 called them). Such signals 
indicate that an organism is accepted as a member of a group and can expect help 
and assistance. A smile or body contacts (tenderness) may be the most important 
"signals of legitimacy" for humans. – The need for certainty is the need to be able to 
predict the course of events and the effects of one's own actions. The "certainty 
tank" is filled by predictions which turn out to be true, whereas it is emptied by 
events which are unexpected. – The competence tank is filled by successful actions 
and emptied by failures. Especially the competence and certainty tanks are 
important for emotions.” lately 
                                                 

  “Tank” should not be understood literally; the tank in this case could be a    
      neuronal circuit, the activity of which could be enhanced or inhibited (Dörner,   
      1997, p. 19). 
 
Figure 4.2: A system for motivation. 
Source: (Dörner & Gerdes, 2005, P. 39). 
Setpoint
Level
Setpoint-Deviation
Consumption
+
Need-Indicator
+ +
Need - Selector
Actual Need
+
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4.1.3 Description of  basic units of PSI: 
The main objective of this section is to demonstrate some of the basic units 
and concepts of the computer simulated model of action regulation in complex 
domain (PSI) as they were described by (Bartl & Dörner, 1998; Gerdes & 
Strohschneider, 1991; Detje & Künzel, 2003). 
Intention: 
An intention is a data structure consisting of information about the goal, about the 
present state and normally of more or less complete plans for achieving the goal 
(Bartl & Dörner, 1998). Because intentions control the action of PSI- robot, 
intention concept is considering the core of PSI-theory. Intention can be defined as a 
combination of the selected motive and the information connected with the active 
Figure 4.3: The internal structure of PSI. 
                      Source: (Bartl & Dörner, 1998, p. 3). 
At the bottom, the motivational system of PSI is symbolised by a number of 
water-tanks. These tanks are mechanical models of “motivators” (ibid, p. 3). 
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motivator within the memory network. Intentions are conceptualized as links 
between different parts of a memory structure. In other words, intentions include 
more than merely the goal to satisfy the needs. They also include a number of 
elements that contain context information, particularly history (of an intention), 
start-situation, available operators (plan), goal-situation, instrumentality, estimated 
time for success and remaining time (which lead to a certain degree of urgency), 
importance and estimated success probability “subject’s competence” (Detje & 
Künzel, 2003, p.317). Furthermore, after an intention has been formed, PSI will 
“run the intention” to achieve the respective goal. Running an intention means 
running different processes through PSI’s units as they will be illustrated as follow:  
GENINT: 
It stands for GENerate INTentions and is the information processing unit, which is 
responsible for constructing intentions (Gerdes & Stroschneider, 1991, p.3). Dörner 
and Hille (1995, p.3829) explained that: “Not every need creates all the time an 
intention. Sometimes we are not hungry, so there is no intention to eat. It generates 
intentions from the needs basically depending on the strength of the need. All the 
generated intentions are stored in the memory of intention till the underlying needs 
are satisfied. Most of the time there is more than one intention in this memory. It 
has to be decided which one to follow. This is the task of SELECTINT”. GENINT 
retrieves the knowledge elements necessary for the completion of the structure of an 
intention: the respective need, the desired goal state(s), the plan or action sequence 
to reach it, and its importance and urgency. GENINT files these pieces of 
information in the intention memory MEMINT (Gerdes & Stroschneider, 1991, 
p.3). 
SELECTINT: 
Gerdes and Stroschneider (1991, p.3) noted that: “SELECTINT has the task of 
selecting the “ACTive INTention” (ACTINT), which is to govern action for the next 
period of time. The principle, according to which SELECTINT makes this selection, 
is basically an “expectation-value-principle”, using the importances and the 
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estimated probabilities of success of the single intentions in MEMINT”.  Dörner and 
Hille (ibid, p.3829) indicated that selecting an intention is depending on the 
importance of the need, the urgency of the realization, and the competence of the 
artificial soul.  
RUNINT: 
It stands for RUN INTentions and is thus the system for handling the execution of 
intentions. In principle, RUNINT takes up the active intention and tries to execute 
the operations, necessary to reach the desired goal state. As a result of the activity of 
RUNINT, intentions are either satisfied or returned as uncompleted, for the time 
being (Gerdes & Stroschneider, 1991, p.3).  
Dörner and Hille (1995, p.3829) noted that: “The realization of the leading intention 
can be done in three ways: Firstly, if the artificial soul has not got enough 
information about how to realize the intention, it explores how to do it. It gains 
knowledge about the satisfaction of the need. It learns. Secondly, the artificial soul 
may plan, if it has got enough knowledge but no plan.  Finally, if it has got both, 
enough knowledge and a decent plan, the artificial soul acts, it uses well-known 
automatism.”  
PERCEPT:  
Dörner and Hille (ibid, pp.3829-3830) noted that: “PERCEPT stands for perception. 
This procedure draws an image of the situation by looking at the reality. PERCEPT 
itself is influenced by the modulating parameters. For instance, the higher the rate of 
updating, the better the image of the situation. PERCEPT perceives the environment 
with the events that rise or satisfy needs and help or hinder the realization of an 
intention. PERCEPT noticed also the uncertainty of the situation. A high level of 
uncertainty means that a lot of events occurred unexpected “. 
Moreover, As a result of the interaction of PERCEPT and RUNINT the system also 
generates a “record memory” by storing images of the past. Another result of this 
interaction is the creation of an “expectation horizon”, the system’s knowledge 
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about the future. It is constructed using the record memory, the current activity of 
RUNINT and the general knowledge base (Gerdes & Stroschneider, 1991, p.3). 
4.1.4 The process of running intentions: 
Gerdes and Stroschneider (1991, pp.6-10) have been discussed the functions 
of RUNINT that has to fulfill in successfully completing a selected intention as 
follow: Firstly, RUNINT has to know about one (or more) goal-state(s) of the given 
intention: It has to know, in which direction it has to move to satisfy the underlying 
need. RUNINT also has to know where it is. It must have knowledge about the 
given situation, about environmental changes in time and about environmental 
changes that result from its own operations. Then, if there is knowledge about the 
operations necessary to reach a goal, RUNINT has to have access to this knowledge 
and has to be able to execute the operations. If there is no such knowledge, 
RUNINT should be able to find new ways to fulfill the intention. 
RUNINT must have the ability to generate solutions to problems by way of 
planning. This can be done via “interpolative planning”, the internal construction of 
new sequences or combinations of already known operators. It can also be done via 
“synthetic planning”, the construction of new operators and operator sequences. To 
that end, RUNINT must have the ability to actively explore its environment (ibid, 
p.6). The knowledge about goal-states, about the given situation and about existing 
plans, comes with the active intention ACTINT. Knowledge about environmental 
changes comes from the HYPERCEPT-process (PERCEPT). RUNINT, in turn, is 
able to direct HYPERCEPT. That is how RUNINT searches actively for certain 
information and can, e.g., change the resolution level of HYPERCEPT for closer 
inspection of interesting objects. RUNINT, of course, also has direct access to the 
triple-hierarchy and the record-memory for planning and the execution of operations 
(ibid, p.6). 
As soon as PSI has discovered, that there are need-satisfying situations, it can form 
intentions. PSI can execute intentions on three different levels (ibid, pp.9-10):  
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1- A level of automatic functioning: At first, PSI tries to find sequences of 
Action-schemata in its knowledge base that might mediate between the given 
situation and the goal state. If such a macro-operator is found, it is executed 
straightforward (“automatic functioning”). 
2- A level of internal planning: Planning” is the next level of intention execution 
that is activated, if no macro-operator is found. planning works−in 
principle−something like this: If PSI knows any operators, that can be executed 
in the given situation, it will try to combine such operators by means of a hill-
climbing heuristic (execute the one operator that yields the greatest step towards 
the goal) or a backward-search heuristic (search for operator-chains that have 
the goal-state as their expected outcome and an input element, that is closer to 
the given situation). 
3- A level of active exploration: Only if planning falls, PSI switches to 
exploration as the third level of intention execution. Exploration leads to overt 
acts, influencing the environment. The first and most elaborate strategy of 
Exploration is hill-climbing. PSI searches for operators that are already known 
to be possible in the given situation. It then (internally) checks the outcome 
expectations of’ these operators for their goal-distance and executes (in reality) 
the one operator that yields the greatest step towards the goal. If the goal isn’t 
yet reached, this procedure is repeated. PSI keeps a record of its activities, so 
that endless loops in this hill-climbing process can be avoided. 
Hill-climbing is, of course, only possible if there is a hill to be climbed, that is, if 
PSI knows a goal state for the predominant need. If there is only a need, but no 
knowledge of a satisfying situation, or if there is such knowledge, but hill-climbing 
has failed, exploration process uses a strategy we call “try something new”. With 
“try something new”, PSI scans its operator list for operators, that might change the 
given situation and then PSI executes them. 
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4.2 PSI- Motivators 
4.2.1 Introduction: 
To be able to act autonomously is not only a matter of cognitive capabilities 
as the ability to learn and the ability to plan and to solve problems, but also is a 
matter of motivation too (Dörner, 1997). The main question that has been 
demonstrated by Dörner’s approach is: “which kinds of motives or needs are 
necessary and advantageous for an autonomous system to survive in a complex and 
changing environment (ibid, p. 17)”. Dörner showed that human beings have got 
many needs such as hunger thirst, but also affiliation and curiosity (Dörner & Hille, 
1995, p.3829). So, existential needs are necessary and certain informational needs 
are advantageous. An autonomous system must have needs for energy and matter 
(for instance water). Additionally needs for affiliation, certainty and competence are 
advantageous. Therefore, when we want to simulate the life of an artificial system, 
these motives should be equipped (ibid). Thus, motivation is based on needs that 
indicate set-point −deviations of certain important variables of a system (e.g. 
disposable energy in terms of the charge of a battery in a battery−powered robot or 
in terms of glucose in the blood of man) (see: Dörner & Hille, 1995, p.3828; Bartl & 
Dörner, 1998, p.3; Hoyer, 2003, p.263). 
4.2.2 Description of PSI-motivators: 
PSI's behaviour is driven by various needs as shown in figure 4.4. Some arise 
periodically (e.g. hunger or so to speak "energy"), some originate from the 
environment (avoidance of danger), and some develop from internal settings 
(curiosity as a lack of knowledge). These needs are connected with certain goals. 
The connection contains the general way of satisfaction the need. For instance: 
hunger is connected with eating, thirst with drinking (Dörner & Hille, 1995, p.3829). 
PSI’s motivators are sensible for the level of a variable. Such variables could be 
water or energy resources of a system, temperature of a body or any other variable 
important for life or welfare of a system. When a variable deviates from its set point, 
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a motivator becomes active. In this case, a need exists and the motivator will try to 
launch activities to restore the set point value of the respective 
variable.
 
Affiliation Certainty Competence Thirst Damage - 
Avoidance 
Hunger 
Informational needs Existential needs 
PSI’s Motivators 
Figure 4.4: PSI’s motivators. 
 
Existential needs: 
Dörner (1997, p. 19) called the needs for water and fuel (for energy) and 
the need to avoid pain (dangerous situations “e.g. falling rocks”) 
existential needs. Naturally, needs for fuel and water are necessary. 
Without these needs PSI could not survive or could only survive in very 
benign environments (i.e., in environments which produce no or only 
few dangerous events).  
Informational needs: 
Beside existential needs, it is advantageous to have three kinds of 
informational needs. The informational needs are certainty (an 
expectation fulfilled) and uncertainty (an expectation unfulfilled), 
competence (fulfilment of needs) and affiliation (need for social 
contacts). These needs do not concern matter or energy, rather 
information. 
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According to (Gerdes & Strohschneider, 1991; Dörner,1997; Bartl, & Dörner,1998; 
Dörner, 1999; Dörner et al., 2002; Detje & Künzel, 2003; Elkady & Starker, 2005), 
PSI-theory is a conceptualization of several information processing units that 
interact with the systems knowledge base, a network of sensory schemata and motor 
programs that are related to a set of needs. PSI then is the interaction of these 
processing units and memory systems. The distinction between different memory 
systems is made on functional grounds. In general, all the knowledge of PSI is 
stored in one network. The knowledge-base is made up of three networks. Of 
course, these three networks are not independent of one other; rather they are linked 
by means of a tight net of relations of various types. The three networks of PSI are: 
1- The sensory network stores schemata and images of phenomena, objects and 
situations, that is, the “declarative knowledge” of PSI. 
2- The motor network contains the action programs of the system, ordered in a 
hierarchy of increasingly finer differentiations. 
3- The motivational “network” is made up of a set of nodes that become active, 
when a corresponding state of deprivation exists. The size of the set-point-
deviation determines the activation of this node and thus the importance of the 
intention to be formed. 
The structure of a motivator within PSI with respect to the need for water, for 
example, is described by Dörner (1997, pp. 18-19; 2003, p. 75) as the following: 
1. Firstly, there must exist a sensor for set-point deviations, which measures the 
water-level in the steam boiler. 
2. Secondly, there can (but must not) exist internal regulators, which in the case 
of a set-point deviation try to re-establish homeostasis by refilling the steam 
boiler from the reserve tank. 
3. This will bring a reduction of the set point deviation if there is enough water in 
the reserve tank. If internal regulation is not successful, a need-indicator will 
become active.  
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4. A need can activate external activities (i.e., activities changes in the 
environment directed towards a goal). A goal is a situation where a need can 
be satisfied. 
5. Motivators are connected with a pleasure and a pain indicator. The pleasure 
indicator produces an internal signal, when a need is satisfied. This signal 
causes learning. The momentarily given situation is learned as a goal and the 
sequence of antecedent actions are learned as a behaviour program, which 
could produce the respective goal state. 
6. The pain indicator becomes active, when a set-point deviation increases. The 
pain indicator produces leaning signals too. It causes avoidance learning. The 
respective situations should be avoided in the future. 
7. Other motivators have the same structure, but have sensors not for the water 
level in a steam boiler, but for the level of other variables. 
8. PSI’ motivators are controlling different forms of behaviour as safeguarding-
behaviour, aggression, flight, exploration. 
4.2.3 Affiliation motive (the need for affiliation): 
Basically, Affiliation motive is the need for social contacts and group 
integration. This need brings social groups into existence. By this need, the PSIs are 
stimulated to form groups and to help each other. Such a need is very helpful 
especially when a PSI arrives in a new and uncertain environment which it does not 
know. In such a case, an affiliation need motivates other PSIs to help the novice in 
the new environment and to show him where it could find water or fuel or to show 
him which roads are dangerous and; therefore, should be avoided (Dörner, 1997, 
p.19). Such an affiliation motive can be realised in a very simple fashion. The PSI 
should strive for “signals of legitimacy”. With man, such signals of legitimacy 
comprise a smile, a clap on the shoulder and other forms of approval. Signals of 
disapproval serve as indicators for “non-affiliation” and will empty the “affiliation 
tank”.  
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If we equip our PSis with a tank, which is filled up by signals of legitimacy and 
which empties in the course of time and; therefore, must be refilled by looking for 
signals of legitimacy and if we add to this “tank of legitimacy” a sensor for the 
respective “legitimacy - level”, we have established the basis of an affiliation need 
(ibid, p. 19). If we additionally program the PSIs in such a way that they produce 
signals of legitimacy only when they receive help, when a need is satisfied, another 
PSI, looking for legitimacy signals, will get such signals only if it provides need-
satisfaction to another PSI. Hence, as signals of legitimacy are only given for 
helpful behaviour, for satisfying the needs of other PSIs, the PSIs must give help to 
receive signals of legitimacy (ibid, p. 19). 
4.2.4 Uncertainty motive (the need for certainty): 
What is a “certainty signal”? Dörner (2003, p. 76) explained that: “An 
organism steadily makes predictions of the future, be it in the form of calculations 
of the outcomes of its own actions or in the form of extrapolations of the course of 
events. These predictions normally are not conscious, but happen automatically and 
are present even with rather primitive animals. The course of events is not only 
predicted, but it is continually checked whether the predictions are correct. We 
normally do not notice these checks if their result is positive, but an organism will 
react with surprise or fright if such a check turns out to be negative.” 
Therefore, uncertainty motive is generally a need of information that is satisfied by 
“certainty signals”. Dörner (ibid, p.75) described certainty as: “Certainty is the 
estimated degree of the ability to predict the course of events. Entropy or 
uncertainty is the degree of predictability of the environment, especially the degree 
of predictability of the consequences of ones own actions”. 
An important certainty signal is, for example, a correct prediction. By acting in a 
certain domain of reality, PSI will learn regularities of its environment. Therefore, it 
will be able to predict the outcomes of its actions and progress of events. If these 
predictions are correct, this is a certainty signal and will fill up the “certainty tank”. 
In addition, PSI compiles knowledge by experience. It learns about the effects of 
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operators in a specific domain of reality, learns goals and learns chains of events. 
Therefore, it is able to predict what will happen in the future (Bartl & Dörner, 
1998). Certainty signals enhance the activity of the “certainty-neuron”, whereas 
uncertainty signals diminish this activity (ibid). 
If PSI meets a novel situation or if it turns out, that a certain action has not the 
foreseen consequence, PSI experiences uncertainly (Dörner, 1997, p. 20). Therefore, 
wrong predictions or unpredicted development of the chain of events mean 
uncertainty and will decrease the level of the “certainty tank”. A decline in certainty 
leads to an increase of background control. Thus, If the “certainty tank” is to empty, 
PSI should activate actions that produce certainty signals. Actions, which produce 
certainty, are all kinds of activities that increase the knowledge about the 
environment. Such activities are for instance all kinds of explorative activities. For 
instance, observing the environment to find out the rules of its developments or trial 
and error behaviour to learn the consequences of certain actions. In system with 
highly developed cognitive abilities, thinking and reasoning are often appropriate 
means of acquiring new information about an uncertain domain of reality (ibid, p. 
20).  
On the other hand, when PSI is equipped with the need for certainty, life becomes 
more dangerous because exploration means exposure to unknown parts of the 
environment and exploration could also result pain and can even death. A falling 
degree of certainty results either in a higher tendency to flight behaviour or in 
behaviour patterns of specific exploration. In addition, when the fields of reality, 
which have been proven uncertain, are simply disregarded; this "withdrawal" from 
reality is also connected with the fact that PSI - at a falling degree of certainty - 
becomes more hesitant as far as its behaviour is concerned. Additionally, it does not 
take actions as fast as usual, its planning time is longer than other circumstances and 
it is not that "courageous" when it comes to exploration (for further details about the 
need for certainty and the need for efficiency signals see: (Dörner & Gerdes, 2005; 
Dörner, 2003; Dörner et al., 2002; Dörner, 1999; Dörner & Schaub, 1998; Dörner, 
1997; Dörner & Hille, 1995).  
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4.2.5 Incompetence motive (the need for efficiency signals): 
In the PSI-model, there is a variable "competence" which is dependent on the 
number of successes and failures and on the weights for the increment or decrement 
effects of successes or failures. If competence’s weight has a high value, a high 
increase in competence will result, even with moderate success. If competence’s 
weight has a low value, competence will not increase considerably even with great 
successes (Dörner, 2001). 
The need for competence − the estimated degree of being able to cope with 
problems and the capability of coping with difficulties and problems (Dörner, 2003, 
p. 75)− is a need for “competence signals”. Each satisfaction of a need; for instance, 
the satisfaction of the need for water, is a signal of competence for PSI. Satisfaction 
of a need signifies that PSI is able to care for itself. Moreover, Need satisfaction 
serves as competence signal and enhances the activity of the “competence-neuron”, 
whereas non-satisfaction decreases this activity. On the other hand, a long lasting 
period of non-satisfaction signifies inability and; therefore, is an incompetence 
signal which empties the competence tank. Alternatively, when planning proves to 
be unsuccessful, PSI’s level of competence is endangered and PSI will exhibit the 
tendency to try its strength, and to prove its competence to itself. For instance, PSI 
will look for a task (which is difficult enough that mastery) that proves competence 
but not so difficult that the risk of failure is high. Therefore, A low level of 
competence (it shouldn’t be too low) will activate “adventure-seeking” (see: Bartl & 
Dörner, 1998, p.3).  
Dörner (2003, pp. 76-77) has explained efficiency signal or what is called 
competence signals as the following:  
“Generally spoken, each action which turns out to be effective (i.e., has an impact 
on the environment or even on the systems structure) is an efficiency-signal. If, for 
instance, the system is able to construct a plan for a course of actions, this plan is–
before it is run–an internal change of the systems cognitive structure; planning has 
been effective and therefore results in an efficiency signal. If it turns out that an 
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action has no effect, it is an "inefficiency signal".  An effect of an action can be an 
efficiency and an inefficiency signal at the same time. If there is an effect, but an 
unexpected one, this is an efficiency signal (as there is an effect) and an inefficiency 
signal (as an uncertainty signal always is an inefficiency signal too; a prediction has 
failed!). Obviously it is in the interests of an agent to strive for a high level of the 
certainty tank and of the competence tank too. A high level can be achieved by the 
above mentioned forms of behaviour and behavioural tendencies”.  
In PSI, competence determines, for instance, whether a risky course of action is 
chosen or abandoned. It determines also resolution level in planning and 
remembering and many other processes. There are two classes of competence 
seeking behaviour. The first class is tried to acquire new skills or new capabilities 
(physical or mental skills). An example for this form of behaviour is “diversive 
exploration” and this means an exposure to an unknown, even dangerous 
environment. The other class of competence seeking behaviour is more primitive. It 
is tried to find evidence for ones own competence by producing pure effects "which 
may be senseless in any other respect” (ibid, p.76). 
4.3 PSI- Emotions 
4.3.1 Introduction: 
Emotional and motivational processes play a considerable role in human 
behaviour triggering cognitive processes (Bartl & Dörner, 1998, p.1). However, 
nobody knows what “emotion” is (Dörner, 2003, p. 75). Additionally, Emotions are 
different. First of all, it is not very clear what the concept of emotions means in 
psychology. For some scholars emotions are something like instincts and for others 
emotions are closely related to motivations (Dörner & Hille, 1995, p.3828). Dörner 
(2003) surveyed the literature underling emotion concept and he found that:   there 
are many different definitions and meanings underling emotion concept such as 
empathy, sentimentality, motive, and intuition. Also, emotions have been defined as 
a sudden trouble transient agitation caused by an acute experience of fear, surprise, 
Chapter Four: PSI-Theory−Fundamentals & Related Work.                                                                                     
 
126 
joy , or as mental feeling or affection (e.g. pain, desire, hope, etc.), or as distinct 
from cognitions or volitions. In addition, Emotion has been identified as a “mental 
state” or as a "pure somatic response" and there has been a long lasting, unsettled 
controversy about the relation of cognition and emotion.Dörner (2003, p. 75) noted 
that: “Under these circumstances trying to find out the "real" meaning of emotion 
does not make much sense, as there might be no "real" meaning at all. The words 
“emotion” or “feeling” have different meanings according to the context of their use 
(this is more the rule than the exception for words of colloquial language). So, it 
seems to be appropriate for scientific use not to look for a definition, but to fix one.”  
Accordingly, Dörner (ibid, p. 75) described emotion as: “Emotion is a reaction of an 
agent, may it be man, animal or an artificial system, to two aspects of its relation to 
reality, namely to entropy or uncertainty of the environment and to competence”. 
The central mechanisms of emotion regulation in PSI are the motivators for 
certainty and competence, thus two informational needs. Active certainty or 
competence motivators elicit certain actions or increase the readiness for it. And 
because Dörner regards emotions as emergent phenomena which do not have to be 
integrated into a system as a separate module, emotions thus develop with PSI not in 
their own emotion module, but as a consequence of rule processes of a homoeostatic 
adjustment system. Afterward, Dörner proposed a theory of emotional reactions to 
understand emotions as reactions to the entropy of the environment and to the 
competence, which an agent has to cope with problems (Dörner, 2003, p. 75).  
Dörner (see: Dörner & Hille, 1995, p.3828) believes that emotions should be 
considered as modulations of cognitive processes. That means emotions are not 
processes of their own, but the distinct forms which cognitive processes adapt under 
certain conditions. To have an emotion means that the processes of behaviour 
regulation are brought into a certain form according to the conditions of a situation.  
In PSI theory, emotion is basically considered as a sophisticated system which 
modulates the cognitive processes. Emotion determines whether behaviour is fast or 
slow, persevering or not, concentrated on the task or the environment, rough or fine 
(Dörner & Hille, 1995, p.3829).  Hence, while there are numerous approaches to 
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emotional concepts for software agents, the PSI-theory is unique in that emotions 
are not defined as explicit states but rather emerge from modulation of the 
information processing and action selection (Bach, 2002). 
Dörner’s agents indicate their reactions also by a number of graphical displays, 
including a face that is animated in accordance to the respective theory of emotion. 
Thus, it becomes possible to attribute mental states (specifically, emotional 
episodes) to the agent that allow for plausible explanation and prediction of its 
behavior (Bach, 2002). Bartl and Dörner (1998, p.7) stated that: “To be able to 
monitor PSI’s emotions we gave a human face to PSI which alters according to 
PSI’s emotional states. All these emotions are observable not only in PSI’s facial 
expressions, but in its behaviour too.” While Figure 4.5 shows some of the facial 
expression of PSI in different situations, figure 4.6 shows intensity of pain as an 
example of intensity degree of emotions. 
    
 
Surprise 
 
Pain Activation Sadness 
 
Hopeless Fear Happiness 
 
Anger 
Figure 4.5: PSI’s emotions. 
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Bartl and Dörner (1998, p.1) explained the relationship between emotions and 
motivations as follow: “In a state of anger, thinking and reasoning differ from these 
processes under “normal” conditions. Different emotional states even influence 
perception in a specific manner. In a long lasting process of action regulation, when 
humans have to tackle difficult problems, neither emotions nor motives remain 
constant. Foreseeing that an important problem cannot be solved an individual will 
feel helpless and this feeling of helplessness will trigger other feelings and can 
change the current motive. The motive to find a solution for an intellectual task will 
be replaced by a motive to demonstrate “competence” as the inability to solve the 
problem threatens the self-confidence of the individual.” 
As well, an uncertain environment normally provides difficult problems and 
therefore looks threatening and may generate anxiety or fear. But with a high degree 
of problem solving capabilities or a high degree of strength and skillfulness, an 
uncertain environment may look exciting, attractive and not at all threatening 
(Dörner, 2003, p. 75). Another instance, a sudden decrease of competence for 
instance would mean a sudden increase of arousal (arousal generally is a general 
preparedness for action), decrease of resolution level (to guarantee quick action), 
 
Figure 4.6: Intensity of Pain.  
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incomplete recall of possible modes of action for the situation at hand and rough 
planning of actions, hence swift and risky action. This mode of action could be 
described as anger (Dörner & Starker, 2004).  
Moreover, Dörner and Hille (1995, p.3830) described the emotional behaviour of 
artificial agent (PSI-agent) that shows behavioral indicators for "fear", "hope", 
"anger", "resignation", "depression", and other emotions as the following: 
« Imagine a dangerous situation. One gets a warning that something terrible 
will happen minutes later. Putting the artificial soul in such a situation, we observe 
an alteration of behavior. In the moment of noticing the signals of danger, the 
modulating parameters alter their values. The activation increases: the system 
accelerates the speed of information processing. The selection threshold increases 
rapidly: for another motive but avoiding the dangerous situation it becomes hard to 
get selected for giving the aim. The resolution level decreases rapidly: there is no 
time to explore, plan or act very carefully. The rate of updating the image of the 
environment decreases: all the resources are needed for the motive to avoid the 
danger. Later this rate increases again: updating the image of the actual situation 
becomes more and more important when approaching the danger, possibilities of 
escaping are viewed. We can observe a highly activation, the sticking on one motive, 
a rather rough way of thinking and doing, and no looking around in the beginning 
turned into a watching the actual situation. We find the artificial soul anxious. The 
dangerous situation doesn't happen. An all clear signal alters the values of the four 
modulating parameters again. They meet their normal levels.”  
Briefly, according to PSI-theory distinct emotions like fear or anger are not 
considered as separate modules of the psychic system but are supposed to be 
modulations of planning, perception and behaviour. Anger for example is defined 
by a superficial level of perception, high activation, high concentration and a low 
level of planning (Hoyer, 2003, p.263).  
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4.3.2 Selection threshold: 
Because PSI’s architecture allows several needs to be active at the same 
moment, it is therefore important to equip PSI with a selection device. This 
selection device has to select one of the active motives for execution. The motive 
selected will become the actual intention (Bartl & Dörner, 1998, p.4). On other 
words, since several motivators always compete with one another for the action 
control, the system has a motive selector that decides, with the help of a fast 
expectation value calculation, which motivator possesses the greatest motive 
strength and thus is to receive the advantage for execution and the selected motive 
will become the actual intention. The value of a motivator is determined by: 
 Its importance (size of the deviation from the desired value). 
 Its urgency (available time until the removal of the actual condition). 
 Its expectation (expectancy-value), which is determined by the ability of the 
agent to actually satisfy this need (probability of success).   
In addition, Selection threshold could also be called “level of concentration” (ibid). 
Selection threshold is the strength of defending the actual intention against 
competitors, against other intentions having the tendency to take over the command. 
The strength of the different motives is not at all constant in the life of PSI, but 
changes continuously. The needs for energy and for water continuously increase as 
they are consumed. But a motive can also gain strength by external factors: If for 
instance PSI notices in a certain situation that it would be easy to get water, a 
tendency to shift to the water-intention will result as now the expectancy value for 
the water-motive increased. Or if an unexpected event will occur the “need for 
certainty” might increase and PSI will exhibit the tendency to explore the 
(uncertain) environment or will have the tendency to run away and to hide. Or if for 
instance planning proves to be unsuccessful, PSI’s “self-confidence” (level of 
competence) is endangered and PSI will exhibit the tendency to “try its strength”, to 
prove its competence to itself, for instance by looking for a task which is difficult 
enough that mastery proves competence, but not so difficult that the risk of failure is 
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high. If selection threshold is high “behavioural oscillations” (i.e., a rapid change 
between different intentions will be hindered to a cer ta in  degree) .  A high 
selection threshold prevents PSI on the other hand from using unexpectedly arising 
opportunities or from reacting to unexpected dangers. If selection threshold is high, 
the field of PSI’s perception will narrow down (ibid, pp.6-7). Furthermore, 
generally when the selection threshold is high, it is difficult for other motives to 
displace the current motive. 
4.3.3 Resolution level: 
Bartl and Dörner (1998, p.6) noted that: “Resolution level is the degree of 
exactness of comparisons between sensory schemata. Comparisons take a long time 
at a high level of resolution, but they will be reliable. Under high pressure (when 
activation is high) the resolution level is low, comparisons do not need a long time, 
but the risk of “over-inclusiveness” is high. A low level of exactness will lead to the 
tendency to consider unequal objects and situations as equal (This is due to certain 
mathematical reasons.)” 
A low resolution level means rough planning, superficial ("over-inclusive") 
perception and shallow, conservative processes of recall (Dörner & Starker, 2004,). 
In other words, a low level will cause quick planning processes and a high readiness 
for action. Plans will be however rather risky (Bartl & Dörner, 1998, p.6). In 
addition, a high resolution level means roughly exploring, planning, and acting, a 
low resolution level influences exploring, planning, and acting so that it happens in 
a very careful way. For example, Dörner and Hille (1995, p.3829) noted that the 
modulating parameter resolution level is influenced by: 
 The importance of the leading intention (based on the strength of the underlying 
need); the higher the importance of the intention, the higher the level of 
resolution (i.e., the more carefully is the exploration, the planning, and the 
acting concerning this intention). 
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 The urgency of the realization of the intention; the higher the urgency, the lower 
the level of resolution (i.e., the faster the intention can be realized, because it is 
urgent). 
 The pressure of needs (based on the strength of all generated intentions); the 
higher the activation, the lower the level of resolution (i.e., the faster the 
intention can be realized, because there are a lot of other things to do). 
4.3.4 Action regulation: 
Dörner (2003, pp. 75-76) described the regulation of certainty and 
competence as follow (see also figure 4.7):  
“For an agent it is sensible to adjust its behaviour to the uncertainty of the respective 
situation and to its competence. In an uncertain environment it is reasonable for 
instance to exhibit a high degree of:  
• Readiness to act: As it is unknown, what would happen next. (this means for 
biological systems a high degree of general arousal, and this again means a high 
level of the sympathetic reaction, of muscle tension, of oxygen within the blood, 
etc...), 
• Safeguarding behaviour: For instance a high degree of background monitoring, 
• Explorative behaviour:  (In order to discover the rules of the respective domain 
of reality and thus diminishing the entropy), 
• Aggressive tendencies: (In order to destroy possibly threatening objects when 
flight is impossible or if it is unknown what to do else with the object), 
• Flight tendencies: (In order to escape from circumstances one cannot cope with). 
If competence is low, it is sensible to exhibit a high degree of: 
• Competence seeking behaviour: There are two classes of competence seeking 
behaviour. Either it is tried to acquire new skills or new capabilities, be it 
physical or mental skills or capabilities. An example for this form of behaviour is 
“diversive exploration” (Berlyne, 1974) and this means an exposure to an 
unknown, even dangerous environment. — The other class of competence 
seeking behaviour is more primitive. It is tried to find evidence for ones own 
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competence by producing pure effects (which may be senseless in any other 
respect). Vandalism may be understood as an example ofsuch a form of 
competence-proving activity. 
• Flight tendencies: (In order to escape threats one cannot cope with).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Moreover, Dörner (ibid, 77) explained that: “Obviously it is in the interests of an 
agent to strive for a high level of the certainty tank and of the competence tank too. 
In figure 4.7, you find a hypothesis about how a system may activate the respective 
forms of behaviour or behavioural tendencies. 
1. When the level in the certainty tank is low (and hence entropy is high) the 
frequency of safeguarding activities should increase to preserve the system 
from surprises. — If however competence is high, the frequency of 
safeguarding activities should not be too high, as surprising events could be 
mastered. 
2. When entropy is high (level in certainty tank low), flight and aggressive 
tendencies should be high, either to escape from threatenings or to destroy 
threatening objects. (Aggression – technically spoken – is an unspecific 
Figure 4.7: Competence and Certainty – Regulation. 
Source: (Dörner, 2003, p. 76). 
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measure to get rid of threats.) When competence is low, flight should be 
preferred to aggression if possible. 
3. When competence is low tendencies for diversive exploration should be high, 
but not high if competence is too low, as diversive exploration always means 
exposure to uncertain situations and this means possible threatenings with 
which one should be able to cope. 
4. When competence is low tendencies for aggression should be high, as 
aggression is an unspecific method of producing strong effects. 
5. When competence and certainty is low, arousal should be high, as under these 
conditions readiness for quick action is necessary. 
6. When readiness for quick action is necessary, the resolution level for cognitive 
processes should be low to waste no time. (When the time which cognitive 
processes consume is dependent on the magnitude of a fan of associations 
which are spreading from a starting point, a low resolution level could mean 
an inhibition of the spreading of activation in a neuronal network). 
7. When readiness for quick action is necessary, the level of concentration on the 
active intention should be high and therefore possibility of distraction should 
be low. This could be achieved by setting a selection threshold, which a 
competing motive should pass before it takes over the guidance of behaviour, 
to a high value. 
In addition, Bartl and Dörner (1998, pp.5-7) stated that: “The information 
processing of PSI is “modulated”. This means that all cognitive processes of PSI are 
“shaped” according to certain conditions. Such conditions are for instance the 
strength of the actual intention, the overall amount of all the different needs, the 
amount of competence and others. These conditions set specific “modulators”. One 
of these modulators is “activation” which depends on the strengths of the needs 
(roughly spoken the amount of activation represents the sum of the strengths of the 
needs). Activation triggers some other modulators, for instance “resolution level” 
and “selection threshold”. These modulators (resolution level and selection 
threshold) together with the need for certainty and the need for competence produce 
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a lot of “emotional” forms of behaviour. PSI exhibits fear (expectation of an uneasy 
event), anxiety (“need for certainty”), anger (when unexpectedly PSI is hindered to 
reach a goal), surprise (unexpected event). This theory of modulations together with 
the specific motivational structure of PSI constitutes a “sub-affective” theory of 
emotion.”  
Furthermore, Dörner and Hille (1995, pp.3828-3829) explained that: 
“Anger, as an example of how emotions are modulations of the processes preparing 
and controlling behaviour could be described as characterized by: 
 High activation (which means amongst other things a high speed of information 
processing). 
 A high "selection threshold" (i.e., a high tendency to concentrate on the actual 
intention and a low sensibility for stimuli not concerning this intention). 
 A low resolution level (i.e., a rather rough way of looking to the environment 
and of planning as well as decision making which does not take into account 
conditions for actions and side and long term effects in detail). A low level of 
resolution results thus in "unconditional" behaviour and "over-inclusive" 
planning. 
 A low rate of updating the image of the actual situation. (Somebody who is 
angry does not take into account the details of the situation and its changes.) 
 "Angry behavior" is different from "non-angry behavior" not because some 
independent state of "anger" is present or not, but because parameters like 
"selection threshold", "resolution level", "activation", and "rate of updating" 
have got different values. 
These specific levels of the modulating parameters guarantee an appropriate 
behaviour in the current situation. In the situation triggering anger it is most of the 
time appropriate to be fast (high activation), to be persevering (high threshold of 
selection), to be rough behavioring (low level of resolution), and to be concentrated 
on the source of anger and its coping instead of watching other details of the 
environment (a low rate of updating), so to say: it is appropriate to be angry (ibid). 
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4.4 Related Work 
4.4.1 Introduction: 
In a series of experiments Dörner and his co-work examined the relation of 
the PSI-model to human behaviour. Different forms of a complex, dynamic, maze-
like environment were used where human subjects had to play a kind of adventure 
game. We will review some of these experiments and their results as follow: 
4.4.2 Research one: Single PSI and societies of PSIs.  
 Aims: Dörner (1997, pp.17-22) has designed this research to investigate the 
following aims: 
1. To investigate the behaviour of single 
PSI and societies of PSIs when 
exposed to an environment that 
provides food and fuel, but on the 
other hand can be dangerous for the 
health and even the life of a PSI.  
2. To investigate the role of emotions for 
behaviour and action regulation by 
investigating the behaviour of an 
artificial system.  
Procedure: PSI lived together with other similar systems in a mazelike 
environment, where it could find at several places petrol stations and wells to satisfy 
its basic needs for fuel and water as shown in figure 4.8. The ‘World’ of PSI looked 
like the map of a town. This ‘World’ however was not stable, but the conditions for 
action change more or less quickly. Some of the roads were barred and could not be 
penetrated. But PSI can learn to identify indicators for such states of a road and in 
this way may be able to avoid unnecessary detours. Additionally, some 
thoroughfares could only be passed at certain daytimes and the PSIs have to learn 
this too. The roads may be sometimes in bad conditions and therefore provide pains 
Figure 4.8: The World of PSI. 
Source: (Dörner (1997). 
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for PSI when passing through. These roads were dangerous for the axes and could 
cause serious damages. Therefore it was wise to avoid such roads and to make 
detours. 
Results: Single PSI and societies of PSIs that lived in a rather complex and 
dangerous environment and equipped or not equipped with a need for affiliation 
were experimented. Results showed that when PSI exposed to a new environment 
and forced to live in it without the help of other PSIs, single PSI had difficulties to 
survive in such complex environment. PSI would have died because of a lack of 
water and fuel in the first phases of its existence. But when PSI lived in PSIs society 
with an affiliation motives, its behaviour were much better because PSI got help 
from other PSIs. Additionally, it was remarkable that when PSI lived in PSIs 
societies with an affiliation motive learn quickly as the PSIs in the PSIs societies 
without an affiliation motive because of knowledge development in the PSI’s 
memory. 
4.4.3 Research two: PSI- model with and without social motive. 
Aim: This experiment was conducted within the socionics-project (Detje, 2003, 
pp.243-244) and aimed to answer the following question: “How would PSI’s 
behaviour change if a social motive is added to PSI?” 
Procedure:  Island game version-II was 
used to investigate the aim of the study 
(see figure 4.9). Moreover, the social 
motive that was implemented in PSI was 
a need for affiliation, implemented as a 
need for signals of legitimacy. PSI could 
send and perceive signals of legitimacy 
(L-signals) and signals of anti-
legitimacy (AL-signals). To simulate 
social agents, an object called “Teddy” 
was created that could send signals of 
Figure 4.9: Screenshot of the island-II. 
Source: (Detje & Kuenzel, 2003, p. 317). 
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legitimacy if it was “manipulated” in the “right” way. New operator was given to 
PSI (the “kiss”-operator) that allowed manipulation of the Teddy-object to send the 
signals needed to satisfy the motive. Table 4.1 shows the definition for the PSI-
program.  
 
Results:   
1- PSIs that could also perceive signals of anti-legitimacy (AL) behave slightly 
different compared to PSIs that could only perceive signals of legitimacy 
(control). These differences resulted in a higher amount of break-downs, a 
lower amount of unsuccessful manipulations and different action regulatory 
priorities. 
2- The PSIs did not differ in “handling” their hunger, thirst, collection of items and 
damage, but they did differ with respect to the needs for certainty, competence 
and affiliation. These results indicated that the change only affects the 
regulation of affiliation and its side effects in terms of a lower level of certainty 
and competence. 
3- To see if the lower amount of unsuccessful manipulations was really due to the 
avoidance of the new combination of hammering the “Teddy”-object (which 
increases the need for affiliation and thus should be avoided), a closer look at 
the first PSI of each group (n=30) and compared the unsuccessful manipulations 
for each operator was considered. The results indicated that the control-PSI was 
much more likely to perform unsuccessful attempts to hammer objects. 
4- A closer look at PSI’s specific behaviour towards the Teddy-object indicated 
that some AL-PSIs seem to suffer from “social masochism”.   
Teddy mX Teddy F Affiliation -1 Kiss 
Teddy mC Teddy F Affiliation 0.1 Hammer 
Table 4.1 : Signals of Legitimacy and Anti-Legitimacy. 
Source: (Detje, 2003, p. 243). 
If operators “mX” (= kiss) or “mC” (= hammer) are applied to the object 
“Teddy” this object is transformed into “TeddyF” and the need for affiliation 
is changed (“-1” = satisfied completely; “0.1” = little increasing) (ibid, p. 243). 
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4.4.4 Research three: A comparison between PSI-model and human     
                                         behaviour in a complex and dynamic task. 
Aims: Bartl and Dörner (1998) aimed to evaluate the ability of PSI-model to model 
human behaviour in a complex and dynamic task (the BioLab game). A comparison 
between the performance of the model and the performance of the subjects was 
measured. These evaluations included comparisons of emotional reactions in 
“critical situations” and of the process of adapting the behaviour to environmental 
changes. Furthermore, single cases were analyzed to validate the assumptions of the 
model about the interaction of motivation, cognition and emotion. 
Procedure: In the BioLab factory, the “biological laboratory of sugar-beet-based 
energy production”, subjects were asked to produce certain types of molasses in 
order to generate electricity and heat (see figure 4.10). There are 10 different kinds 
of catalysts to modify the molecular structure of the molasses. The subjects, as well 
as, PSIs had to fulfill three aims. Two appetitive aims that were the production of 
electricity and heat, and one aversive aim (the avoidance of contamination). Two 
important aspects of the task must be 
mentioned: 
1- The subjects did not know 
anything about the structure of the 
system. They had to explore it. 
2- As well as the PSIs, they had to 
deal with an environment 
completely new to them. 
Furthermore the situations of need 
satisfaction got exhausted after 
they had been frequented several 
times.  
Experimental Design: The experiment conducted with 19 subjects (12 female and 
7 male) each of them playing the BioLab game for one hour. The age of the subjects 
varied between 19 and 29 years with a mean of 25 years. The sample of subject was 
Figure 4.10: Screenshot of the program 
surface of the BioLab game.  
Source: (Bartl & Dörner, 1998, p. 8). 
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compared to a sample of PSIs. 19 model runs were produced by varying starting 
parameters by chance within a certain range. The sample of artificial subjects 
mainly varied as to memory capacity and depth of planning. In order to have fair 
conditions comparing the performance, the PSI protocols were cut off as to the 
mean number of actions carried out by the subjects during one hour. 
Results: The data analysis concentrated on two aspects: one of them was the 
performance of human and artificial behaviour. The general aim of the BioLab 
game was to satisfy three system needs: the need for electricity, the need for heat 
and the avoidance of contamination. Fulfilling these needs would be a valid 
indicator for their efficiency working on the BioLab problem. However, comparing 
the efficiency was not sufficient, because similar efficiencies could be achieved by 
different behaviour. The second aspect of data analysis focused on behavioural 
aspects, such as the percentage of effective actions and the pattern of catalyst use. 
Efficiency of needs satisfaction: The efficiency of managing the BioLab problem 
was represented by the score achieved at the end of the run. Figure 4.11 shows that, 
in general, the subjects as well as the model runs were quite successful in managing 
the BioLab problem. The two groups do not differ significantly in the t-test for 
independent samples.  
Figure 4.11: Efficiency of need satisfaction.  
Source: (Bartl and Dörner, 1998, p. 11). 
The markers symbolise single subjects as to 
the number of points achieved in the BioLab 
game (ibid, p. 11). 
 
Figure 4.12:  Percentage of effective actions.  
Source: (Bartl and Dörner, 1998, p. 11). 
The markers are set for each single subject 
(ibid, p. 11). 
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Effective actions: Managing the BioLab problem subjects had to learn the specific 
effects of catalysts. Some catalysts were always effective; others need certain 
conditions to work. Comparing the percentage of effective actions between the 
subjects and the model runs were striking. The two samples had similar means and 
comparable variances (see figure 4.11). 
General discussion of the results: 
1- The behaviour of PSI and human behaviour were remarkable parallel. 
2- The performance of extraordinary successful subjects could not be achieved by 
PSI, because humans more or less frequently change their thinking and planning 
procedures. PSI was not able to do so, because mainly language and self-
reflection was missing. 
3- Generally, "emotional" systems were more successful than unemotional ones. 
4.4.5 Research four: PSI-model with and without emotions. 
Aim: In particular, whether emotions are helpful or even necessary for problem 
solving or not was investigated in this study by Dörner and Starker (2004). They 
had investigated the behaviour of a PSI-model with and without emotions. 
Procedure: To examine the role of emotions, Dörner and Starker compared (20) 
PSI-subjects with different "personalities" with (20) PSI-subjects with fixed 
parameters for arousal and resolution level" on a medium level.  
Results: Dörner and Starker found that there were highly significant differences in 
respect of the behavioural parameters of the two groups. The emotional PSIs were 
more successful in collecting nucleos and in preserving themselves from damage 
than non-emotional PSIs, as shown in figures 4.13 and 4.14. The "emotional" 
system was more able to adjust its behaviour to the requirements of the situation in 
respect of uncertainty and incompetence motives than the non-emotional system. 
                                                 

 This problem (language) was partly solved by implementing language in PSI-   
    system. For further details see: (Dörner, 1999; Künzel, 2003; Künzel, 2004).  
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4.4.6 Research five: A comparison between PSI-emotions and    
                                    human emotions in a complex and dynamic task. 
Aim: In this research, Dörner (2003) investigated and compared the artificial 
emotions that were implemented in PSI-agent with the human emotional system. 
The variance of the reaction time was used to measure the emotional behaviour of 
the subjects because it was supposed that emotional regulations resulted in 
variations of reaction times.  
Procedure: The overall characteristics of behaviour in longer sequences of 
behavioural units were observed in the island game. 
Simulation and results:  
1- Figure 4.15 shows a pattern of the reaction times of a subject (III in the island 
game) for a 30 minutes period at the beginning of the game. The different 
colours belong to different forms of action. The light grey lines stand for 
manipulations of objects, shaking them, hammering them etc.. The medium 
grey lines stand for locomotions from one station to another one or for trials of 
locomotions. This subject (III) was rated by the experimenters as "very 
emotional”. 
2- Figure 4.16 shows the reaction pattern of a simulated “emotional” subject.        
A high level of emotionality was simulated by giving the arousal formula a high 
increment weight so that arousal increased very quickly with increasing values 
                   Figure 4.13:                                                           Figure 4.14:    
         Mean number of breakdowns.                   Mean number of collected nucleos. 
Source: (Dörner and Starker, 2004). 
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of the motives. Dörner (ibid) explained that the overall pattern of this simulated 
subject was similar to the pattern of subject III. 
3- Figure 4.17 shows a pattern of the reaction times of a subject (XXXIX), who 
was rated as “cool”. Subject (XXXIX) had showed longer periods of being 
occupied with one object (systematic exploration of an object to find out what 
could be done with it can be observed in the phases around 100 and 400) and 
longer periods of locomotions (diversive exploration of the island), indicators of 
a more “organized”, sustained behaviour. 
4- Figure 4.18 shows the reaction pattern of a simulated “cool” subject. The results 
of this research showed that it seemed to be possible to generate patterns of 
emotional behaviour similar to the patterns of human behaviour. By varying the 
PSI- parameters, one can get different types of personality and make predictions 
of the behaviour of individual subjects. 
 
Figure 4.15: An “emotional” subject. 
 
Figure 4.17: A “cool” subject. 
 
Figure 4.18: A simulated “cool” subject. 
 
Figure 4.16: A simulated “emotional” subject. 
 
Source: (Dörner, 2003, p. 79). 
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4.4.7 Research six: Simulating social emotions, especially for       
                                      aggression in groups of social agents. 
Aims: In this research, Dörner (2005, pp.39-43) aimed to simulate social emotions, 
especially for aggression in groups of social agents. 
Procedure: Dörner constructed emotional agents according to the Psi-Theory, but 
had only rather reduced cognitive capabilities compared with the original Psi-agent. 
He called this agent a "Psi-mouse". Figure 4.19 shows some mice in their 
environment and the cognitive map of one mouse for a distinct area. The memory of 
a mouse consists of cognitive maps and includes a "social memory" too (the mice 
remember "friends" and "enemies"). Dark-gray spots in figure 4.19 are water places 
(W), food-places (F), dangerous areas (D); here the mice can be hurt. If they are hurt 
they can try to find a healing – place (H). 
Basic concepts: Dörner (ibid, p. 41) explained aggression and crowding as follow: 
Aggression: To be aggressive is not at all based in the motivational system of the 
mice. To destroy something or to bite another mouse is just an instrument among 
others and not in any way distinct. On the contrary, there is an inbuilt avoidance 
tendency of the mice to bite each other, especially not to bite friends. 
Crowding: Crowding means an increase in aggressive actions when a population 
increases. 
Results of the simulation: 
1- Figure 4.20 shows that when there were only a few mice in the region, each 
mouse had a lot of friends and not very many enemies. This changed when the 
populations grow. It can be seen that the relative number of friendships 
decreased and the number of enemies increased (the development of friendships 
and enmities was according to the crowding).   
2- Figure 4.21 shows the rate of aggressive actions in a population of mice living in 
a very poor environment where it was hard to get food or water. These mice 
were very aggressive. The average level of hunger and the average level of thirst 
were very high. But the level of the competence motivation was rather low. This 
was due to the fact that these mice experienced their aggressiveness as a 
satisfaction of the need for competence. 
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3- Figure 4.22 shows results of a similar population of mice living in a comparably 
rich environment. Here, the aggression rate was rather low and the level of 
hunger and thirst was low too, as these mice found enough opportunities for 
feeding and drinking. It was for them not necessary to fight for food. So the 
level of the need for competence was rather high; these mice did not get very 
much efficiency-signals, as getting food and water did not need much effort and 
hence aggression was not necessary. 
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Figure 4.20: Growth of a population 
and development  o f  the  numbers 
 o f  f r i e n d s h i p s  a n d  e n m i t i e s . 
 Source: (Dörner & Gerdes, 2005, P. 41). 
Figure 4.19: Some mice in their environment. 
Source: (Dörner & Gerdes, 2005, P. 41). 
Mice in between food – and water places and 
with paths leading to different goals for the 
selected mouse “white halo” (ibid, P. 41). 
 
Rough
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1 12 23 34 45 56 67 78 89 100111 122 133 144 155 166 177 188199
Agg
Hung
Thir
Comp
Figure 4.21: Rough environment, 
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Sweet
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1 14 27 40 53 66 79 92 105118 131144 157170 183196
Agg
Hung
Thir
Comp
Figure 4.22: Easy environment with 
enough food, water, etc.. 
Source: (Dörner & Gerdes, 2005, P. 42). 
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Discussion 
In this chapter, we have aimed to give a general introduction and 
a big picture of the scope of the PSI-theory within the artificial 
intelligence and computer science communities. This scoping is useful 
to understand human action regulation. Hence, we have demonstrated a 
general description and basic fundamentals of PSI-theory that was 
partially implemented as a computer program. To support these aims, 
we have discussed “intention” that was considering the core of PSI-
theory and control the action of PSI-agent.  
For a good overview of the process of running intentions, we have seen 
that it included firstly a level of automatic functioning, then a level of 
internal planning, and finally a level of active exploration. Careful 
consideration was given to PSI- motivators that consisted of existential 
needs (without these needs PSI-agent could not survive) and 
informational needs (certainty - competence – affiliation). It is pretty 
clear that affiliation motive is the need for social contacts and group 
integration. The PSIs were stimulated to form groups and to help each 
other as it was shown by (Dörner, 1997, pp.17-22; Detje, 2003, pp.243-
244; Dörner, 2005, pp.39-43). Related to Dörner research (1997), when 
PSI exposed to a new environment and forced to live in it without the 
help of other PSIs, single PSI had difficulties to survive in such 
complex environment.  
We have also demonstrated the key element to explore the 
surroundings; uncertainty motive. In fact, uncertainty motive, from a 
conceptual standpoint, is generally a need of information that is 
satisfied by “certainty signals”. The interactions between uncertainty 
motive and incompetence motive (which is dependent on the number of 
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successes and failures) affect PSI- emotions. This point of view had 
been admitted by Dörner and Hille (1995, p.3828) as they had 
mentioned that “emotions are not processes of their own, but the 
distinct forms which cognitive processes adapt under certain 
conditions.” 
Taking this view, Bartl and Dörner (1998) had found that "emotional" 
systems were more successful than unemotional ones. This result holds 
a possible key to simultaneously investigate and compare the behaviour 
of a PSI-model with and without emotions. The most unique result of 
Dörner and Starker (2004) was that the emotional system was more 
able to adjust its behaviour to the requirements of the situation with 
respect to uncertainty and competence than the non-emotional system. 
Selection threshold as a device that has to select one of the active 
motives for execution depending on its importance, its urgency and its 
expectation (probability of success) was discussed in this chapter 
followed by further details about resolution level concept that was 
defined by Bartl and Dörner (1998) as the degree of exactness of 
comparisons between sensory schemata depending on the importance 
and the urgency of the leading intention.  
These concepts of PSI-theory explained human action regulation 
through the relationships between cognition, emotion, and motivation.  
Hence, PSI- theory can explain behaviours such as, readiness to act, 
safeguarding behaviour, explorative behaviour, aggressive tendencies, 
flight tendencies, and competence seeking behaviour. Researches done 
in the scope of PSI-theory indicated that PSI can simulate human 
behaviour in complex and dynamic tasks. For instance, according to 
Dörner (2005), the effect of crowding relatively decreased the number 
of friendships and the number of enemies increased. 
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As said by Dörner (ibid), comparing to a population of mice living in 
rich environment, the PSIs’ behaviours were aggressive when PSIs 
were living in a very poor environment where it was hard to get food or 
water. Additionally, Bartl and Dörner (1998) modeled human 
behaviour in a complex and dynamic task (the BioLab game).  
The performance of the PSI was compared to the performance of 
human subjects and results of this comparison showed that the 
behaviour of PSI and human behaviour were remarkable parallel. 
Moreover, Dörner (2003) proved that PSI can simulate both 
“emotional” and “cool” subjects, and by varying the PSI- parameters, 
one can get different types of personality and make predictions of the 
behaviour of individual subjects. 
The progress that was done and the further development of PSI-theory 
facilitate the responsibility to simulate different human action strategies 
and single cases too, as it will be explained in chapter five and chapter 
six. 
 
 
 
Chapter       
Research Methodology 
The Experiment & Strategies 
  
Summary 
This chapter provides details about a method that has been used towards 
determining and classifying human action strategies in a complex and dynamic 
task. In section 5.1, we will provide a description of the experimental setup (i.e., 
participants, materials, island-game, apparatus, instructions, experimental design 
and procedure, and dependent variables) that has been conducted to investigate the 
main aim of the current research. Results of the experiment will be illustrated and 
discussed in section 5.2. As well, in section 5.3, we are going to describe the 
method and the major terms such as, strategy and tactics that will be frequently 
used when we analyze participants’ action strategies. While a description of 
nucleotides-first-strategy (e.g., tactic towards satisfying uncertainty motive, 
incompetence motive, resolution level and selection threshold) will be explained in 
section 5.4, a description of balance between motives-strategy will be shown in 
section 5.5. In sections 5.6 and 5.7 we will discuss two different action strategies of 
two single cases.  
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5.1 The Experiment 
5.1.1 Introduction: 
The primary purpose of this research is to simulate different human action 
strategies in a complex and dynamic task. In this chapter, we will identify these 
strategies. To reach this goal; identifying different human action strategies, we have 
conducted an experiment that included a complex and dynamic task to figure out 
and investigate human action strategies. Island game-task has used to achieve this 
aim. Early versions of island game has been used as we had mentioned in chapter 
four to compare human behaviour with PSI’s behaviour in the same complex 
environment and to investigate hypotheses about the interrelation between human 
behaviour and PSI-parameters. As well as, the island game has been used to test the 
hypotheses of the present research. In this experiment, our aim was to find answers 
to the following research questions:  
 What are the different kinds of action-strategies will be used by the participants 
during playing the game?  
 What are the differences between these strategies? 
 What are the criteria used for choosing one’s strategy?  
 What are the effects (advantages and disadvantages) of one’s strategy? 
 What is the main goal of each strategy? 
 Which possible courses of action can be taken under each strategy? and why? 
 How the decision making will be taken? 
Of course, we had also other many questions, but we just introduced the main 
categories of our questions.  
5.1.2 Participants: 
 A sample of 40 participants (average age= 23,05 years and SD= 4,22 ), most 
of the participants were students at Otto Friedrich university-Bamberg, took the 
experiment in partial fulfillment of course requirements. All participants reported 
having no problem related to colour perception, and had normal or corrected-to 
normal visual acuity. All the participants had a basic familiarity with computers and 
were able to use the mouse.  
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5.1.3 Materials: 
Island game, a well-structured problem, 
was written using Pascal language. The 
internal game objects were organized 
for fast display of a scene and relied on 
the human visual system to pick out 
relevant objects and their relations. The 
program recorded each participant 
moves in the game accompanied with 
the associated time. The participants had 
to choose one operator from operators 
list, and then click by using the mouse to make the operator active to use. Figure 5.1 
shows screenshot of island-game. In the following, we will discuss this game.  
5.1.4 Island-game:  
Island game, a computer 
simulation of a robot - called 
“James”- endowed with several 
needs (e.g., energy and water), 
was used to investigate what 
“Dietrich Dörner” calls action-
regulation. The island-game 
contains numerous locations as 
shown in figure 5.2.  
 
                                                 
∗ Island game –version III that had been used in the experiment was programmed 
by Frand Detje and Roman Seidl. For further details about the island-game 
program see: ( Detje, 1998; Gerdes & Dörner, 2003). 
                     
Figure 5.1: Screenshot of island-game. 
Figure 5.2: Locomotions and geographical 
                 structure of the island-game.  
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In addition, there are many different objects that can be manipulated in various 
ways. Manipulations of the objects can have effects on the robot (for example, 
water can be drunk and the need for water is satisfied) or the environment (for 
instance, dunes can be sifted). Subjects have to control the robot to collect rocks 
called 'Nucleotides' and satisfy its existential needs. Moreover, they have to protect 
the robot from damage. Two explicit goals must be met to play this “island-game” 
successfully:  I- The needs of the robot have to be satisfied and; II- The task of 
collecting “nucleotides” has to be fulfilled. Implicitly, and this leads to a third goal; 
III- The island, which is unknown to the subjects, has to be explored (see: Detje, 
2003, p.243).  
5.1.5 Apparatus: 
The game was presented on a computer run with Windows 2000 (German 
version). Participants were seated approximately 60 cm from the 17 inch colour 
screen. Our experiment was videoed. Moreover, software packages that records 
participant’ responses have been developed, because measurement of responses on 
each session is strongly facilitating analyzing the data. So, responses were recorded 
with its input sensitivity. The program recorded each mouse click with its 
associated time accompanied by its topic (e.g., object, operator, direction,…etc.). 
5.1.6 Instructions: 
At the beginning of the experiment, participants were informed that they 
took part in a problem-solving experiment. Before beginning the first session, 
standard instructions for the task were given using Power Point presentation (see 
appendix) that was edited by Elkady & Seidl (2001). Instructions explained the 
basic rules of the game, described the task, and showed how to activate the 
operators. Furthermore, the instructions contained briefly description of the robot, 
the island environment, and the desirable tasks that are to keep the robot alive (e.g. 
to find enough water and food for the robot) and to collect so-called “Nucleotides”. 
It was also allowed to ask questions about unclear instructions to be sure that the 
participants were able to manipulate simply the simulation. During playing 
sessions, participants were allowed to think and speak freely. 
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5.1.7 Experimental design and procedure:  
The sample of experiment was divided into two groups (group-A and group-
B). Each group consisted of twenty participants. While “group-A” played island-
game that its resources could be renewable, group-B played non-renewable 
resources version. All participants were tested individually in a quiet laboratory and 
in a sound-attenuated cabin that separated the participants from the laboratory. This 
was done so that the participants could only see the flat-screen monitor and 
minimize any effects that may be caused during the experiment. The participants 
were also asked to adjust the height of the chair that they were seated in so that they 
were approximately at eye level with the monitor. There was one video camera set 
in front of the participant to record the game and facial expressions.  
To run effectively the software, the experiment was designed so that the 
experimenter could operate the game from the laboratory and the response to the 
game by using the mouse. The cabin allowed the experimenter to remain out of 
sight while the participant was interacting with the game. The software also 
recorded time for each mouse click so that the data could later be accurately 
analyzed. Participants completed the game in four consequent playing sessions. 
Each session is thirty minutes in duration. In order to minimize fatigue during 
sessions, between five and ten minutes break was given to each participant after 
completing thirty minutes of playing the simulation game. No feedback was 
provided by the observers to the participants about their performance in break 
periods. The simulation was adaptive to stop automatically every thirty minutes 
without losing the previously data. Therefore, the participant can safely complete 
the game from the point, which he/ she was stopped. As soon as the responses for a 
current session had been recorded, the next session began after the participant 
clicked the enter key. The entire experiment for each participant took 
approximately between 165 and 180 minutes. Two observers were seated in a well-
illuminated laboratory facing 56 inch TV connected to camera in cabin that 
displayed the performance of the participant. 
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5.1.8 Dependent variables: 
Basic dependent variables of the game were the achievement of both criteria 
(caring about existential needs and collecting “nucleotides”). Moreover, Dörner 
(see: Dörner & starker, 2004) determined eight systematic dependent variables that 
could summarize a participant’s results of the island-game. Definitions of these 
dependent variables are shown in table 5.1. 
 
5.2 Results of the experiment 
5.2.1 Introduction: 
In this section, we are going to show the results of the two experimental 
groups (group-A and group-B), and also the results of the whole sample on the 
eight dependent variables. Table 5.3, figure 5.6 and figure 5.7 show result of group-
A (n=20). Table 5.4, figure 5.8 and figure 5.9 how results of group-B (n=20). As 
well, table 5.2, figure 5.4 and figure 5.5 show result of the whole sample (n=40). 
For further comparison, figure 5.3 shows means of group-A, group-B and the whole 
sample.  
NSL Number of Successful Locomotions on the island. 
NUL Number of Unsuccessful Locomotions or trials to move on the island. 
NLOC Number of visited locomotions on the island (exploration activity). 
NEX Number of breakdowns of the robot because of missing "food" or 
water or too much damage. 
NAGG Number of approaches (aggressions) to an object (i.e., hazelnut bush, 
rock, etc.). 
NSM Number of Successfully Manipulated objects. 
NUM Number of Unsuccessfully Manipulated objects. 
NNUK Number of found Nucleotides. 
Table 5.1: Definitions of the dependent variables. 
Source: (Dörner & Starker, 2004). 
Chapter Five: Research Methodology −The Experiment & Strategies. 
 
155 
 
 NSL NUL NLOC NEX NAGG NSM NUM NNUK 
Maximum 399 667 95 14 402 694 1029 161 
Minimum 139 136 37 0 183 155 95 23 
Mean 268.75 353 65.2 6.33 281.15 316.13 289.1 83.4 
SD 69.89 101.76 14.24 3.5 46.96 87.83 176.63 25.07 
                                       Table 5.2: Results of the sample (n= 40). 
 NSL NUL NLOC NEX NAGG NSM NUM NNUK 
Maximum 399 479 75 11 402 390 535 105 
Minimum 200 198 48 0 228 169 100 40 
Mean 266.85 351.05 64.45 4.45 292.4 319.15 277.45 81.95 
SD 53.49 63.75 7.32 2.21 32 42.71 90.45 15.05 
                                         Table 5.3: Results of group-A (n= 20).  
 
 NSL NUL NLOC NEX NAGG NSM NUM NNUK 
Maximum 397 667 95 14 386 694 1029 161 
Minimum 139 136 37 3 183 155 95 23 
Mean 270.65 354.95 65.95 8.2 269.9 313.1 300.75 84.85 
SD 61.98 93.01 15.95 2.5 37.99 76.02 156.6 24.53 
                                         Table 5.4: Results of group-B (n= 20).  
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                                          Figure 5.3: Results of group-A, group-B and the sample.  
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Figure 5.4: Results of the sample (n= 40). 
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Figure 5.5: Mean of the sample (n= 40). 
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Figure 5.6: Results of group-A (n= 20). 
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Figure 5.7: Mean of group-A (n= 20). 
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Figure 5.8: Results of group-B (n=20).  
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Figure 5.9: Mean of group-B (n= 20). 
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5.2.2    Discussion 
The results of the experiment show that for both two groups, 
there are no differences between their results on the eight dependent 
variables as it was shown in table 5.3 (results of group-A) and table 5.4 
(results of group-B) and figure 5.3 (results of the sample, group-A and 
group-B). “Group-B” had relative number of breakdowns more than 
“group-A”. This was expected, because “group-B” had played non-
renewable resources version and “group-A” had played island-game 
version that its resources could be renewable. 
The results of the experiment are consistent with our expectation and 
are confirmed by our hypothesis that participants had different 
motivations (e.g. uncertainty ad incompetence motives), action plans, 
resolution levels, selection thresholds during playing the island game. 
Hence, different type of strategies had been formulated and used by the 
participants. These results support Dörner’s argument (2003, p.78) that 
the island game requires a lot of different cognitive activities, namely 
goal-learning, learning action sequences, remembering, background-
control, task-witching, planning, extrapolation to foresee the future and 
coping with time restrictions.  
Taken together, these results indicate that further qualitative 
investigations are needed to figure out different subjects’ strategies and 
to classify these strategies.   
In next sections, we will introduce our description of these strategies in 
perspective of PSI-theory. In the next section, we are going to discuss 
the method that was used towards analyzing action regulation of 
different strategies and single cases of personality. 
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5.3 Method and Description of Major Terms 
5.3.1 Introduction: 
This section deals with the qualitative method that had used towards 
analyzing action regulation of different strategies and single cases of personality. 
That method had been used by Dörner and Schaub (1994) when they analyzed 
human action regulation during controlling uncertain complex problem. Moreover, 
it had been also used by Strohschneider and Güss (1998) when they investigated 
planning and problem solving (differences between Brazilian and German 
students).  This method helped us to recognize planning, decision making, 
information processing and mistakes that the participants had used during playing 
the island-game. Of course, that consequently helped us to set up PSI-parameters to 
simulate such action regulation strategies of participants and the two single cases. 
5.3.2 The Method: 
Dörner and Schaub (1994) mean by action 
regulation the interaction of goal elaboration, 
forecasting activities, hypothesis formation, 
planning, decision making and self reflection. 
Figure 5.10 shows phases of action regulation, 
as it has been described by Dörner and Schaub 
(ibid). In the following, briefly description of 
the basic concepts of action regulation will be 
demonstrated using island-game as an example 
of the description.  
Goal-Elaboration: 
In island-game, the goals were both ill-defined 
(open) and well defined. An open goal was, for 
instance, the task of taking care of the robot 
“James”; whereas the task of collecting 
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Figure 5.10: 
 Phases of action regulation. 
Source: (Dörner & Schaub, 1994). 
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nucleotides as much as possible was well defined. Dörner and Schaub (ibid) 
proposed that it was rather common that subjects in situations with ill-defined goals 
did not at all spend much time and effort in the elaboration of goals.” 
 Hypothesis–Formation:  
In such task, like island- game it is necessary to develop hypotheses to understand 
the functions of both operators and objects, and to explore the structure of the 
island. Dörner and Schaub (ibid) found that most mistakes in information collection 
are “channeling errors", which result from a preformed image of the reality. Dörner 
and Schaub (ibid) added that the subject was not prepared to look at the whole 
range of information, but only to a narrow part which he, according to his image of 
the system, considered to be important. 
Prognosing: 
In general, prognosis is a prediction of the probable course of events or outcomes of 
actions. Dörner and Schaub (ibid) argue that it is very difficult for us to build a 
good image of what is going on in time. We have difficulties in understanding the 
characteristics of developments simply because we forget so much. Therefore, the 
images we form about developments are often too simple. Moreover, prognoses will  
be especially difficult, when subjects fail to understand long-term developments 
and the developments are not monotonic, but exhibit more or less sudden changes 
in direction of development. 
Planning:  
Dörner and Schaub (ibid) elucidated that planning means to create new courses of 
action by a combination of pieces which the planner finds in his memory "model of 
the world".  With complex systems, the main mistake of planning seems to be to 
disregard side effects and long-term effects, which nearly every action will have. It 
is not uncommon to find that the process of planning is guided not by the goal, 
which should be achieved, but by the salience of the effects of one's actions.  
In addition, Strohschneider & Güss, (1998) clarified that planning is based on the 
knowledge of the given situation and uses knowledge about possible measures, 
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their conditions for implementation, their main- and side-effects and their 
probability for success in order to find a sequence of steps that has a satisfying 
chance to reach the intended goal(s). 
 
Monitoring:  
Dörner and Schaub (1994) argue that decisions in a complex situation often have 
long "dead-times". Successes or failures are not immediately visible, but will show 
up only after days, months or even years. Feedback-delay makes the control of the 
appropriateness of ones actions difficult.  The non-cohesion of decision and effect 
will often lead to an abandonment of monitoring the effects of ones actions.  
Strohschneider and Güss, (ibid) described plans, in perspective of the purpose 
of their study, on different dimensions as the following: 
• Depth, time perspective: Plans can have a different time perspective. 
They can be “short” in the sense that their range encompasses only the 
immediate future. Plans with a “deep” time perspective consist of a long 
sequence of actions that reaches far into the future. 
•  Concreteness: Plans can be very abstract; general outlines of the intended 
course of action (one might call them strategies), or they can be very 
elaborated; detailed prescriptions for a specific sequence of actions. 
• Coherence, or structuredness: They refer to the fact that actions may be 
related to each other or that the plan basically consists of a cluster of 
unrelated possibilities. 
• Width, or number of “branches“: Independently of their time 
perspective, plans can be narrow and consist of just one course of action or 
they can be wide and take different possibilities and events that might 
happen into account. 
• Flexibility: Rigid planning does not allow for any detours of the planned 
course of action, although detours might be sometimes necessary.  
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Self-Reflection: 
Dörner and Schaub (1994) argue that if one induces self-reflection, one can 
improve the capabilities of problem-solving considerably. The abandonment of 
phases of self-reflection is often caused by the tendency to avoid doubts about the 
appropriateness of one's thinking abilities. Self-criticism implies the recognition of 
the mistakes that one has made, and this may mean a loss of the feeling of 
competence. A high feeling of competence, however, is just what seems to be 
extremely needed in complex problem-situations. The abandonment of self-
reflections means that one will be caught in a vicious circle of incompetence.  
Error-prone thinking tendencies are not detected, therefore, a lot of errors will result 
and actions will not have the desired effects. The ineffectiveness of one's actions, 
however, endangers the feeling of competence and therefore one tries to avoid the 
confrontation with the errors, which in turn blocks reflections about the reasons of 
the mistakes (ibid).  
5.3.3 Strategy, and tactics: 
Every participant had his own strategy and tactics to fulfill the game 
criterions. A subject’s strategy is the set of decisions-based on his motives’ 
structure-made to achieve desired goals. It involves how the participant will achieve 
goals, and what is the important and what is not. Because strategy means that one 
has determined, in advance, an ultimate goal he would like to achieve. Therefore, 
strategy is making a choice amongst multiple choices. In strategy, comprehensive 
planning∗ and a conducted long-term plan of action are considered (sometimes a 
participant does not care about long-term plan rather short term plan). Here, 
planning determines how the participant will learn about the structure of the island-
environment and how he shall discover it. In general; plan in strategy is much more 
cohesive than a hastily constructed one. Strategy is immutable, because it is 
considered as a big picture look at a problem and it gives us the course of action we 
take as we attempt to achieve our goals.  
                                                 
∗
 For further details about strategy and planning see (Dörner, 1989, p.95-97). 
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Tactics are the set of actions or activities taken to reach specific goal or goals 
towards fulfilling a strategy. One can describe a tactic as a device for 
accomplishing an end; a method, or a set of requirements for a plan to take effect. 
Hence, tactics are what we do to carry out strategy (in other words, the actual ways 
in which the strategies are executed).  
Also, tactics are seen as an aspect of strategy 
and not an end in themselves. Tactics vary with 
circumstances. Therefore, tactics present a 
small picture perspective. Strategy is what one 
wants to do, while tactics are the means to 
reach that aim. Briefly, a strategy can be a sum 
up of a number of tactics (see figure 5.11). 
Dörner (2001) and Starker had found the following participants’ strategies that were 
used after playing an early version of island-game (version II). 
1. Survival-strategy: Try to find as much water, hazel-nuts and sunflower seeds 
as you can. 
2. Basis-Camp-strategy: Find a place where a lot of water and fuel exist. Use this 
place as a basis camp for expeditions to collect nucleotides and turn back to this 
place when the vehicle begins to run out of water or fuel. 
3. Nucleotides-first-strategy: Don't care about the vehicle. You'll get a new one 
after each breakdown. 
4. Action-strategy: Try to be as active as possible. Change whatever can be 
changed. 
5. Carpe-diem-Strategy: Don't waste your time with long-term planning and 
strategy formation! Look for the opportunities of the moment. 
                                                 

  Version-II  Is a small version of the island game that contains fewer objects and    
     locomotion than version III that had been used in our experiment, but has the    
     same task and motives that are in version III ). 
 
 …… 
Strategy 
Tactic Tactic 
Figure 5.11: Strategy and tactics. 
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5.3.4     Discussion  
In the current research, we also observed the strategies that Dörner and 
Starker had investigated in island-game version II.  Moreover, we also 
discovered two new strategies (stereotype-strategy and balance between 
motives strategy). In the current work, we simulated two strategies that 
had been considered by Dörner and Starker (survival-strategy and 
nucleotides-first-strategy), because they had been also used by 
participants when they had played island-game version III. Moreover, 
we simulated the two new strategies that we had found by the 
participants, when they had played island-game version III too. These 
two new strategies are (stereotype-strategy and balance between 
motives strategy).  In the following, we are going to explain these 
strategies in perspective of PSI-theory. Firstly, we will discuss 
nucleotides-first-strategy. We will explain action regulation of subjects 
those who used this strategy. Secondly, uncertainty and incompetence 
motives, resolution level, selection threshold and action process of 
subjects those who used balance between motives-strategy will also be 
discussed.  By simulating these two strategies; nucleotides-first-strategy 
and balance between motives-strategy, in perspective of PSI-theory, we 
can assume that PSI-agent is able to simulate different human strategies 
in a complex and dynamic task. Moreover, we viewed the PSI-agent as 
potentially having the ability to simulate all strategies that humans can 
do in complex tasks. Therefore, we assumed that it makes sense, when 
PSI simulates single cases too. Taking this view, we have analyzed and 
then simulated (participant-XXVIII)’s strategy, as an example of 
balance between motives- strategy). We also simulated (participant-
XXXVIII)’s strategy as an example of stereotype-strategy. While in 
chapter six we will show the simulation process, in the following, we 
will demonstrate the analyzation process of actions for these four 
different strategies. 
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5.4 The Nucleotides-First-Strategy 
5.4.1 Introduction: 
In general, participants who used the nucleotides-first-strategy during 
playing the island-game had considered nucleotides as a main motive and they had 
ignored the existential needs (hunger−thirst−damage avoidance) and affiliation 
motive too. 
 In the first session of playing island game, they had high level of uncertainty and 
the other three sessions their actions were characterized by high level to collect 
nucleotides. Figure 5.12 shows action profiles of three participants who used the 
nucleotides-first-strategy.  We can notice that these profiles are characterized by 
high number of breakdowns (because the participants ignored the existential needs) 
and high number of nucleotides (because searching nucleotides was their main 
motive). And because searching nucleotides was their main motive, Most of 
Figure 5.12: The nucleotides-first strategy−action profiles. 
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aggressions related to nucleotides’ objects. 
We noticed also that participants, who used nucleotides-first strategy, did not 
consider “Teddy”; the affiliation’s goal in the game, one of their goals, because 
they were always in a hurry to collect many nucleotides as they could. And they 
considered satisfying affiliation’s motive could slow down and reduce the number 
of nucleotides (their main goals). Therefore, one can estimate that affiliation’s 
motive was reduced or played no role with these participants during collecting 
nucleotides. That means affiliation motive should have a very small weight value, 
when we simulate participants who used nucleotides-first strategy. Basic 
characteristics (e.g., motives, resolution level and tactics) of action profile of the 
participants, who used nucleotides-first strategy, will be illustrated as follow.  
5.4.2 Uncertainty motive: 
Island game was not a simple mission because there are many difficulties 
and problems that faced the players or the participants during playing the island 
game, and they had to solve these problems. For example, the participants did not 
know the geographical structure of the island; therefore, they had to explore the 
geographical form of the island and learn where and how one could move between 
the different places (see: Dörner, 2001; Dörner; 2003; Dörner, & Schaub, 1998). 
Moreover, in order to satisfy uncertainty motive, a participant had to find out 
solutions for the following questions or problems: 
• Which objects can be considered as goals for hunger and thirst motives? 
• Which operators can be used to manipulate these objects? 
• Where can one find these objects?  
• How can one avoid damage? 
• How can one repair damage?  
• Are there particular objects that could help to fix the robot? 
• Where can one find these objects?  
Participants, who used nucleotides-first strategy, had a high level of uncertainty 
motive in the first session. And because they wanted to reduce their uncertainty, 
they had manipulated objects and operators to discover and detect their meaning 
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and their purposes. Therefore, they continuously tried to find the meaning 
underlying things. Every encounter and every piece of knowledge gained had been 
applied. Then, this experience was evaluated to see if it had any consequence to 
help them to get their goals. Participants, who used nucleotides-first strategy, had 
used the following tactics to satisfy uncertainty: 
A. Searching general certainty about all objects, operators, and locomotions. 
Participants had explored all objects in a locomotion by using most of the operators. 
Moreover, participants tried to do that very quickly as possible, thus they can 
explore different locomotions.  Such participants were characterized by acting very 
fast and were motived to acquire certainty about surroundings. Hence, satisfying 
uncertainty motive should have a high priority in their parameter list accompanied 
by high selection threshold. Consequently, their results were characterized by high 
number of aggressions, high number of successful manipulations, high number of 
successful locomotions and high number of locomotions. Yet, because they had 
high level of uncertainty motive, they sometimes collected few number of 
“nucleotides” in the first session because they had spent much time in exploration 
process and consequently, they had high number of breakdowns (see figure 5. 13).    
B. Searching certainty about most objects, operators, and locomotions. 
Here, the participant, who used nucleotides-first strategy, explored most objects in 
locomotion, instead of exploring all objects. In addition, the same tactic occurred 
when the participant had explored operators too. To simulate such tactic, one can 
assume that satisfying uncertainty motive should have a high priority in their 
parameter list, their selection thresholds should also have a moderate level that 
allows other motives to be active and thus target for next action and that just in the 
first session. Consequently, results of the participants, who used nucleotides-first 
strategy and used also this tactic, were characterized by high number of 
aggressions, high number of successful manipulations, high number of successful 
locomotions and high number of locomotions. Of course, these dependent variables 
were fewer in their values than the previous tactic.  As well, because of their 
moderate level of selection threshold, they collected a high number of 
“nucleotides” and had a few number of breakdowns compared to previous tactic 
(see also figure 5.13). 
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Figure 5.13: The nucleotides-first-strategy− action process. 
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C. Formulating hypotheses about objects and operators before acting.  
In this tactic, participants built hypotheses about objects and their relations to 
motives. For example, “water” as a goal could satisfy thirst (right hypothesis). An 
example of wrong hypothesis is that “a tree” could satisfy hunger. For this reason, 
they explored just objects that match their hypotheses. Moreover, they used the 
same tactic with operators and their relations to objects. For example, the sucker 
operator could suck water. As a result, they chose few number of objects and test 
them by few numbers of operators and consequently, they had got few number of 
aggressions and few number of successful manipulations. And before they chose an 
operator from operators list to make it active for action, they had spent relative 
much time to formulate a right hypothesis (see figure 5.15). This tactic was 
considered as a great source of competence, because competence increased very 
high after a hypothesis was successfully 
proved. However, it was also considered as a 
source of incompetence, because competence 
decreased after a hypothesis was failed as it is 
shown in figures 5.14. Moreover, 
classification process was considered an 
essential step towards exploring objects and 
operators. At this point, a subject attempted 
to classify the surroundings into two main 
and primary categories (known and 
unknown). Figure 5.13 shows effects of 
classification process of objects, in 
perspective of known-unknown criterion, on 
                                                 

 It apparently seems that the results of  figures 5.14 and 5.15  were early introduced     
    in PSI-theory, however the current results support what was before found and     
    vice versa. 
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arousal and both certainty and competence. For example, while a known object 
increased the participant’s certainty and competence, it decreased at the same time 
the participant’s arousal.  
 
Participants, who used nucleotides-first strategy and used also this tactic, preferred 
planning to simple acting without planning. When this tactic had success, a 
participant began to act steadily and his results were also characterized by high 
number of “nucleotides”. But when this tactic had failure, a participant’s 
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Figure 5.15: Classification process and formulating hypotheses. 
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competence had decreased and his action began to be unconfident. However, most 
those who used nucleotides-first strategy had a high level of persistence; therefore, 
they had reformulated new hypothesis (try new operator) till they found the 
effective one (see figure 5.15). Planning steps as it was shown in figure 5.15 will be 
briefly explained as follow: 
1- Constructing a hypothesis about usages and benefits of the object.  
Before a participant, who used nucleotides-first strategy, began to act, he attempted 
to construct a hypothesis about the benefits of the objects. This prediction phase 
was considered a result process from the interaction between the participant’s 
memory, motives, and the current object. This interaction process apparently 
coasted time. However, the benefit of constructing a hypothesis about the object 
was especially important because this process reduced much time in the next action 
steps and consequently, it reduced number of unsuccessful manipulations during 
playing sessions. 
2- Constructing a hypothesis about the proper operator. 
After zooming in an object, there were different operators that a participant could 
select one of them to handle the object. Here, the participant attempted to construct 
a hypothesis about the proper operator that could be proper to handle with the 
current object. Of course, participants differed from each other in respect of these 
two phases. It was recognized that most of them used these two phases, while 
random choices, during the exploration process, had been made by the others. 
3- Testing by acting. 
It is rational that when one attempts to prove a hypothesis, he takes an action. 
However, it was observed that some of the participants just pointed to an operator 
without taking action (e.g. click on the operator to activate it for manipulation). In 
this case, the operator was not applied and the hypothesis was not proved. 
4- Learning from feed-back. 
After activating an operator, one can observe if it is effective or not. Inadvertently, 
some participants did not observe the effect of the operators, while others did. The 
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reason for that could be due to the participant’s resolution level. When one has a 
high resolution level, he could see and observe the effect, while low resolution level 
interrupts one’s perception. Learning from feedback about results is important 
because one should have relevant feedback and consequences about his 
performance. Participants, who used nucleotides-first strategy, used the feedback 
information about the result of a process or activity to guide them to next steps. 
They also learned by trial and error. They stored automatically information 
according to both outcomes (success and failure) for future retrieval, so they had 
saved time by avoiding mistakes (e.g., using useless operators). As well, they were 
likely to retrieve the steps that had been previously experienced, and then they 
applied these steps. Also, because they had stored experienced information from 
feed-back, they could skip steps towards solutions more quickly than participants 
who used stereotype-strategy. Those who used stereotype-strategy did not use the 
feed-back efficiently, so they repeatedly made the same mistakes. 
5- Re-plan. 
When the operator was failed, the participant, who used nucleotides-first strategy, 
replaned and tried again by using another operator, till he had found the right 
operator and conditionally stored both object and its operator in memory for future 
retrieval. Here, the participant put a lot of energy to identify the best tactic to reach 
his goals. 
D. Exploring systematically an object by all operators. 
Sometimes, a participant; who used nucleotides-first strategy, began to explore an 
object by all operators and without formulating hypothesis. He followed systematic 
order as shown in figure 5.16. The systematic order if this tactic was as follow. 
1. A participant zoomed in an object, and then he explored it by using the operator 
(A). When the operator (A) failed to make change or had no effect then; 
2. The participant activated the next operator -“the operator (B)” -, and when it 
failed to make change or had no effect then; 
3. The participant activated the next operator- “the operator (C)” -, and when it 
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had effect and the object was changed then; 
4. The participant explored the object again, or zoomed out and then; 
5. The participant explored systematically new object. 
In first session, action profiles of those who used nucleotides-first strategy were 
characterized by high number of unsuccessful manipulations. However, in the next 
sessions, the action profiles were characterized by high number of successful 
manipulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E. Exploring geographical structure of the island by choosing a direction 
from directions’ list similar to the clockwise direction. 
In order to move to new location or to explore geographical structure of the island, 
participants used clockwise direction tactic as it is shown in figure 5.17. The 
systematic order of this tactic was as follow: 
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1. A participant clicked “North-direction” to move to new location. When “North-
direction” failed or was blocked then; 
2. The participant clicked “NE-direction” - and when it failed or was blocked the 
participant clicked “East”. When “East-direction” was blocked then; 
3. The participant clicked “SE-direction” and came in to a new location. And to 
move to new location, a participant clicked again “North-direction”……..etc. 
5.4.3 Incompetence motive:  
Participants, who used nucleotides-first strategy, acted confidentially and 
assuredly and they searched for success. Yet, success for them meant collecting 
many nucleotides as possible. In other words, they focused on the way that made 
their competence high. They did not want to feel incompetent or inadequate. 
Therefore, they tried to act in such way that made them competent and successful. 
Moreover, they minimized the effect of failures or such behaviours that made them 
feel incompetent. Hence, the increase of competence was higher than the decrease 
of competence. When their goals were being threatened and at risk of becoming 
endangered, they can become aggressive (towards environment; i.e., beating 
affiliation goal or towards the robot; i.e., ignoring the robot’s needs) and inclined to 
behave in a hostile fashion to protect their goals.  
In addition, because those who used nucleotides-first strategy seemed that as they 
did not accept mistakes, they tried to complete tasks to the final detail without 
mistakes (e.g., they explored objects by all or most operators till they were sure that 
the objects were completely explored). They heavily had used their intuitions; 
therefore, they sometimes know things intuitively by getting feelings about them, 
and then they checked their intuitions by systematic verification. Because they had 
determined very high standards of action especially towards collecting nucleotides, 
they were usually hard pressed; did not give themselves enough breaks and seem 
unhappy. Moreover, they sometimes were not satisfied about their actions or results 
and that was because of their high level of aspiration. Moreover, they were very 
sensitive to conflict situations. For instance, when the robot would breakdown and 
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at the same time, there was a chance to collect nucleotides. Therefore, situations, 
which were charged with conflict, may drive them into a state of anger or 
confusion, and that clearly appeared in their facial expressions (i.e., stressful 
emotion).  
5.4.4 Resolution level: 
Participants, who used nucleotides-first strategy, were sensitive to 
differences between objects, especially nucleotides objects. One can assume that 
they had a high resolution level and they worked enthusiastically to collect many 
nucleotides. Moreover, they did not focus on the other objects, except that served 
their main task (nucleotides). They stored nucleotides objects and their operators in 
memory. Hence, they could quickly elicit and determine the operator, when they 
found a nucleotides object. Therefore, their profile was characterized by few 
number of unsuccessful manipulations and high number of successful 
manipulations. 
5.4.5 Selection threshold:  
Participants, who used nucleotides-first strategy, had high selection 
thresholds towards collecting nucleotides and, at the same time, they did not make 
balance between motives. For example, when they were in a locomotion, they 
scanned and searched just for nucleotides objects. In conflict situations, whereas 
one of the robot’ motives was high, they display little importance to the robot’ 
motives. They simply try to achieve their main goal (nucleotides), regardless the 
consequences that the robot can suffer. For example, when the robot was in danger 
and it should have been repaired and, at the same time, there was a chance to collect 
nucleotides, they did not repair the robot rather than they had collected nucleotides. 
They would not reduce their high level of aspiration to save the robot; therefore, the 
robot had frequently breakdowns. For this reason, they had high number of 
breakdowns and, at the same time, they had high number of nucleotides (see figure 
5.12).  
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5.5 The Balance-Between-Motives-Strategy 
5.5.1 Introduction: 
Some participants played the island game and they made balance between 
motives. In other words, some participants were capable of achieving both tasks 
(saving the robot from breakdowns and collecting nucleotides) by considering all 
goals of existential needs together with nucleotides. These participants had 
moderate (medium) level of selection threshold and high resolution level that was 
important to notice differences very rapidly and sensitively. Therefore, they were 
able to store and easily recognize more details about objects and locomotions. We 
called these participants “productive subjects”, because they had competently and 
efficiently achieved the both tasks (save the robot from breakdowns and collect 
nucleotides) in respect of comparing their results to the results of the sample as it 
will be shown in chapter six. Figure 5.18 shows action profiles of three participants 
who used balance between motives-strategy. 
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Figure 5.18: The balance-between-motives-strategy − action profiles. 
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5.5.2 Uncertainty motive: 
Participants, who used balance between motives strategy, had high level of 
uncertainty especially in the first session. They concentrated to satisfy uncertainty 
motive by focusing their actions to gather information about goals and their relation 
to motives. For example, after (30) minutes of playing the game, they had a large 
database about the tasks of the game. That included goals formulation, objects, 
operators and geographical structure of the island. They gathered and; then, coded 
information systematically in the memory. Therefore, they were quickly able to 
recall information from memory to solve new problems (situations). Tactics that 
had been mostly used to satisfy uncertainty motive by those who used balance 
between motives strategy will be briefly illustrated as follow:   
A. Complete-incomplete action-tactic.  
While most of participants, who used balance between motives strategy, used 
complete action tactic as shown in figure 5.19, some of them used incomplete 
action tactic as shown in figure 5.20. Complete-incomplete action tactics depended 
on a participant’s uncertainty motive towards an object. To clarify, if the increase 
value of uncertainty motive was more than the decrease value, then a participant 
would use complete action tactic. While if the decrease value of uncertainty was     
more than the increase value, then a participant would use incomplete action tactic. 
Moreover, participants, who used incomplete action tactic, assumed that every 
object had just one right operator and the other operators would not be useful, and 
the effect of an operator could change an object just for one time and no more. 
While participants, who used complete action tactic, assumed that every object 
could have one or more right and useful operators, thus an object could be changed 
more than one time by one or more operators.  
In addition, what a (participant-A), who used complete action tactic, did in (90) 
minutes, a (participant-B), who used incomplete action tactic, did it in (120) 
minutes. 
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Figure 5.19: Complete action tactic. 
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Figure 5.20: Incomplete action tactic.  
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Figure 5.21: Bipolar-direction tactic. 
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To simulate these participants, we should do the following (see table 5.5):  
1. The increase value of uncertainty motive of “participant-A”, who used 
complete action tactic, should be higher than the increase value of uncertainty 
motive of “participant-B” who used incomplete action tactic. 
2. The decrease value of uncertainty motive of “participant-A” should be lower 
than the decrease value of uncertainty motive of “participant -B”. 
3. In all circumstances, the resolution level of “participant -B” should be lower 
than “participant -A”. 
B. Exploring geographical structure of the island by using bipolar-direction- 
tactic. 
In this tactic, a participant explored the island by bipolar-direction strategy; e.g. 
(North then South), (East then West), (NE then SW) or (NW then SE). For 
example, as it was shown in figure 5.21, a participant had clicked north in order to 
move to new locomotion, and when that failed; then, he clicked south. 
C. Exploring an object in a locomotion, and then quickly move to new 
locomotion-tactic. 
In this tactic, a participant had just explored an object in a locomotion, and then 
moved to new locomotion (see figure 5.22). This participant felt bored quickly and 
therefore, he had looked for new information. Therefore, the action profile of such 
participant was marked by high number of aggressions and high number of 
successful locomotions. To simulate such tactic, we should give the weight of 
uncertainty motive the highest value. Moreover, the increase value of uncertainty 
should also be high; therefore, the participant will look for information. Also, the 
decrease of uncertainty motive should be high; therefore, the participant (or the 
PSI-agent) will feel bored quickly. 
 The increase value 
of uncertainty 
The decrease value 
of uncertainty 
Participant-A 
(complete action tactic). high low 
Participant-B 
(incomplete action tactic). low high 
  Table 5.5: Estimated parameters for complete and incomplete action tactics. 
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5.5.3 Incompetence motive: 
Applying what a participant had learned about objects and operators to the 
new situation increases the participant competence. Participants, who used balance 
between motives strategy, used exploring-then–applying tactic (see figure 5.25) as 
a main source of competence. Applying known knowledge was one source to 
increase competence. They preferred to do things that they had known. They tried 
to maintain their competence always high by acting such action that led to success.  
Moreover, they began with things that the outcome prediction would surely be right 
and accordingly, their competence would be high. They explored new locomotions 
and objects to apply what they had learned and to prove their competence. 
Therefore, we can assume that a participant, who used balance between motives 
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strategy, had a high value of incompetence motive. Therefore, the weight of 
incompetence motive should be high in his parameter, accompanied by high value 
of uncertainty motive too. And the increase value of incompetence motive should 
be higher than the decrease value of incompetence motive. Hence, the PSI-agent, 
which will simulate such strategy, will act and look for information to satisfy 
incompetence motive by satisfying uncertainty motive.  
Choosing actions that had positive outcomes enabled the participants, who used 
balance between motives strategy, to recover from mistakes more quickly than the 
participants who used other strategies.  
5.5.4 Action process: 
Participants, who used balance between motives strategy, used more 
extensive means to apply to a problem and learned how to integrate and synthesize 
knowledge. Hence, they were very quickly to determine optimal goals when they 
were encountered to unfamiliar or new locomotions. And that related to their efforts 
to gather information and to understand the relations between motives and goals in 
the first session. In other words, that related to their high level of uncertainty 
motive. They had organized gained information according to solutions, and then 
they used this information automatically and rapidly. Learning from feed-back was 
one of their action characteristics. Therefore, they learned from mistakes. They did 
not stop to learn through their course of action, but rather they enhanced their 
experiences during the four sessions. So, they quickly responded to changes. 
Briefly, they were flexible; mentally quick; able to see possibilities; systematic; and 
adaptable. Table 5.6 shows how the main motive changed during the playing 
sessions.  
Session Main motive Action towards satisfying the motive 
One Uncertainty Exploring new objects and locomotions 
Two Incompetence Exploring-and then-applying tactic 
Three Task motive Searching nucleotides 
Four Searching uncertainty 
because of bore. 
Diversive exploration 
Table 5.6: The main motive changed during the playing sessions. 
(The balance-between-motives-strategy) 
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5.6 Single Case One- (Participant-XXVIII)’s Strategy 
                (An example of the balance-between-motives-strategy) 
5.6.1 Introduction: 
The experimental participant No.28 (female) is a student at the department 
of psychology at Bamberg University. While she was playing the island game, she 
made balance between motives. In other words, she made balance between 
existential needs of the robot and collecting nucleotides. Her motives and the 
weight of motives changed during the sessions flexibly. That means she was 
looking for information, in the first session, to satisfy uncertainty motive. In the 
second session, she applied what she had learned in the first session to satisfy 
incompetence motive. In the third session, she was doing the task perfectly (i.e., 
searching “nucleotides”) to satisfy nucleotides motive. And finally, diversive 
exploration was emerged because of bore (see table 5.6).  
5.6.2 Action process: 
At the beginning, participant No. 28 tried to increase her knowledge span 
about objects and locomotions. In other words, at the beginning, she had no 
knowledge or experience about surroundings. Therefore, she had high level of 
uncertainty accompanied by high selection threshold, especially towards satisfying 
uncertainty motive. She explored one object in a location, and then she moved from 
the location quickly. She began first to explore objects by operators. Sometimes a 
participant began from an operator and tried it with all objects in a location to know 
the operator function. She explored objects by formulating hypotheses about the 
relations between objects and operators (e.g. she had chosen one or two operators 
that could be the right one with the selected object). She was happy when she had a 
success; especially, when the chosen operator had the right effect. Connections 
between motives and their goals had success, in first session, except for the damage 
avoidance goals. Failures, in the first session, did not have big negative effects on 
her competence, because she considered that failures could be happen at the 
beginning. She had also high level of uncertainty towards locomotions. Therefore, 
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she explored the directions; however, randomly. Hence, she could not figure out the 
geographical structure of the island. Her resolution level was low that she could not 
notice the small differences between objects (i.e., trees). Moreover, she had a good 
memory to remember the relations between motives, objects and operators. The 
robot had breakdowns, because of her high level of uncertainty towards 
locomotions and because she did not know the damage avoidance goals that were 
always her biggest problem. To some extent, she was sure that she can not put the 
robot in safe. Once she had found damage avoidance goals, she was very happy and 
her action began to be steady. At that time, she considered that success is collecting 
nucleotides parallel to caring about the robot’s needs. She began to be always sure 
that the robot is in a safe situation. So, whenever she had found water, food and 
plant, she fed the robot. She sometimes fed the robot although the robot did not 
actually need that. She did not react fast when the robot was in a danger (e.g., when 
it had damage). However, that increased her arousal and also increased her 
tendency to contact with affiliation’s goal (i.e., Teddy). 
Her emotions intensity was somehow moderate and she often smiled when she 
kissed “Teddy” (Teddy is the goal of affiliation motive). Moreover, she kissed 
“Teddy”, when she had a frustration. It seemed that kissing “Teddy” supported her 
or increased her competence, especially after failures. She smiled as a reaction to a 
surprising new object, although the robot was in critical situation. It seemed also as 
she said to herself, “I am not able to protect the robot so let it and continue 
exploring the island and search new object”. In early two sessions, “Teddy” (the 
goal of affiliation motive) was an object that satisfied affiliation motive and also for 
competence. Once she found later that it could be a source of nucleotides, it was 
one of her favorite objects. As a result, she interacted with “Teddy”, whenever she 
found it.  
While table 5.7 shows estimated parameters for the experimental sessions, figure 
5.23 shows development of action process during the four sessions and figure 5.24 
shows profile of her action process. Description of action process of each session 
will be explained as follow: 
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Figure 5.23: Participant-xxviii 
Development of action process during the four sessions. 
 
Figure 5.24: Participant-xxviii 
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5.6.3    Participant–xxviii: Session one 
Certainty: Because she had high level of uncertainty motive, especially 
towards objects, she concentrated on exploring objects in the island to increase 
her knowledge span about operators and objects. At the beginning, she 
randomly tried one or two operators with an object and that explains why she 
had got high number of unsuccessful manipulations in this session. After that, 
she began to formulate hypotheses about objects and operators. Evidently, 
formulating hypotheses was considered as a type of planning. So, she spent 
much time in a locomotion and that explains why she had got low number of 
locomotions. It seems that she had the following concept in her mind; 
 “Every object in the island has a certain operator that one should find it out”.  
Selection Threshold: She had a high level of selection threshold towards 
satisfying uncertainty motive. As well, collecting “nucleotides” was considered 
as sub-goal. Moreover, she had low resolution level and she could not 
discriminate between objects that had small difference (i.e., trees) 
 Goal–Elaboration: She spent much time to elaborate goals and consequently; 
the relations between motives and their goals was structured, except for damage 
avoidance goals.  
Competence: At the beginning, she had no experience and knowledge about 
objects, operators and locomotions of the island. So, she had high level of 
uncertainty. Consequently, she had a high level of incompetence. To increase 
her level of competence she used exploring-applying tactic (see figure 5.25) in 
which she applied what she had learned about objects and operators whenever 
she met a known object. After that, she turned to explore a new object. 
Arousal: She had moderate level of arousal and that was noticeably observed 
as she had put her initial hypothesis to test. Furthermore, a surprising emotion 
to effects of the operators on objects plainly remarked her reactions in this 
session. 
Figure 5.25: Exploring- applying tactic. 
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5.6.4    Participant-xxviii: Session two 
Certainty: she had high level of uncertainty motive; especially towards 
locomotions. Therefore, she concentrated on exploring locomotions in the 
island to increase her knowledge span about locomotions of the island. And to 
satisfy this motive, she moved continually between locomotions; and as a 
result, she had got very high number of successful locomotions in this session. 
However, she did not build a geographical map for the island. Consequently, in 
this session, she had got a high number of unsuccessful locomotions.  
Selection Threshold: She had a high level of selection threshold particularly 
towards satisfying uncertainty motive. This persistence caused the robot to 
have damage because the robot had been encountered to harmful locomotions. 
In addition, she did not know damage avoidance’s goals; so, the robot had 
frequently breakdowns.  
Resolution Level: In this session, she had low resolution level and she could 
not discriminate between objects that had small differences. 
Competence: To increase her competence after the robot had broken-down; 
she tried to collect “nucleotides” as possible as she could.  Furthermore, she 
reused “exploring-applying strategy” to increase her competence; however, she 
zoomed in an object followed by zooming out without taking action. As well, 
moving randomly among locomotions without zooming objects was observed 
under low level of competence.  
Arousal: She had high level of arousal because of frequent breakdowns and 
that had affected her planning negatively. For example, she got tensional and 
could not successfully move among locomotions; therefore, she had high 
number of unsuccessful locomotion. Furthermore, distress and sad emotions 
appeared on her face in this session accompanied by red face.  
Action style: This session was remarkably characterized by her persistence and 
patience to do well as possible (i.e.; collecting “nucleotides”), although the 
situation of the robot was frustrating. 
Chapter Five: Research Methodology −The Experiment & Strategies. 
 
188 
 
5.6.5    Participant-xxviii: Session three 
Main motive: While collecting “nucleotides” was her main motive in this 
session, searching goals of existential needs was constantly considered her sub-
goal. For these reasons, she had collected very high number of “nucleotides” 
and the robot did not breakdown in comparison to the two early sessions. In 
addition, she frequently kissed “Teddy” (the goal of affiliation motive) 
whenever she found it after every success. It seemed that contact with 
affiliation’s goal was regarded as a reward because of success. Additionally, 
one should note that contacting with affiliation’s goal, in this session, was 
greatly needed after success.  
Certainty: She had a moderate level towards satisfying uncertainty motive, 
because she had got most information about objects and locomotion in the 
previous tow sessions. Furthermore, because she had had collected many 
“nucleotides”, her competence was increased and was very high in this session.  
Selection Threshold: Her selection threshold was moderate. Hence, collecting 
“nucleotides” and searching existential goals were balanced.  
Basic reinforcement strength: Because she steadily and progressively acted 
and goals were successfully chosen in respect to their motives, strong and 
robust links between motives and goals characterized her basic reinforcement 
strength in this session. Resolution level was low and she could not 
discriminate between objects that had small differences.  
Action style: We can confidently say that her success in the third session was 
related to the successful exploration process that she had made in the first two 
sessions. For example, her high level of uncertainty towards objects in the first 
session powered her to gain knowledge about objects in the island. Moreover, 
her high level of uncertainty motive towards the island locomotions motivated 
her to have an experience about locomotions in the island. Therefore, her action 
,in the third session, was automatic and routine (applying perfectly what she 
had learned). Moreover, happiness emotion appeared after she had recognized 
damage-avoidance goal.  
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5.6.6    Participant-XXVIII: Session four 
Action style: Figure 5.26 shows her action style in this session. This session 
was characterized by:  
• Applying all gained knowledge to collect many “nucleotides” as possible. 
• Supplying “James” with existential goals, although that was absolutely 
unnecessary because the robot motivation was low (supply at low 
motivation). Over-supplying the robot with existential goals was a source 
to increase her competence. 
• Bore that was caused by high level of certainty accompanied by high level 
of competence. 
• Re-exploring known objects by new operators. As a result, she had high 
number of unsuccessful manipulations. As well, because of bore, she 
moved between locomotions. Consequently, she had high number of 
unsuccessful locomotions.  
• Low resolution level and low level of selection threshold; consequently, 
there was no main goal in this session rather than all goals had similar 
chance to be the target of action. 
• Because of bore, she searched uncertainty. Therefore, number of successful 
locomotions and number of unsuccessful locomotions were very high.  
• Bore had increased her tendency towards searching affiliations goal. 
Hence, in this session, “Teddy” (the goal of affiliation motive) was 
searched and kissed frequently. Moreover, basic reinforcement strength 
between motives, goals and operators was strong and robust. 
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(Session four: action style). 
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Table 5.7: Participant-xxviii−estimated parameters for the experimental sessions. 
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5.7 Single Case Two- (Participant-XXXVIII)’s Strategy 
                                (An example of the stereotype-strategy) 
5.7.1 Introduction: 
The experimental participant No.38 (female) is a student at the department 
of psychology at Bamberg University. While she played the island game, her action 
style was classified as stereotype-strategy. Figure 5.28 shows development of 
action process during the four sessions and figure 5.29 shows profile of her action 
process.  Table 5.8 shows estimated parameters for the experimental sessions. The 
description of her strategy will be discussed as follow.   
5.7.2 Uncertainty motive: 
Participant No.38 had most of the time very high level of uncertainty motive; 
especially towards exploring objects. Therefore, she tried to explore the most 
objects in locomotion by the most operators in the operators’ list. However, she did 
not have success, because she did not formulate hypotheses about both objects and 
operators, but she had used random tactics to explore objects all the time. 
Consequently, she had high number of unsuccessful manipulations. In general, 
those who used stereotype strategy did not change or develop their learning tactics 
during the playing sessions and were intolerant to look for new information, or 
increase their capabilities and expand their knowledge. While those who used 
balance between motives strategy continued to seek new information and 
persistently attempt to enhance their abilities and skills to control environment and 
to increase their knowledge span. Participants, who used stereotype-strategy, had 
used the following tactics to satisfy uncertainty (see figure 5.27): 
A. Randomly exploring objects and operators:  
Participants did not build hypotheses about objects and their relations to motives, 
but they had randomly explored objects. To clarify, an object was zoomed in, and 
then an operator was randomly activated from operators’ list. Whatever the operator 
had effect or not, the object was zoomed out. Hence, action’s profile of such 
participants was characterized by high number of aggressions, high number of 
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unsuccessful manipulations and few number of successful manipulations. That 
because the subject weakly stored the object and its operator in memory. Moreover, 
subject’s competence was decreased by such repeatedly failures. 
B. Randomly exploring geographical structure of the island:  
Participants, who used stereotype-strategy, did not build hypotheses about 
geographical structure of the island; but they had explored directions randomly 
from directions’ list. Consequently, action’s profile of such participant was 
characterized by high number of unsuccessful locomotions.  
Participant No. 38 simply refused to search new knowledge and insisted on refusing 
to investigate how to know. She spent her research time gaining information that 
could support what she had already gained at the first stage of playing. She was 
inflexible to consider anything else than what she had predetermined and 
categorized, and she did not attempt to re-examine her learning tactic, or get 
accurate information about the relations between objects and operations and/or 
objects and motives. 
Figure 5.27: Participant-xxxviii-action process. 
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Figure 5.29: Participant-xxxviii 
Profile of the action process. 
 
Figure 5.28: Participant-xxxviii. 
Development of action process during the four sessions. 
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5.7.3 Goal-elaboration: 
Goal-elaboration process was failed because she had low level of basic 
reinforcement strength. Hence, she quickly forgot what she had learned and 
explored and her knowledge span about objects and the function of operators was 
very narrow. Consequently, she had got a very high number of unsuccessful 
manipulations. As well, those who used stereotype strategy during playing the 
island game did not strive to improve or meet a standard of excellence during the 
playing or to find ways to do better, because they just depended on the physical 
senses of objects (i.e., dunes and rocks). For instance, participant No. 38 did not 
explore intensively dunes and rocks. Although tactics should work together to 
achieve the ultimate goal that one wants to achieve, some participants did not look 
at their tactics as an integrated sequence, and therefore long-term effects were not 
considered. For example, sometimes the robot had massive damage; however, she 
began to collect nucleotides. Consequently, the robot was broken-down and she lost 
five nucleotides, although he had taken this risk to collect two nucleotides. 
5.7.4 Incompetence motive: 
Participant No. 38 had a low level of incompetence motive and she was 
always hesitated and incompetent (e.g., she zoomed in objects, and then zoomed 
out without any action and that could explain why she had a high number of 
aggressions).  She tried very carefully and for a long time before she could decide 
an action. She hardly smiled during playing the game. When the consequence of 
using an operator had no effect, she was quickly frustrated and her competence 
decreased quickly; therefore she switched quickly between directions (back and 
front), operators, and objects.  
Those who used stereotype strategy were unconfident, because all they had to do 
was just repeating routine and acted in a stereotype manner. For example, they 
sometimes moved between locomotions without real exploration purpose and 
because of this, time passed without benefit. In addition, she was reacting 
uncontrollably, inhibiting quickly and ignoring the robot existential needs.  
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5.7.5 Selection threshold: 
She had a high level of selection threshold towards satisfying uncertainty 
motive especially towards exploring objects. Moreover, sub-goals were not 
sometimes considered. She was relatively making stereotype generalization about 
the function of operators and her responses were automatic and routine. For 
example, sieving operator was hardly used while shaking operator was frequently 
and routinely used with most objects. High selection thresholds of those who used 
stereotype strategy kept their stereotype performances always domain (e.g., they 
were not careful to define long-term planning, determining and setting goals, and a 
careful consideration of the consequences of actions, but they were rather 
actionism. Participants, who used stereotype strategy, would be less likely to 
change their stereotype strategy whatever the result of exploration process indicates 
that they were in a wrong direction.  
5.7.6 Action process: 
As her action rhythmus was slow and she did not encounter the robot to harmful 
locomotions unintentionally, the robot did not lose much energy. Therefore, her 
robot did not need food, water, or energy more than usual. So, that explained why 
her robot had few number of breakdowns. She had high level of arousal and a very 
low level of basic reinforcement strength and that was obviously observed as she 
had always forgot the connection between objects and their operators.  
Since her planning was unsuccessful and her concentration was useless because of 
the high level of arousal, she frequently showed frustration emotion during playing 
the game. That was because she acted from fear of failure instead of hope of 
success. Hence, her emotions were mixed between worry and fear which led to 
rigid planning that did not allow any detours of the planned course of action to 
appear; so planning was incoherence. This inability to manage distressing emotions 
(i.e., worry and fear) led to shallow planning especially under time pressure.  
She spent much time in a locomotion and that could explain why she had got few 
number of locomotions in the first session. Under stress, she adopted again the 
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same short-term strategy to avoid the problem and she seemed incapable of making 
a single positive step towards changing her action. Her stereotype action was 
dominant and unchangeable during the four playing sessions and that might be 
because she was not aware why she reacted the way she did (she simply had no self 
reflection). Moreover, she did not learn from feed-back or previous experiences. 
Therefore, her responses seemed reflexive or mechanical without thinking. Her 
responses were reflexive because she did not think deliberatively and so there was 
no continuous learning development process, but rather separate reflexive learning 
units. And because she also did not formulate hypotheses while she was planning, 
her actions seemed impulsive and hasty. After a short period of successful actions, 
her performance was relapsed and slipped and mistakes appeared again. 
Since participants, who used stereotype strategy, were not comfortable with new 
information (e.g., they did not want to update their information; did not open to 
seek out original view from a wide variety of sources; could not generate new ideas 
and take different perspectives; did not seize opportunities and risks in their 
thinking; i.e., set challenging goals and take calculated risks), their robot had 
breakdowns because they did not try to fulfill the robot’s needs or seek ways to 
satisfy these needs. 
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Table 5.8: Participant-xxxviii−estimated parameters for the experimental sessions. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have aimed to investigate different action 
strategies of subjects that they used during handling a complex task. 
We have approached our task mindful by an experiment. Therefore, we 
have firstly demonstrated the experiment and the experimental design 
and procedure (i.e., participants, materials, the island-game, apparatus, 
instructions, and dependent variables. Secondly, we have discussed the 
results of the experiment, which indicated that there were four 
strategies and many different tactics that had been applied by the 
participants while playing the island game. 
These strategies were the nucleotides-first-strategy, the survival-
strategy, the balance-between-motives-strategy, and the stereotype-
strategy.  We have described the action process of each strategy (i.e. 
uncertainty motive, incompetence motive, nucleotides motive, 
existential needs, resolution level and selection threshold) in 
perspective of the PSI-approach. Moreover, we have illustrated 
advantage and disadvantage of each strategy and the most important 
parameters to simulate these strategies. We have also explained most 
tactics that had been used during playing the game (e.g., formulating 
hypotheses about objects and operators before acting, clockwise 
direction tactic, complete-incomplete action-tactic, bipolar-direction- 
tactic, and randomly exploring objects and operators tactic).  
In next chapter, we will show how we simulate these strategies, in 
perspective of the PSI-theory and by PSI-agent, and the two single 
cases that had been discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, we will 
discuss the behaviour of the PSI-and and we will also evaluate this 
behaviour in corresponding to major agent criteria that have been 
shown in chapter three.  
Chapter       
Simulation, Results and Discussion 
 
 
 
Summary 
In this chapter, we are going to discuss how we simulated human action 
strategies by the PSI-agent. In section 6.1 we will distinguish between the four 
different action strategies which were used by the participant when playing the 
island game. In section 6.2 we are going to explain how we simulated these four 
different action strategies and the action strategies of two single cases. Correlations 
between the results of participants’ action processes and the results for different 
sets of parameters by PSI-agent will be explained in section 6.3. In Section 4.4 we 
will discuss these correlations and we will evaluate the behaviour of the PSI-agent 
with respect to the agent-criteria which were discussed in chapter three (see 3.4, p. 
90). Work in progress will be shown in section 6.5. Finally, we will conclude this 
work with a summary and an outlook towards future work.  
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6.1 Action Strategies: Categorization 
6.1.1 Introduction: 
In chapter five, we described four strategies which the participants used 
when they played the island game. In this section we are going to show the 
differences between these strategies and how many participants used these 
strategies. 
6.1.2 One situation but four different action strategies: 
In this section, we are going to distinguish between the four different 
strategies. Figure 6.1 illustrates an example of a state of the existential needs of the 
robot. As illustrated in figure 6.1, the thirst motive is an urgent motive and after a 
while the damage avoidance motive may also be urgent. Figure 6.2 (see below-left 
side) shows a screenshot of a location on the island. And we can see some goals 
for the motives in this location. A participant can manipulate these goals to satisfy 
the robot’s needs. We will explain how participants with different strategies 
respond to such a situation: 
1 
2 
4 3 
Figure 6.2:  
A screenshot of a location in the island 
(we see here some goals of the motives). 
N. Goal 
1 Damage avoidance motive. 
2 Thirst motive. 
3 Task motive (i.e. collecting the 
nucleotides). 
4 Damage avoidance motive. 
Table 6.1:  
Goals of the motives. 
Figure 6.1:  
An example of a state of the 
existential needs of the robot. 
  
Damage 
  
 
Thirst 
Hunger 
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The main goal of the participants who use the survival-strategy is to care 
for the robot and assure its security by satisfying its existential needs. 
Therefore, those participants look for goals for the existential needs of the 
robot. That is accompanied by high selection threshold. Nucleotides are 
ignored. A participant who uses the survival strategy acts in such 
situations as follows: 
Firstly, the participant activates the “sucker operator” in order to suck 
water (object-Nr. 2.) to satisfy the thirst motive, because this motive is an 
urgent motive in this situation. Secondly, the participant would choose a 
plant that is considered as a goal of the damage avoidance motive (object-
Nr.1 or Nr. 4) to feed the robot, although damage is not very high in this 
situation as shown in figure 6.1 (p.200). The participant uses over-feed 
tactic because he/she expects that the damage avoidance motive would 
increase. Thirdly, if the participant has a high level of the task motive (i.e. 
collecting the nucleotides), he would explore the tree (object-Nr.3) to 
look for nucleotides. If the participant has a low level of the task motive, 
he would quickly move from the current location to a new one. If one of 
the existential motives of the robot increases, he quickly moves from the 
current location to a new one to look for goals of the existential needs of 
the robot. 
Briefly, the participant would attempt to protect the robot as possible and 
he would have advantage to ignore the task motive. 
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The main goal of the participants who use the nucleotides-first-strategy is 
to collect as many nucleotides as possible. Collecting the nucleotides is 
the main goal. That is accompanied by high selection threshold in order 
to collect the nucleotides. Moreover, the existential needs of the robot are 
mostly ignored. A participant who uses the nucleotides-first-strategy acts 
in such situations as follows: 
Firstly, the participant would explore the tree (object-Nr.3) to look for 
nucleotides in order to satisfy this motive (i.e. the task motive). Secondly, 
if the participant finds a nucleotide, he would collect it. And if his task 
motive is satisfied, he would activate the “sucker operator” to suck water 
(object-Nr.2) in order to satisfy the thirst motive, because the thirst 
motive is an urgent motive. If the participant does not find a nucleotide, 
his task motive (i.e. collecting the nucleotides) would be still high. 
Therefore, the participant would quickly move to new location to look for 
other nucleotides. Although the thirst motive is an urgent motive in this 
situation as shown in figure 6.1 (p. 200) and the damage avoidance 
motive would increase after a while; however, the participant would leave 
the location to look for other nucleotides.  
Briefly, the participant would attempt to collect as many nucleotides as 
possible and would ignore the existential needs of the robot. 
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Participants who use the stereotype-strategy have actually no main goal; 
all goals of the different motives are considered. That is accompanied by 
a low selection threshold as well as a low level of basic reinforcement 
strength. A participant who uses the stereotype-strategy acts in such 
situations as follows: 
Firstly, the participant would explore a plant (object-Nr.1 or Nr. 4) which 
is considered as a goal of the damage avoidance motive, although the 
damage motive is not the most urgent motive in this situation. The 
participant explores the island not with the intention to feed the robot, but 
to satisfy the uncertainty motive. However, the participant would not 
store the results of the exploration in his memory; consequently, he would 
repeat the same operation in future. That is because the participant has a 
low level of basic reinforcement strength. Secondly, the participant would 
attempt to activate the “sucker operator”. However, because of a lack of 
competence he would not use it and then he would zoom away from the 
object (i.e., object-Nr. 2.). Under all conditions (success or failure), the 
participant would attempt to explore the other plant (object- Nr.1 or Nr.4) 
randomly. Finally, the participant would leave the location to another one 
without determining exactly an explicit goal for the next exploration. In 
other words, the participant began to explore goals randomly with very 
low level of basic reinforcement strength and then moved to a new 
location without knowing exactly what he/she should look for.  
Briefly, the participant would ignore both tasks (i.e., the robot’s needs 
and the task motive). 
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Participants who use the balance-between-motives-strategy give equal 
weights to the task motive (i.e. collecting the nucleotides) and the robot’s 
needs. That is accompanied by a moderate (medium) level of the 
selection threshold and a high level of the basic reinforcement strength. A 
participant who uses the balance-between-motives-strategy acts in such 
situations as follows: 
Firstly, the participant would quickly activate the “sucker operator” to 
suck water (object-Nr.2.) in order to protect the robot from a breakdown. 
Secondly, the participant would zoom in to the tree (object-Nr.3) to look 
for nucleotides in order to satisfy the task motive. Thirdly, the participant 
would choose a plant (object-Nr.1 or Nr. 4) that is considered as a goal of 
the damage avoidance motive in order to feed the robot, although the 
damage is not very high in this situation but the thirst motive as shown in 
figure 6.1 (p.201). The participant would do that to ensure the robot’s 
safety, when he/she moves to new location. Finally, the participant would 
quickly move to new location in order to look for nucleotides. 
Briefly, the participant would attempt to protect the robot as possible and 
at the same time to collect nucleotides. 
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6.1.3    Discussion 
As discussed in chapter five, the results of the experiment show that there are no 
differences between the results of the participants of group-A and the results of 
the participants of group-B with respect to the eight dependent variables and 
that because the participants had played the game using different strategies. 
Therefore, we can assume that in this case the type of environment, whether poor 
or rich, plays no important role. Most important is the way (the strategy) the 
available resources are managed by the actors.  As shown in figures 6.5 and 6.6 (p. 
207), there is no difference between the mean of nucleotides for the participants of 
group-(A) (i.e., M = 81.95) and the mean of nucleotides for the participants of 
group-(B) (i.e., M =84.85).  
The mean of breakdowns for the participants of group-(B) (i.e. M= 8.2) was higher 
than the mean of breakdowns for the participants of group-(A) (i.e. M= 4.45) as 
shown in figures 6.5 and 6.6 (p. 207). The reason for this result is that the 
participants of group-B played the non-renewable resources version of the game, 
while the participants of group-A played the renewable resources version of the 
island-game.   
In figures 6.7 and 6.8 (p. 208), we see the results of the subjects with the four 
different strategies with respect to the eight dependent variables for the whole 
sample (n=40). Participants who used the nucleotides-first-strategy had the highest 
number of successful manipulations, because they had a high motive to collect as 
many nucleotides as possible. Moreover, Participants who used the nucleotides-
first-strategy concentrated on just those objects which included nucleotides and 
ignored the existential needs; consequently, they had also the highest number of 
locomotions and the highest number of breakdowns. 
                                                 

 The participants of group-A played the renewable resources version of the     
    island-game. For further details see chapter five — 5.1.7, p. 153. 

 the participants of group-B played the non-renewable resources version of the   
      game. For further details see chapter five — 5.1.7, p. 153. 

 The eight dependent variables were defined in chapter five (5.1.8, p. 154). 
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Participants who used the stereotype-strategy had the lowest number of successful 
manipulations, because they had the lowest basic reinforcement strength. 
Therefore, they quickly forgot what they had learned. Consequently, they had the 
lowest number of collected nucleotides. Moreover, participants who used the 
stereotype-strategy had a high number of unsuccessful manipulations, a high 
number of unsuccessful locomotions and a high number of breakdowns.  
As shown in table 6.2 (p. 205), most of the participants used the balance-between-
motive-strategy or the nucleotides-first-strategy when playing the island game.  
Since the task motive (i.e. collecting the nucleotides) was the main motive of 
participants who used the nucleotides-first-strategy and the task motive was also 
one of the main motives of participants who used the balance-between-motive-
strategy, it can be assumed that the common factor between these two strategies 
was the task motive (i.e. collecting the nucleotides). When we look for the 
background of the task motive, we could assume that the task motive is based on 
achievement motivation. I assume that the participants’ motives were affected by 
their cultural values. And since social values (from the author’s point of view) 
refer to the criteria which determine forms of the actions and provide an important 
filter for selecting input, especially motives orders. I assume that the actions of the 
participants in this game were affected by “the feeling of responsibility towards 
work” as a social value in the German culture. This result indicates that most of the 
participants had a high level of the task motive (i.e. collecting the nucleotides), 
because they were affected by “the feeling of responsibility towards work” as a 
social value in the German culture. 
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Strategies Nucleotides first Balance Survival Stereotype Sum 
Group-A 6 8 4 2 20 
Group-B 8 8 1 3 20 
Sample 14 16 5 5 40 
Table 6.2: The four strategies and the number of subjects who used these strategies. 
 Nucleotides first Balance Survival Stereotype 
Group “A” “B” “A” “B” “A” “B” “A” “B” 
NSL 318.33 291.5 251.88 253.5 230 252 246 267 
NUL 365.33 388.88 325.25 342 340 265 433.5 329 
NLOC 71.33 77.13 64.38 64.13 53.5 56 66 44.33 
NEX 6.17 10.25 3.13 7.25 2.75 3 8 7 
NAGG 331.67 282.5 284.63 248.75 269 315 252.5 277.67 
NSM 348.17 389.33 334.13 279.13 294 283 222.5 210.33 
NUM 194.17 317.5 276.33 256.13 356.25 449 374 325.67 
NNUK 100 110.63 83.13 76.88 67.25 75 52.5 40.67 
Table 6.3: Means of the dependent variables for each group and for each strategy. 
 Nucleotides first Balance Survival Stereotype 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
NSL 303 77.3 252.69 62.51 234.4 20.6 258.6 79.93 
NUL 378.79 105.59 333.63 98.26 325 62.07 370.8 139.5 
NLOC 74.64 14.48 64.25 10.93 54 4.95 53 12.79 
NEX 8.5 3.23 5.19 3.06 2.8 0.83 7.4 3.36 
NAGG 303.57 49.24 266.69 32.56 278.2 33.17 267.6 75.57 
NSM 371.71 110.49 306.63 45.99 291.8 11.52 215.2 53.14 
NUM 264.64 234.91 266.25 115.27 374.8 80.48 345 218.65 
NNUK 106.07 20.04 80 12.99 68.8 6.14 45.4 15.4 
Table 6.4: Means and standard deviations for the whole sample (n=40).   
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Figure 6.3: Profiles of the four different strategies−group-A (n=20). 
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Figure 6.4: Profiles of the four different strategies−group-B (n=20). 
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Figure 6.6: A comparison between the four different strategies “group-B” (n=20). 
Figure 6.5: A comparison between the four different strategies “group-A” (n=20). 
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Figure 6.8: A comparison between the four different strategies−the whole sample (n=40). 
 
Figure 6.7: Profiles of the four different strategies−the whole sample (n=40). 
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6.2 Simulating Different Action Strategies and Two Single Cases 
6.2.1 Introduction: 
In this section, we are going to explain how we simulated the different 
human action strategies by the PSI-agent. We simulated the different participants’ 
strategies by varying the PSI-parameters. Figure 6.10 (see below) shows a 
screenshot with the PSI-parameters. As shown in figure 6.9 (see below), the PSI-
agent is the same robot without the control of a human subject, but with the PSI-
theory implementation serving as the robot’s “soul”. The PSI-agent reacts to its 
environment by forming memories, expectations, immediate evaluations, and 
possesses a number of fixed but individually different parameters which influence 
their behaviour and perception. These parameters of modulation determine the way 
of “operating” an intention. The PSI-agent operated with different parameters to 
simulate the respective strategies which the participants of group-A (15 females 
and 5 males − participants’ age range was between 18 and 30 “M= 23.05, 
SD=4.22”) used when playing the island game. The simulation time was varied, 
because we discovered that the participants had different playing-speeds when 
playing the island-game. While the participants with a fast playing-speed were 
given a long simulation time, those with a slower playing-speed were given a 
shorter simulation time.  
 Figure 6.9: A screenshot with the PSI-Program                   Figure 6.10: 
                    (PSI plays island game).                    A screenshot with the PSI-parameters. 
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6.2.2 Simulating the nucleotides-first-strategy: 
To investigate the ability of the PSI-model to simulate the strategies of 
single persons, the PSI-agent operated with the set of parameters (A) as shown in 
table 6.5 (p. 213) to simulate the participants (n=6) who used the nucleotides-
first-strategy when playing the game. Because their main motive was the task 
motive (i.e., collection the nucleotides), a high value was given to the weight of the 
task motive in this set of parameters. The set of parameters (A) was operated with 
a simulation time of 1.500.000 cycles. Twenty different profiles were produced by 
the PSI-agent for these parameters. Table 6.7 (p. 213) shows the results of the set 
of parameters (A) and figure 6.11 (p. 214) shows the mean of results of the twenty 
different profiles which were produced by the PSI-agent for the set of parameters 
(A) and the mean of the participants’ results for those who used the nucleotides-
first-strategy.  
As mentioned in section 6.2.1(p.209), the participants had different playing-speeds 
when playing the island-game. Therefore, the PSI-agent operated with the set of 
parameters (B) as shown in table 6.6 (p. 213) with a simulation time of 1.600.000 
cycles to simulate the different playing-speeds for those who used the nucleotides-
first-strategy. Twenty different profiles were produced by the PSI-agent for these 
parameters. Additionally, the values of increment and decrement of hunger and 
thirst motives got lower values in the set of parameters (B) than in the set of 
parameters (A). The reason for this modification was to simulate the slight 
differences between the participants’ personalities, although they used the same 
strategy (i.e., the nucleotides-first-strategy). Table 6.8 (p. 213) shows the results 
for the set of parameters (B) and figure 6.12 (p. 214) shows the mean of results of 
the twenty different profiles which were produced by the PSI-agent for the set of 
parameters (B) and the mean of the participants’ results for those who used the 
nucleotides-first-strategy.  
                                                 

 Six participants from group-A used the nucleotides-first-strategy as shown in table 6.2,    
   p. 205.  
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6.2.3 Simulating the survival-strategy: 
To investigate the ability of the PSI-model to simulate another different 
strategy, the PSI-agent operated with the set of parameters (C) as shown in table 
6.9 (p. 215) to simulate the participants (n=4) who used the survival-strategy 
when playing the game. Because their main motive was to protect the robot from 
breakdown by looking for the objects which could satisfy the existential needs of 
the robot, high values were given to the weights of the existential needs. 
Additionally, the weights of the existential needs were higher than the weight of 
the task motive. The set of parameters (C) as shown in table 6.9 (p. 215) was 
operated with a simulation time of 2.000.000 cycles. Twenty different profiles 
were produced by the PSI-agent for these parameters. Table 6.10 (p. 215) shows 
the results for the set of parameters (C). Figure 6.13 (p. 215) shows the mean of 
the twenty different profiles which were produced by the PSI-agent for the set of 
parameters (C) and the mean of the participants’ results for those who used the 
survival-strategy.  
6.2.4 Simulating the balance-between-motives-strategy (single 
case one): 
To investigate the ability of the PSI-model to simulate single cases, we 
simulated the participant-xxviii’s strategy as an example of those who used the 
balance-between-motives-strategy when playing the island game. The PSI-agent 
operated with the set of parameters (X) as shown in table 6.11 (p. 216) to simulate 
the participant-xxviii’s strategy. Because the participant-xxviii considered the 
robot’s needs and the task motive (i.e., collecting the nucleotides), the weight of 
selection threshold in this set of parameters got a moderate value. The set of 
parameters was operated once with a simulation time of 1.500.000 cycles. One 
profile was produced by the PSI-agent for this set of parameters to simulate the 
participant’s strategy. Figure 6.14 (p. 216) shows results for this set of parameters 
and the results of the participant’s strategy in the game. 
                                                 

 Four participants from group-A used the survival-strategy as shown in table 6.2, p. 205. 
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6.2.5 Simulating the stereotype-strategy (single case two): 
To investigate the ability of the PSI-model to simulate another different 
single case, PSI-agent operated with the set of parameters (Y) as shown in table 
6.12 (p. 217) to simulate participant-xxxviii’s strategy as an example of those who 
used the stereotype-strategy when playing the island game. Additionally, since the 
participant-xxxviii played the non-renewable resources version of the island game, 
we simulated the participant’s strategy to investigate also the ability of the PSI-
model to simulate single cases in different environments. Because participant-
xxxviii had a high level of uncertainty, the weight of uncertainty motive got the 
highest value. The weight of the resolution level and the weight of the selection 
threshold got very low values in this set of parameters. The reason for this 
parameter setting was that the participant-xxxviii quickly changed her goals (e.g., 
the existential goals and the task goals “nucleotides”) and she did not notice the 
differences between goals. The set of parameters was operated once with a 
simulation time of 500.000 cycles. One profile was produced by the PSI-agent for 
this set of parameters to simulate the participant’s strategy. Figure 6.15 (p. 217) 
shows results for this set of parameters and the results of the participant’s strategy 
in the game. 
6.2.6 Simulating different action strategies of different personalities: 
We used twenty different sets of parameters – parameters-D – as shown in 
table 6.13 (p. 218) to simulate twenty different human action strategies of the 
participants of group-(A). The participants of group-(A) used four different 
strategies (see table 6.2, p. 203). Therefore, different motives priorities, different 
selection thresholds, different resolution levels…..etc. were given to simulate the 
twenty different action strategies of the participants. Table 6.14 (p. 218) shows 
results for the sets of parameters (D) and figure 6.16 (p. 219) illustrates these 
results.  
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 Hunger Thirst Nucleotides 
Damage 
avoidance Uncertainty Incompetence 
Weight 1 1 1 0.3 0.1 0.001 
Increment 0.009 0.009 1 0.4 0.1 0.001 
Decrement 1 1 0 1 0.5 1 
 Affiliation Arousal 
Resolution 
level 
Selection 
threshold 
  
Weight 1 0.1 0.0 1 Forgetting 0.0 
Increment 0.005 0 0 0 Protocol factor 1000 
Decrement 1 0.1 0.5 1 
Basic reinforcement  
strength 0.001 
Table 6.5: Simulating the nucleotides-first-strategy — the set of parameters (A).   
 Hunger Thirst Nucleotides 
Damage 
avoidance Uncertainty Incompetence 
Weight 1 1 1 0.3 0.1 0.001 
Increment 0.001 0.001 1 0.4 0.1 0.001 
Decrement 1 1 0 1 0.5 1 
 Affiliation Arousal 
Resolution 
level 
Selection 
threshold 
  
Weight 1 0.1 0.0 1 Forgetting 0.0 
Increment 0.005 0 0 0 Protocol factor 1000 
Decrement 1 0.1 0.5 1 
Basic reinforcement  
strength 0.001 
Table 6.6: Simulating the nucleotides-first-strategy — the set of parameters (B). 
 NSL NUL NLOC NEX NAGG NSM NUM NNUK 
Mean 317,4 312,25 72,15 12,65 245,8 248,45 210,85 97,45 
SD 25,2 35,12 13,71 0,49 11,24 22,98 24,01 14,38 
Table 6.7: Results for the set of parameters (A).  
 NSL NUL NLOC NEX NAGG NSM NUM NNUK 
Mean 380,75 343,7 76,7 5,2 252,25 245,3 222,65 98,9 
SD 35,15 43,16 12,61 0,62 14,39 19,25 31,58 10,87 
Table 6.8: Results for the set of parameters (B). 
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Figure 6.11: 
Mean of the results for the set of parameters (A) and the mean of the 
participants’ results of those who used the nucleotides-first-strategy (n=6). 
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Nucleotides first-strategy (group-A) 318.33 365.33 71.33 6.17 331.67 348.17 194.17 100
PSI-parameter-(A) 317.4 312.25 72.15 12.65 245.8 248.45 210.85 97.45
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Figure 6.12:  
Mean of the results for the set of parameters (B) and the mean of the 
participants’ results of those who used the nucleotides-first-strategy (n=6). 
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 Hunger Thirst Nucleotides 
Damage 
avoidance Uncertainty Incompetence 
Weight 1 1 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.001 
Increment 0.001 0.001 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.001 
Decrement 1 1 0 1 0.5 1 
 Affiliation Arousal 
Resolution 
level 
Selection 
threshold 
  
Weight 1 0.1 0.0 1 Forgetting 0.0 
Increment 0.005 0 0 0 Protocol  factor 1000 
Decrement 1 0.1 0.5 1 
Basic reinforcement  
Strength 0.001 
Table 6.9: 
Simulating the survival-strategy — the set of parameters (C). 
 NSL NUL NLOC NEX NAGG NSM NUM NNUK 
Mean 602,85 482,75 74 4,85 325 249,95 290,65 63,8 
SD 92,71 89,05 18,37 0,88 41,13 37,89 48,25 12,28 
Table 6.10: 
Results for the set of parameters (C). 
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1100
Survival-strategy (group-A) 230 340 53.5 2.75 269 294 356.25 67.25
PSI-parameter-(C) 602.85 482.75 74 4.85 325 249.95 290.65 63.8
NSL NUL NLOC NEX NAGG NSM NUM NNUk
Figure 6.13: Mean of the results for the set of parameters (C) and the mean  
of the participants’ results of those who used the survival-strategy (n=4). 
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 Hunger Thirst Nucleotide 
Damage 
avoidance Uncertainty Incompetence 
Weight 1 1 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.5 
Increment 0.0005 0.0005 0.3 1 0.01 0.01 
Decrement 1 1 0.1 1 0.01 0.03 
 Affiliation Arousal 
Resolution 
level 
Selection 
threshold 
  
Weight 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.5 Forgetting 0.0 
Increment 0.000005 0 0 0 Protocol factor 1000 
Decrement 1 1 1 1 
Basic reinforcement   
strength 0.001 
Table 6.11: 
 The set of parameters (X) that was used to simulate the participant-xxviii’s strategy. 
Participant-xxviii was considered as an example of those who used  
the balance-between-motives-strategy when playing the island-game. 
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900
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1100
Variables
Va
lu
e
s
S.XXVIII 355 398 56 6 287 285 125 64
PSI 385 416 82 4 249 260 183 104
NSL NUL NLOC NEX NAGG NSM NUM NNUK
 
Figure 6.14:  
Results of the participant-xxviii’s strategy and the results for the  
set of parameters (X) that was used to simulate the participant’s strategy. 
(An example of the balance-between-motives-strategy) 
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 Hunger Thirst Nucleotide 
Damage 
avoidance Uncertainty Incompetence 
Weight 1 1 0.7 0.1 0.5 0.5 
Increment 0.0005 0.0005 0.3 1 0.01 0.01 
Decrement 1 1 0.1 1 0.01 0.03 
 Affiliation Arousal 
Resolution 
level 
Selection 
threshold   
Weight 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.5 Forgetting 0.0 
Increment 0.000005 0 0 0 Protocol factor 1000 
Decrement 1 1 1 1 
Basic 
reinforcement   
strength 0.001 
Table 6.12:  
The set of parameters (Y) that was used to simulate the participant-xxxviii’s strategy. 
Participant-xxxviii was considered as an example of those who  
used the stereotype-strategy when playing the island-game. 
 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
1000
1100
Variables
Va
lu
es
S.XXXVIII 148 136 37 3 387 155 674 23
PSI 247 216 88 3 261 100 281 15
NSL NUL NLOC NEX NAGG NSM NUM NNUK
 
Figure 6.15:  
Results of the participant-xxxviii’s strategy and the results for the 
set of parameters (Y) that was used to simulate the participant’s strategy. 
(An example of the stereotype-strategy) 
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Table 6.13:  
The sets of parameters (D) consist of twenty different sets of parameters those were 
used to simulate the twenty different profiles of personality. 
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1 1 1 0.5 0.4 0.1 1 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 
2 1 1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.5 
3 1 1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.8 0.01 0.5 0.2 0.9 0.5 
4 1 1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.75 0.4 0.3 
5 1 1 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.02 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 
6 1 1 0.9 0.3 0.1 1 0.7 0.01 0.5 0.02 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7 
7 1 1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.9 
8 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.01 0.3 0.01 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 
9 1 1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.01 0.4 0.01 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.3 
10 1 1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.7 0.07 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 
11 1 1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.8 0.01 0.5 0.8 0.7 0.3 
12 1 1 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.33 1 0.01 1 0.01 1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
13 1 1 1 0.1 0.1 0.33 0.5 1 1 0.01 0.5 0.9 0.1 0.1 
14 0.5 0.5 1 0.1 0.1 0.33 0.5 1 0.4 0.01 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 
15 1 1 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.33 1 0.001 1 0.001 1 0.75 0.9 0.2 
16 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 1 0.5 0.02 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.5 
17 1 1 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.33 1 0.001 1 0.0001 1 0.75 0.9 0.8 
18 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.7 0.07 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.5 
19 1 1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 1 0.01 0.8 0.01 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.3 
20 1 1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.5 
Increment Hunger (0.0005), decrement Hunger (1), Increment Thirst (0.0005), decrement Thirst (1), 
Forgetting (0), Protocol-Factor (1000), Basic Reinforcement Strength (0,001), Increment Affiliation 
(0,000005), Decrement Affiliation (1). 
 NSL NUL NLOC NEX NAGG NSM NUM NNUK 
Mean 327 297,45 70,25 2,85 257,7 213,35 240,65 81,15 
SD 100,11 101,55 15,78 0,99 28,34 37,53 45,26 21,74 
Table 6.14:  
Results for the sets of parameters (D) those were used to simulate 
the twenty different profiles of personality. 
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Figure 6.17:  
Mean of the twenty different profiles of personality (the participants of group-A) 
and the mean of results for the set of parameters (A). 
 
Figure 6.16: 
Mean of the twenty different profiles of personality (the participants of group-A) 
and the mean of results for the twenty different sets of parameters (D). 
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Figure 6.19: 
  Mean of the twenty different profiles of personality (the participants of group-A) 
and the mean of results for the set of parameters (C). 
 
Figure 6.18:  
 Mean of the twenty different profiles of personality (the participants of group-A) 
and the mean of results for the set of parameters (B). 
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Correlations between the data 
of participants  with the data 
of PSI-parameter- 
Canonical 
Correlation 
A 0.92 
B 0.91 
C 0.89 
D 0.88 
Table 6.15: Results of correlations 
between the results of the participants of 
group-A with the PSI-program 
executions of the four      parameters (A, 
B, C and D). 
6.3 Correlations between participants’ strategies 
and the results of the PSI-parameters 
6.3.1 Introduction: 
In this study we assume that the PSI-agent (and of course the theory behind 
the agent) had similar motives, emotions and cognitive processes as the human 
participants. The “personality” of a PSI-subject is the profile of parameters of the 
emotional regulations; such parameters are for instance, the gradient of the 
increase of arousal (dependent on the increase of a need) or the gradient of the 
decrease of competence when inefficiency is noticed (see: Dörner & Starker, 
2004). Therefore, we set the already mentioned sets of parameters in a way that 
could simulate and produce similar strategies which the participants used in the 
experiment. That means we gave the PSI-agent different "personalities".  
6.3.2 Results of the correlations:   
The results of the participants of group-A with respect to the eight 
dependent variables were correlated with the results of the PSI-agent operating 
with the sets of parameters A, B, C and D. Table 6.15 shows correlations between 
the participants’ results with the results for the sets of parameters A,B,C and D.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 

 The eight dependent variables were defined in chapter five (5.1.8, p. 154).  
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6.4 General Discussion 
In figures 6.11, 6.12 (p. 214) and 6.13 (p. 215), we see that the PSI-model 
produces strategies which are similar to those of the participants when playing the 
island-game. Figures 6.11and 6.12 (p. 214) show that the PSI-agent operating with 
the set of parameters (A) and the PSI-agent operating with the set of parameters 
(B) simulated the strategies of those who used the nucleotides-first-strategy (n=6). 
Figure 6.13 (p. 215) shows that the PSI-agent operating with the set of parameters 
(C) simulated the strategies of those who used the survival-strategy (n=4).  
Two single cases were also simulated by the PSI-agent operating with the 
sets of parameters X and Y. The sets of parameters X and Y were adjusted in a 
way that could simulate the strategies of the two participants. We simulated each 
single case by one set of parameters as shown in table 6.11 (p. 216) and table 6.12 
(p. 217). Figure 6.14 (p. 216) and figure 6.15 (p. 217) show the results of these 
simulations. The simulations of the two single cases indicated that the PSI-model 
is able to simulate different single case strategies. Additionally, the PSI-agent 
followed the similar order of motives which the two single cases used.  
As shown in table 6.15 (p. 221), we correlated the results of the participants 
of group-A (n=20) with the results for the sets of parameters-A, B, C and D. The 
results of correlations (i.e., 0.92, 0.91, 0.89 and 0.88) indicate that there are highly 
significant correlations between the results of the PSI-agent operating with the sets 
of parameters A, B, C and D, and the results of the human strategies. As 
demonstrated in table 1.1 (chapter one, p.20), we argued that the PSI-agent can 
simulate most of the different action strategies which can be found with man and it 
is possible to generate patterns of emotional behaviour similar to the patterns of 
human behaviour by varying the PSI-parameters. As shown in table 6.15 (p. 221), 
the correlation (i.e. 0.88) between twenty different human strategies and the results 
for the twenty different sets of parameters which simulated these strategies is 
significant. This high correlation indicates that the PSI-model can simulate 
different action strategies which can be found with different personalities. Figure 
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6.16 (p. 219) illustrate these results (i.e., the mean of the twenty different profiles 
of personality (participants of group-A) and mean of the results for twenty 
different sets of parameters (D). The results are consistent with our hypotheses and 
our predictions that the PSI-model can simulate single cases and different 
strategies and personalities. On the applied perspective, the PSI-theory can help to 
predict the behaviour of participants in uncertain environments which contain 
different goals. The PSI-theory provides a way to analyse such action strategies 
and to simulate these strategies by the PSI-agent.  
The results of the current experiment and simulation are consistent with the results 
of experiments from Dörner and his co-workers which checked the relation of the 
PSI-model to human behaviour (see: Detje & Künzel, 2003; Dörner, 1999; Dörner, 
2000; Dörner, 2001; Dörner et al. ,2002; Dörner, & Hille, 1995; Dörner, & 
Schaub, 1998; Hille, 1998, Elkady, 2005; Hoyer, 2003; Künzel, 2004)). Different 
forms of complex, dynamic, maze-like environments were used, where human 
participants had to play a kind of adventure game. In general, the results of these 
experiments show that it is possible to predict human behaviour by the PSI-theory 
to a satisfactory degree (Dörner & Starker, 2004). Bartl & Dörner (1998) found 
that the behaviour of the PSI-model and human behaviour in the BioLab-game 
were remarkably parallel. Hoyer (2003) found that under pressure a participant 
panics and switches rapidly between different strategies, and that can be 
interpreted as an expression of a rapid decline in competence when confronted 
with complexity and uncertainty. Additionally, the behaviour of the PSI-model 
indicates that the integration of cognitive, emotional, and motivational processes of 
PSI-theory is sound and can be used to explain human behaviour in complex 
systems.  
As mentioned in chapter three, the capabilities of an architecture refer to what the 
architecture as a system is able to do. The main objective in this chapter was to 
exactly determine what has to be measured and which criteria might be taken into 
                                                 

 For further details about the evaluation criteria of an agent see chapter three (3.4, p. 90). 
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account to evaluate and highlight the strong and weak aspects of the behaviour of 
the PSI-agent. We will evaluate the PSI-agent in corresponding to the major agent 
criteria as follows:  
In general, a system is said to learn if it is capable of acquiring new knowledge 
from its environment. Learning may also enable the ability to perform new tasks 
without having to be redesigned or reprogrammed, especially when accompanied 
by generalization. The PSI-agent is supplemented with appropriate mechanisms 
which enable the system to learn and to explore the environment. One of these 
mechanisms is the “uncertainty motive”. Therefore, the PSI-model is able to 
acquire knowledge especially when the PSI-model discovers a difference between 
internal expectations and external observation and when the PSI-model is 
operating in an uncertain environment. In addition, the PSI-agent, by such 
activities as; observing; thinking; and trial and error behaviour which produce 
certainty, learns the rules governing a certain domain of reality and learns the 
outcomes of its own actions. This will increase the number of certainty-signals and 
thus the “tank of certainty” will be refilled. And so the need for certainty 
disappears. The PSI-agent was programmed to perceive objects and places, 
generate plans, and execute action sequences by modifying existing nodes and/or 
by creating autonomously new nodes to remember a novel experience. Moreover, 
because the PSI-model stores events in its memory for future retrieval, the PSI-
model could provide the means for self-modification of behaviour in future when 
the agent is challenged by un-familiar situation. In addition, the PSI-model can be 
refined by detecting and recovering from failures, specifically when a discrepancy 
appears between what was projected to occur and what actually occurred during 
action.  PSI-agent shows the following forms of deliberative behaviour: 
 Exploring the reality in order to add new information in memory (i.e., in case 
of a lack of certainty). 
 Storing this knowledge for future retrieval when is needed (e.g., under a 
pressure of an urgent motive). 
 Avoiding failures as possible and that is a result of learning from feedback. 
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 Connecting gaols with their motives successfully. 
 Deciding which goals are needed in case of exposed to new location. 
 Eliciting proper operators from memory in order to handle objects (or goals). 
 Deciding autonomously which and when a motive should be satisfied.    
Furthermore, the PSI-agent implements stimulus-response rules (i.e. object-
operator actions) to explore unknown objects. These rules are always consulted 
when the agent must choose an action to perform (especially when uncertainty 
motive is high and the objects or stimuli in the current situation are new or 
unknown). If an operator applies to an object, the successful operator is stored with 
its object in the PSI-memory and in this way the PSI-memory will increase. In the 
PSI-agent, learning is not constrained to occur monotonically; rather to occur non-
monotonically. When any new knowledge is gained through learning, the PSI-
model is adding knowledge to the knowledge base which existed previously. 
Therefore, as the PSI’ experiences increase, the sets of experiences and neural 
nodes are strengthened and the next classification of a similar experience will then 
be more certain and rapid. Since world knowledge is not explicit, knowledge in the 
PSI-model can be added by the agent itself because of the existence of uncertainty 
motive. 
The PSI-agent uses analogy-tactic which is acquired from solving a previous 
problem in a domain. The analogy-tactic means here a comparison between two 
different things (e.g., objects or situations) which are alike in some respects in 
order to highlight some form of similarity (e.g., the two objects perform a similar 
function by a similar mechanism). Points of comparison may include parts of a 
whole or common attributes (e.g., trees). This tactic is evoked when the PSI-agent 
comes to a place where a new motive's satisfaction is similar to a previously 
satisfied one. The analogy-tactic then directs the PSI-agent in the direction that 
leads to the previous solution (i.e., satisfaction). That is because the PSI-agent 
develops a set of similarity between features of objects and then applies the 
solution (e.g., appropriate operators) from the known problem to the new problem.  
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In robotic agents, an agent is given instructions and information by a programmer 
about the environment, domain knowledge, or how to accomplish a particular task.  
Or a programmer simply gives the agent the knowledge in a sequential series of 
instructions. Such non-autonomous features of learning do not exist in the PSI-
model. When the PSI-robot begins to manage the task, it works autonomously and 
does not need the guidance of the PSI’s programmer. 
With respect to generalization capability, in the PSI-model when a connection 
between stimulus and response (i.e., an object and its operator) is created, it is 
available for immediate application. What is learned, the PSI-agent transfers it 
over different instances of the same problem and this transfer is a direct result of 
the ability of generalization. Also, the PSI-agent is able to transfer and apply 
knowledge that was acquired to another domain in the same environment.  
With respect to the taskability of an agent which refers to the ability of an agent to 
perform different tasks without having to be reprogrammed (see: Laird, 1991, 
p.12; Langley& Laird, 2002, p.19), the PSI-model has been used in a wide variety 
of task domains involving planning and problem solving such as island 2D game 
(versions I, II, and III) and island 3D (version I). The long-term goal of the PSI-
model is to be as general as the human information-processing system which 
focuses on sensory-motive-motor tasks. The PSI-model can be applied to a variety 
of robot control problems for the purpose of exploring, analyzing and handling 
uncertain environments by using its independently planning mechanism and 
motivations. In addition, the PSI-model is most appropriate for uncertain 
environments where actions have uncertain outcomes, and simulation-time 
environments which involve multi-goals and different tasks. Based on the nature of 
the PSI-model, maintaining coherence in the light of multiple and simultaneous 
goals would seem to be an important issue in the PSI-model, since all interactive 
processes run parallel and the PSI-model applies perceptual filter (i.e. resolution 
level). And because a domain may require an agent to perform many different 
types of tasks simultaneously in order to survive, the PSI-model supports multiple, 
simultaneous goals.  
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As explained by Dörner (1997, p. 18), the PSI-model can manipulate different 
and multiple tasks. For example, in such environment (i.e. the world of PSI) there 
are different types of events in which the PSI-model should learn it (ibid). For 
example: 
1. There are positive events, which indicate the possibility to satisfy one’s needs. 
Such events are wells and petrol-stations. 
2. There are negative events which may cause damages and pains to the robot. In 
the world of the PSI, roads in a bad state or rock-falls are such events. 
3. There are helpful events. For instance, a thoroughfare, which opens suddenly, 
is shortening the distance to a certain goal 
4. There are hindering events. For instance, barred roads, which make detours 
necessary. 
5. Additionally there are indicators for all these events (i.e., signals), which 
indicate that a petrol station is closed.  
In the beginning of the simulation, the PSI-model did not know anything about its 
environment and had to learn its characteristics. After a while, the PSI-model 
learned which roads should be avoided, which thoroughfares are open at which 
daytime. Additionally, the PSI-model learned the positions of the petrol stations 
and the wells and learned when these stations are open. The PSI-model learned 
also when the wells provide water and when not and the PSI-model learned which 
signs in the environment indicate blocked roads.   
With respect to the reactivity of an agent (the ability of a system to respond to 
changes in an unpredictable environment), the PSI-agent has features of a reactive 
agent such as; perceiving its environment, interacting with it, and responding to 
changes which can occur on it. Moreover, the PSI-agent has memory to store what 
the robot has learned, to perform advanced control and to set expectations. 
Furthermore, the PSI-agent can exploit opportunities or avoid dangers as they 
arise. Also, the sensors of the PSI-agent are connected to perception unit and the 
                                                 

 For further details about Dörner’s research see section 4.4.2, p. 136. 
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PSI’s memory. As new goals are learned, the PSI-robot is able to respond quickly 
to new circumstances or changes in the environment. The PSI-memory allows the 
robot to react to the changing situations in an uncertain environment effectively. 
When a sensor detects a change, it relays this information to PSI’s memory to see 
if the input is appropriate for the current goal and the sub-goals. So, if the input is 
within the current goals, decision is taken immediately. If the input is not within 
the current goals, may be no action will be taken and the PSI-robot leaves the 
locomotion and searches the needed goals in a different place. This modulation of 
perception with respect to the current goals gives the PSI-model saliency in 
domains which require perception and coordinated action.  
With respect to the efficiency and scaling of an agent, scaling in the PSI involves 
either the addition of new robotic capabilities or the application of existing 
capabilities in more complex ways. Therefore, additional robotic capabilities will 
be fully utilized and without further extension of the PSI-architecture.  
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6.5 Work in Progress 
Introduction: 
To investigate the best resolution levels which one should take into account 
when one tries to simulate human behaviour by the PSI-model. We have 
investigated the resolution level by operating one set of the PSI-parameters with 
different resolution levels systemically. Table 6.16 (see below) shows the PSI-
parameter which was used to investigate the resolution level. Table 6.17 (see 
below) shows values of resolution levels which were investigated systemically. 
Figure 6.20 (p. 230) shows results of investigating different resolution levels. 
Table 6.18 (p. 230) shows suggested resolution levels and their results.  
We excluded results which did fit in the results range of the participants with 
respect to the eight dependent variables (the eight dependent variables were 
defined in chapter five — 5.1.8, p. 154). Therefore, from our point of view, table 
6.18 (p. 230) illustrated the best resolution levels which one should take into 
account when one tries to simulate human behaviour by the PSI-model.  
 Hunger Thirst Nucleotide 
Damage 
avoidance Certainty Competence 
Weight 1 1 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.001 
Increment 0.00009 0.00009 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.1 
Decrement 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 
 Affiliation Arousal Res. Level S. Threshold   
Weight 1 0.1 0.0 0.1 Forgetting 0.0 
Increment 0.00005 0 0 0 P. Factor 1000 
Decrement 1 0.1 0.5 0.1 B. R.   Strength 0.001 
Table 6.16:  
The set of parameters that was used to investigate the resolution level. 
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0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
        0.4         0.4         0.4      0.4        0.4      0.4      0.4         0.4       0.4         0.4     0.4 
        0.5         0.5         0.5      0.5        0.5      0.5      0.5         0.5       0.5         0.5     0.5 
        0.6         0.6         0.6      0.6        0.6      0.6      0.6         0.6       0.6         0.6     0.6 
        0.7         0.7         0.7      0.7        0.7      0.7      0.7         0.7       0.7         0.7     0.7 
        0.8         0.8         0.8      0.8        0.8      0.8      0.8         0.8       0.8         0.8     0.8 
        0.9         0.9         0.9      0.9        0.9      0.9      0.9         0.9       0.9         0.9     0.9 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
     Table 6.17:  
Values of the resolution levels that were investigated systemically. 
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Figure 6.20:  
Results of investigating different resolution levels. 
R. Level NSL NUL NLOC NEX NAGG NSM NUM NNUK 
0.0 0 0.5 370 316 63 1 192 211 182 103 
0.1 0 0.7 261 261 78 1 281 183 298 88 
0.1 0 1 155 179 73 0 222 175 228 91 
0.2 0 0.8 240 216 58 1 215 167 231 90 
0.3 0 0.6 312 327 84 2 272 204 303 101 
0.4 0 0.8 235 258 81 2 263 209 248 113 
0.5 0 0.6 308 309 51 1 254 192 295 85 
0.5 0 0.7 258 260 84 1 302 220 313 110 
0.5 0 0.8 240 216 58 1 215 167 231 90 
0.5 0 1 256 250 85 2 252 173 273 90 
0.6 0 1 222 212 84 1 235 167 202 86 
0.7 0 0.9 178 162 60 1 221 161 239 85 
0.7 0 1 172 181 48 1 215 160 255 72 
0.9 0 0.9 221 212 86 1 237 185 262 105 
0.9 0 1 187 201 57 1 225 178 285 93 
1 0 0.9 214 245 62 1 252 180 291 90 
1 0 1 212 192 80 0 218 162 222 84 
Table 6.18:  
Suggested resolution levels and their results. 
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Summary and Outlook 
This dissertation has mainly attempted to investigate the ability of the PSI-model 
to simulate the interaction between emotions, motivations and cognition to explain 
different human action strategies and the action processes of single persons.  
As shown in table 1.1 (see chapter one, p. 20), we suggested questions and 
hypotheses to investigate the ability of the PSI-model to simulate different human 
action strategies and the action processes of single cases. In the following section, 
I will discuss these questions and hypotheses with respect to the results of the 
dissertation:  
 What is the state of the PSI-agent’s behaviour in corresponding to agent 
criteria? 
In respective of the agent criteria (the agent criteria were described in chapter three 
— 3.4, p. 90), we have investigated the behaviour of the PSI-agent and we have 
found that:  
The PSI-agent is able to acquire knowledge from its environment independently. 
The PSI-agent can perceive objects, generate plans, and execute action sequences. 
The PSI-agent initially operates reflexively and then operates deliberatively. 
In the PSI-model, learning is not constrained to occur monotonically; rather to 
occur non-monotonically. Based on the nature of the PSI-model, maintaining 
coherence, taskability, rationality, socialability and adaptation seem to be 
important issues in the PSI-model, since all interactive processes of the PSI-model 
run parallel. The PSI-agent is an autonomous agent which can operate on its own 
without the need for human guidance. 
 Can PSI-agent simulate all the different action strategies that can be 
found with man? 
As shown in this dissertation, the PSI-model can simulate the different strategies 
(e.g., the nucleotides-first-strategy, the balance-between-motives-strategy, the 
stereotype-strategy, and the survival-strategy) which had been used by the 
participants of the experiment when playing the island game. Correlations (i.e., 
0.92, 0.91, 0.89 and 0.88) between the results of the twenty participants and the 
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twenty different PSI-parameters which simulated the different participants’ 
strategies were significant. Moreover, the PSI-agent seemed to exhibit the same 
motives, emotions and tactics as the human subjects. 
 It is possible to simulate the behaviour of individual human beings by the 
PSI-agent. 
Two action processes of two different personalities were investigated through the 
concepts of the PSI-theory to determine exactly which strategies had been used by 
these two different personalities and why they used these strategies when playing 
the island game. The analysis of these two different personalities indicated that one 
of them used the balance-between-motives-strategy because the participant had a 
moderate level of the selection threshold, while the other one had used the 
stereotype-strategy because this participant had a low level of the selection 
threshold, a low level of the resolution level and a low level of the basic 
reinforcement strength. Subsequently, we set the PSI-parameters to simulate these 
two strategies which had been used by these two different personalities. Results of 
the simulation showed that the PSI-agent could produce the same strategies which 
the two different participants had used when playing the island game. Moreover, 
qualitative analysis of the two single cases indicated that the PSI-model can also 
simulate single cases strategies. Additionally, the PSI-agent followed the same 
participants’ motives, emotions, selection thresholds and resolution levels which 
the participants had used when playing the game. The results of the simulation 
were consistent with our hypotheses and our predictions that the PSI-model can 
simulate different human action strategies.  
 How can we improve the PSI-agent respectively to the theory behind the 
agent? 
Introduction: 
Based on the observation and the qualitative analysis of the experiment, the 
following arguments are suggested to enhance the PSI-theory: 
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1. In the PSI-model, the competence-motive is dependent on the number of 
successes and failures and on the weights for the increment or decrement 
effects of successes or failures. If competence’s weight has a high value, a 
high increase in competence will result, even with moderate success. If 
competence’s weight has a low value, competence will not increase 
considerably even with great successes (see: Dörner, 2001). I observed that the 
increment and the decrement values on one’s competence are not only affected 
by a success or a failure, but also they are affected by a state of a current 
urgent motive. When the pressure of an urgent motive is low, the increased 
competence after satisfying this motive is low too. And when the pressure of 
an urgent motive is high, the increased competence after satisfying this motive 
is high too.  An urgent motive can be one or more of the existential motives, 
the affiliation motive, and the task motive (i.e. collecting the nucleotides). The 
increment and the decrement values on one’s competence after an action 
follow different orders depending on a current urgent motive state as shown 
below in table 6.19 .  
2. High levels of both uncertainty and incompetence motives reduce one’s 
selection threshold. Therefore, it is easy for other motives to replace the 
current motive. 
 
Participants A B C D 
State of an urgent motive (e.g., the 
existential motives, the affiliation 
motive, and the task motive (i.e. 
collecting the nucleotides).) 
20% 40% 70% 90% 
Increased competence after satisfaction Low Medium High high 
Table 6.19: Shows how the increase of one’s competence after satisfaction 
depends on the state of the current urgent motive. 
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3. I observed that under the following circumstances the participants had satisfied 
affiliation motive:  
I. After frequent successes: “success” here means that a participant is able to 
accomplish both tasks (i.e., collecting nucleotides and protecting the robot from 
breakdowns). Here, looking for affiliation goals after frequent success is 
activated by both high competence level and high certainty level. The reason for 
this is that one needs an appreciation signal for well done task after frequent 
successes. 
II. After frequent failures: “failure” here means that a participant is not able to 
accomplish the task (i.e., collecting nucleotides or protecting the robot from 
breakdown) or a participant is not able to understand operators or objects or the 
geographical structure of the island. Here, looking for affiliation goals after 
frequent failures is activated by both low competence level and low certainty 
level. The reason for this is that one needs competence signals and support after 
frequent failures to work further. 
When a participant’s competence is low and accompanied by low certainty, the 
affiliation motive is increased and/or activated. And when a participant’s 
competence is high and accompanied by high certainty, the affiliation motive is 
also increased and/or activated. Figures 6.21, 6.22 and 6.23 (p. 234) illustrate how 
affiliation motive is activated under these circumstances.   
Additionally, at the beginning, when a participant has a high level of uncertainty; 
consequently, he has explored the surroundings and of course his competence was 
high after successful exploration process. In this case, affiliation motive was not 
activated, because the participant had considered that − increase of certainty and 
competence − as a minimum essential level of success to do both tasks well later.  
In future work, the author will try to investigate the following question: 
Why does a motive seem to be activated under special circumstances? (i.e., by 
other motives and at a certain time). The author’s hypothesis is that: “When two or 
more motives coincide at a certain time, another – third– motive is activated.” 
This work would be needed to improve the PSI-model of human action regulation.  
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The instructions of the island-game were presented by using the Power Point 
program. The original Power Point version that consisted of 62 slides was created 
and edited in English language by Ayman Elkady and translated to German 
language by Roman Seidl. In the following, a short version of this power point-24 
slide- will be shown.  
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Willkommen beim 
Institut für Theoretische
Psychologie
 Manchmal müssen Menschen in komplizierten
und gefährlichen Situationen handeln
 Dabei kann man reale Situationen von 
Phantasiesituationen unterscheiden
 Reale Situationen haben einen realen Ort und 
eine reale Zeit und sind logisch aufgebaut
Zum Beispiel:
Der Weltraum…
… oder die Natur
Phantasie-Situationen
Sie sind vielleicht nach einer anderen Logik 
aufgebaut.
Sie sind auch nicht an einen realen Raum oder eine 
bestimmte Zeit gebunden und es können andere 
Objekte als in der „wahren“ Realität möglich sein.
Die Geschichte mit der Insel
 Mit der Kernkraft ist das schon so ein Problem! Wohin mit dem 
strahlenden Abfall? Und was geschieht bei einem Kernkraftunfall? - Auf 
der anderen Seite: Kernkraft belastet die Umwelt nicht mit Verbrennungs-
produkten und hat auch sonst noch einige Vorteile. Wenn nur die Strah-
lung nicht wäre!
 Nun hat man neuerdings Nukleotide entdeckt. Diese kann man in 
Kernkraftwerken in den Reaktoren als Heizelemente benutzen, aber sie 
lösen sich während des Betriebes vollkommen in Wasser auf. Es gibt also 
keine schädlichen Nebenprodukte. Auch ein Kernkraftunfall ist mit den 
Nukleotiden ausgeschlossen; sobald sie mit normaler Luft in Berührung 
kommen, werden sie zu Wasser. Während des Kernzerfalls werden auch 
keine schädlichen Gammastrahlungen frei, nur eben Hitze. Die Nukleotide 
sind also wahrhaft ideale Brennelemente. Es gibt sie leider nicht sehr 
häufig in der Natur; man hat sie aber auch noch nicht herstellen können.
Wenn Sie dies gelesen haben klicken 
Sie mit der linken Maustaste...
1 2 
3 4 
5 6 
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Die Geschichte mit der Insel
 Eine Lagerstätte für Nukleotide befindet sich auf einer kleinen Südseeinsel. Ihre 
Aufgabe ist es, auf dieser ansonsten unbekannten Insel, mit Hilfe des Roboters 
James Nukleotide aufzuspüren und zu sammeln. Der Roboter ist nötig, da man 
sich wegen der starken vulkanischen Aktivität auf der Insel nicht selbst dort 
aufhalten kann. Immer wieder gibt es in bestimmten Gegenden Steinschlag und 
Schwefeldämpfe, die auch James zu schaffen machen, andererseits die 
Nukleotide an die Oberfläche schleudern.
 Außerdem sollte die Insel so gut wie möglich erkundet werden, denn außer der 
Vulkanaktivität hat man keine genauen Kenntnisse über deren Beschaffenheit.
 Sie befehligen den Roboter von einem geschützten Ort auf einem Schiff aus, 
das in sicherer Entfernung von der Insel vor Anker liegt. Sie haben Kontakt nur 
über einen Bildschirm, der Ihnen Bilder von der Insel liefert und den 
Kommandotasten, mit denen Sie die Richtung bestimmen, in die sich der 
Roboter bewegen soll, bzw. mit denen Sie die Aktionen steuern. 
Wenn Sie dies gelesen haben klicken 
Sie mit der linken Maustaste...
Ihr Auftrag
Ihr Auftrag ist also, auf einer Phantasie-Insel einen Roboter (mit dem Namen 
„James“), zu steuern und zu betreuen, der Durst, Hunger und Schaden erleiden 
kann. 
Die Ziele ihrer Mission sind folgende: 
1) Sammeln Sie so viele Nukleotide wie möglich 
2) Halten Sie die Funktionsfähigkeit von James aufrecht
=> Achten Sie also auf die Anzeigen für Hunger, Durst und Schaden.
Versäumen Sie es, auf James Acht zu geben, kann das zu seinem Zusammenbruch
führen. Es muss dann eine Reparatur versucht oder ein neuer Roboter zur 
Verfügung gestellt werden. Die kostet allerdings jeweils 5 der Nukleotide.
Wenn Sie dies gelesen haben klicken 
Sie mit der linken Maustaste...
Wir erklären nun Einzelheiten
Schritt für Schritt…
James
• Soll James sich über die Insel bewe-
gen, so können Sie über die Rich-
tungsbuttons bestimmen, in welcher 
Himmelsrichtung James den Ort ver-
lassen soll. Sie können James in eine 
von acht Richtungen bewegen, wenn 
hier ein einigermaßen befahrbarer 
Weg existiert. Nicht in jeder Situation 
können Sie sich überall hin bewegen, 
da mitunter dichtes Gestrüpp oder 
Felsgeröll die Vorwärtsbewegung in 
eine bestimmte Richtung unmöglich 
macht. Das werden Sie aber merken.
Wenn Sie dies gelesen haben klicken 
Sie mit der linken Maustaste...
James
• Auf Ihrem Monitor sehen Sie direkt in der Mitte eine Abbildung der Landschaft, wie sie sich James 
Kameraauge darbietet. Dabei handelt es sich oft um verschiedene Blickwinkel. Lassen Sie sich 
dadurch nicht verwirren. Auf dem kleinen Sichtfenster sehen Sie jeweils die Situation, in der sich 
James gerade befindet mit ihren verschiedenen Komponenten, wie Dünen, Höhlen, Pflanzen, 
Sträucher, Bäume usw. 
• Die Nukleotide sind kleine sechseckige bis runde Elemente, die Sie unschwer entdecken werden. Sie 
können sie dann jeweils einsammeln und mitnehmen. Manchmal aber sind die Nukleotide auch 
verborgen, und Sie müssen sie suchen. Dazu können Sie James umherfahren oder auch die in einer 
Situation vorfindbaren Objekte manipulieren lassen. Durch Mausklick können Sie einzelne Objekte 
(zum Beispiel einen Baum) auswählen, und James damit befehlen, sich diesem anzunähern. 
Anschließend können Sie James Operationen ausführen lassen. Dazu dienen die Werkzeuge an der 
rechten Leiste. James hat einen Greifarm, mit dem er Dinge aufnehmen kann. Dazu klicken Sie bitte 
den Greifarm von James mit der Maus an. Soll James anstelle des Greifens andere Operationen 
ausführen, so klicken Sie bitte die passenden Werkzeuge an. Unter dem Greifarm befindet sich 
beispielsweise ein Sieb, das bei Bedarf ausgefahren werden kann. Welche Operationen bei welchem 
Objekt sinnvoll sind und welche nicht, das werden Sie im Laufe des Versuchs selbst herausfinden. 
Wenn Sie dies gelesen haben klicken 
Sie mit der linken Maustaste...
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James
• Wenn James sich wieder von dem ausgewählten Objekt entfernen soll, klicken Sie einfach mit der 
Maus auf den Button "weg". James gelangt dann wieder zu seinem Standort, von dem aus er den 
ganzen Ort gut übersehen kann.
• Um Ihre Aufgabe, der Erkundung der Insel und Sammlung von Nukleotiden durchführen zu können, 
müssen dem Roboter regelmäßig bestimmte Stoffe zugeführt werden. James braucht nämlich Energie. 
James' Kraftzentrum ist eine Dampfmaschine; diese Dampfmaschine braucht Wasser und außerdem 
braucht der Brenner der Dampfmaschine Brennstoff. Die Dampfmaschine ist allerdings sinnigerweise 
so ausgestattet, dass sich James mit den Ressourcen, die er auf der Insel vorfindet, versorgen kann. Er 
kann also ölhaltige Pflanzenteile aufnehmen und "verdauen“. Der "Verdauungsprozess" besteht darin, 
dass das Öl ausgepresst wird und dann in einen Brennstoffbehälter für die Heizung der 
Dampfmaschine zur Verfügung steht. Außerdem kann James mit Hilfe einer Saugpumpe Wasser 
aufnehmen. Meerwasser allerdings ist ihm unzuträglich. Wo genau sich auf der Insel Wasserstellen 
befinden und wo es ölhaltige Pflanzen gibt, ist allerdings gänzlich unbekannt. Sie müssen das 
herausfinden, und Sie sollten dafür sorgen, dass James zum Zwecke der Erfüllung seiner 
Nukleotidensammelaufgabe immer über genügend Brennstoff und Wasser verfügt. 
• Ansonsten kann es passieren, dass er stehen bleibt und zugrunde geht. Sie müssen dann warten, bis 
James repariert oder ausgewechselt wurde. Dies gilt es zu verhindern, auch weil es fünf der von Ihnen 
aufgesammelten Nukleotide kostet.
Wenn Sie dies gelesen haben klicken 
Sie mit der linken Maustaste...
• Nebenstehende Abbildung zeigt die Zeit an, die der Roboter auf der Insel verbringt, 
sowie die Ausprägung der Bedürfnisse und die Anzahl der gesammelten Nukleotide. 
Ab einem bestimmten Schwellenwert machen sich die nicht befriedigten 
Bedürfnisse von James auch akustisch bemerkbar. Nun wird es höchste Zeit ihm 
Ressourcen zuzuführen. Der Durst kann etwa an Wasserlachen, die auf der Insel 
vorkommen, gestillt werden. Vielleicht gibt es aber noch andere Möglichkeiten. Das 
ist (noch) nicht bekannt. Auf der Insel wachsen verschiedene Pflanzen, die teilweise 
sehr gut den „Hunger“ von James stillen, zum anderen Teil aber auch schädlich 
sind! Genaues muss erst erforscht werden. 
• Durch das Herumfahren auf der Insel nutzt der Roboter seine Gelenke und 
Kugellager ab (auch abhängig von der Weggüte – eine Anzeige, die hier nicht 
eingeblendet ist). Es gibt eine Pflanze, die gleichsam wie Medizin wirkt und James‘
Gelenke etc. schmiert und heilt.
• Der Roboter verfügt darüber hinaus über einen Behälter, in dem er die 
verschiedensten Dinge mitführen kann. Sozusagen einen „Rucksack“. Um sich 
dessen Inhalt anzeigen zu lassen klicken Sie einfach direkt auf James. Die genaue 
Funktion herauszufinden ist Ihre Sache. Allerdings sei soviel gesagt: Wenn Sie 
etwas aus dem Rucksack herausnehmen, tun Sie es mit Bedacht. Denn einfach 
herausgenommene Dinge, ohne Operatoranwendung wirft der Roboter achtlos weg 
und findet sie nie mehr.
• Auf der Insel befindet neben den Vulkanen auch ein Gebirge. Dessen Felsen versperren mitunter den Weg, sind 
aber zu solide um gänzlich weggehämmert zu werden. Mit den Roboter können Sie versuchen, ob es eine andere 
Möglichkeit gibt, den Weg freizumachen. Eventuell versperrt ein solcher Brocken sogar einen Zugang zu 
besonders reichen Nukleotidenvorkommen. Seien Sie also erfinderisch und denken Sie an so etwas wie Dynamit, 
um Felsen wegzusprengen! 
Wenn Sie dies gelesen haben klicken Sie mit 
der linken Maustaste...
Hier sehen Sie James’ magische Hand mit der er die 
verschiedenen Operatoren steuern kann.
Wie man die Operatoren anwendet
1- Wenn Sie meinen, dass James durstig ist, 
klicken Sie auf das Objekt, um es näher
heranzuholen
2- Dann klicken Sie auf diesen Operator               , damit James seinen
Saugstutzen verwendet
3- James saugt nun das Wasser aus der Pfütze.
4- Es erfolgt ein Bestätigungston für erfolgreiche
Bedürfnisbefriedigung Wenn Sie dies gelesen haben klicken 
Sie mit der linken Maustaste...
Operatorenauswahl
 Bei der Funktion einiger
der Operatoren wollen
wir Ihnen helfen
 Die Restlichen
sollten Sie selbst
explorieren
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Wir werden Ihnen jetzt nicht alles 
zeigen, was James essen und trinken 
kann.
Sie werden es bald selbst 
herausfinden...
Hier sehen Sie verschiedene 
mögliche Situationen, 
in denen sich
Nukleotide   (             )  und 
andere Objekte verbergen
ier sehen ie verschiedene 
ögliche ituationen, 
in denen sich
ukleotide   (             )  und 
andere bjekte verbergen
Gedulden Sie sich noch eine Minute. 
Dann wird das Spiel beginnen.
